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1 Role of universities and their governance in Germany 
Why do we pay taxes? How are they spent for the advantage of society? What is happening 
behind the scenes?  
Those are the questions that are interrelating policies, control mechanisms and leadership, 
which makes them crucial in every public institution of today’s knowledge society. 
Universities and their financing as public institutions are grounded on beliefs about their 
advantage for society, which itself seeks for joint welfare. Disentangling how a nation, group 
or institution can create benefits by organizing transactions with a prudent mix of market and 
hierarchical mechanisms is a key challenge in setting up efficient conditions and fostering 
progress. A convincing and well-coordinated arrangement of institutions within a society 
might be the most powerful instrument to confront populistic ideals of isolation. 
Smith (1776) identified the cause for welfare in division of labor, specialization and self-
interest. Solow elaborated a growth theory based on technological progress and total factor 
productivity (Solow, 1956, 1957) explaining growth by the exogenously given technological 
and productivity advantages. Endogenous growth models further developed this perspective 
e.g. by Romer (1990) or Aghion and Williamson (1998), which try to understand 
technological progress as endogenous process. Universities as driver of technological progress 
are important in this context, however, they were considered an exogenous factor (Acs, 
Audretsch, & Lehmann, 2013; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Audretsch, Lehmann, & 
Warning, 2005; Lehmann & Menter, 2015). Dohmen, Enke, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2016) 
complemented patience as an explanatory factor for welfare recently. This is in line with 
investments in education and research, neither of which is immediately available on the 
individual or state level but worthwhile in the future. 
Combining these thoughts, the motivation to analyze universities is not only curiosity, but 
also to explain remaining residuals. Universities are not exogenously given but endogenous 
institutions, which are also subject to their environments and production processes (Audretsch 
& Lehmann, 2005; Lehmann, 2015). The way of organizing labor in a society, generating 
human capital and technological progress, decisions on public good investments and the 
preferences of human beings (e.g. patience, risk appetite, etc.) are the determinants of 
inequalities among nations. This is the foundation to open the black box of evaluating internal 
and external mechanisms in place at universities. 
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Universities are both different and similar to other known organizational forms. Nowadays, 
business organizations tend to live and die in the wake of exogenous market movements, 
fashion trends or management approaches. In contrast, the “business model” of universities is 
ancient and changes ponderously, the institutions became stable parts of society by providing 
human capital as well as societal or technical progress. Today, they are considered essential 
for society, not only reflecting a merit of civilization but also being a contributor to the 
residual of economic welfare. However, also universities were forced to adapt to 
contemporary challenges (see chapter 2 History of German universities). Out of a positive 
perspective, they survive because they are the most efficient way of fulfilling their purposes: 
teaching, research and – if considered – innovation as third mission. At the same time, they 
are institutions that are a human creation and thus, are subject to the same mode of actions as 
all societal and business organizations in terms of reacting to the needs of groups via 
motivation and coordination.  
Universities in Germany are funded predominantly publicly, using taxes collected from every 
citizen and redistributing it to a smaller group, intended to contribute to the benefit of all. It is 
rational to ask and evaluate how current policies are contributing to the university mission, 
which claims to benefit the society that pays for it, even though not every citizen comes into 
direct contact with it (for instance craftsmen with a different training route). However, 
research institutions as a more specialized organization than universities have benefited from 
a substantial increase in research funding recently (Himmelrath, 2018). Although governance 
and management mechanisms have been already a topic of discussion when German 
universities came into existence, they had different from today the risk to fail. This is the 
reason why they were broadly installed in favor of a collegial design that was subject to 
market forces and group coherence. Recent developments (strengthening of universities of 
applied sciences and research institutes) and societal demands call for an application of 
concepts that are successful in the business context: competition as well as a system of checks 
and balances, with autonomy and control. Thus, contests are introduced to increase university 
performance, university boards were installed that should control and give advice and the 
president got extensive power to manage. 
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Germany is stuck in the middle as are many Continental European countries. The system is a 
hybrid of the strongly market-oriented Anglo-American higher education system and the 
strongly hierarchy-oriented Asian higher education system, which are both leading in the 
world. In the European context, after the Lisbon agreement, the decision on how to spend the 
agreed additional money is important not only for the higher education landscape per se but 
also for reasons of rationalization in the court of public opinion of all European countries. By 
the changing of external and internal governance mechanisms, financial means are becoming 
more competitive. As a consequence, universities will need to develop and adopt new 
strategies to cope with those new structures and to maintain their operational level as in the 
past.  
Thus, to answer the following questions is vital for the beneficial advancement of universities 
and with this public welfare: What are the path dependencies of universities that shape our 
modern understanding? How can the performance of universities be influenced beneficially 
from an external governance and internal management perspective? In particular, how are 
policy and university structures affecting university performance? 
The underlying concepts of those questions are the interplay of management and governance, 
which are key elements of a Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance as a means to 
reduce under-investments in specific relations should display the interests of relevant 
stakeholders (Zingales, 2000). In particular, governance can be seen as the construction of a 
proper institutional framework, which is dependent on external measures like policy 
initiatives as well as the design of institutions and their power (may this be boards, 
management, etc.) in terms of incentives and control. Management is, on the one side the 
“technical” design of a position comprising a complex of tasks and on the other side 
dependent on the staffing of this position with a proper person that is able and motivated to 
fulfill those tasks. A Corporate Governance frame is the interaction of both that are ideally 
coordinated prudently (Popper, 1945) to ensure the desired conduct of the distinct purposes of 
universities: research and teaching by a set of selection, control and incentive mechanisms. 
This dissertation wants to answer the outlined questions by first tracing the roots and path 
dependencies of German universities in chapter two. The third chapter helps to understand 
determinants and theoretical underpinnings of governance and management, in general and in 
particular, in the German higher education system, comprising policy interventions, 
institutional mechanisms and individual leadership elements. In the fourth chapter, a 
sketching systematization of the German higher education system and the dataset is presented 
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to show the current state and result of the dynamics that were outlined historically and 
theoretically in chapters two and three. This is followed by three empirical research projects:  
First, the German Excellence Initiative – being a political governance instrument – gets 
evaluated. The analysis is tackling two questions: First, what was the impact of the Excellence 
Initiative on Excellence Universities as well as on the whole university system? Second, does 
a differentiation exist in terms of research quantity and research quality? The findings show 
that the Initiative was a role model in terms of research quantity – raising the quantitative 
output for the whole system and in particular for the winners – while it created a loosing 
winners effect in terms of research quality – raising the qualitative output for the system but 
decreasing it for the winners. 
Second, German university boards – being a control and power diffusion mechanism – are 
questioned in terms of whether and how they differ according to specific frameworks and 
competences. The testing of the difference hypotheses shows that the participation in deciding 
who is in the board as well as a president coming from outside or inside the university are 
related to the representation of societal, scientific or business members. 
Third, German university presidents – as personalities entering a management task – are 
researched. In particular, the research questions of (i) which personality traits influence to be 
perceived as leader (leadership emergence) and (ii) how leadership behavior contributes to be 
perceived as good leader (leadership effectiveness) are assessed. The results indicate that 
based on the Big 5 personality traits the only robust trait, which influences to be considered as 
a leader, is emotional stability. While considerable leadership behavior does not seem to 
influence leadership effectiveness, very low and very strong structure-giving behaviors are 
influencing it positively. 
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The dissertation will close with a conclusion summing up the different aspects that were 
addressed in terms of the institutional setting and personal dimensions as well as to outline 
some limitations. The results are of interest for all groups that have roots or interfaces with 
higher education – and even for those that do not have direct interrelations. Higher education 
managers and politicians can benefit from the knowledge on modes of actions and 
determinants of higher education in order to modify or to put into place efficient strategies 
and instruments. Members of the system like professors, scientific employees, and university 
staff can benefit from an understanding of causes, effects and factors that help to generate not 
only scientific advantages, but also overall economic advantages. Finally yet importantly, 
every taxpayer can get an insight into what his or her money is used for, and whether or not 
this investment leads to a satisfactory outcome. 
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2 History of German universities 
2.1 Introduction to the relevance of the history of universities (until 1919) 
“Allein nur, indem man dies [Wechselwirkung von Zeitalter, Nationalcharakter, 
Mannigfaltigkeit der Individuen und Abweichungen durch genievolle Individuen] schrittweise 
verfolgt und am Ende im Ganzen überschaut, gelangt man dahin, sich vollkommne 
Rechenschaft abzulegen, wie die Bildung des Menschen durch ein regelmässiges 
Fortschreiten Dauer gewinnt, ohne doch in die Einförmigkeit auszuarten […]“ 
“Only if one traces this [interdependency of era, national character, manifoldness of 
individuals and variations by genius individuals] stepwise and overlooks it in the end 
aggregated one gets to the point of utterly giving account how formation of human beings 
wins permanence by regular progress without degenerating to uniformity […]” 
(Von Humboldt, 1772, reprint 1960, p. 237, free translation) 
The demand for highly skilled workers and priests has always been existent in advanced 
civilizations – ancient Greece, imperial China or the Aztecs. Most cultures know centralized 
teaching institutions that were broadly sharing perceptions and research without a deep 
questioning that was independent of potentates. Extraordinary might be athenaeums and 
lyceums in ancient Greece similar to universities that had the right to challenge authorities 
(Perkin, 2007). The benefits of a loosely bundled school dependent on personalities and 
supporting the regent leading to the previously mentioned teaching institutions outweighed 
the costs of no more or less central school for students, teachers and regents.  
Yet, institutions like universities with a certain degree of autonomy as well as organized in a 
permanent corporate structure arose first in Europe with the founding of Bologna. The 
upcoming of universities is tightly interlocked with the power vacuum that many tried to fill, 
as well as with the medieval rivalries of fragmented territories and the investiture dispute 
(Perkin, 2007). Consequently, the benefits of one institution providing know-how, 
permanence and structure overbalanced the costs of loosely bundled, erratic schools. The 
evolution of universities as institutions that we know today was not due to coincidence but 
rather due to path dependencies that are shaped by the spirit and need of the respective time. 
The reason why it is important to understand not only the relations of our current university 
governance (analyzed in chapter 3 Determinants of Corporate Governance in higher 
education and 4 Governance and management in the German higher education system) but 
also the history and development of universities lies exactly in those path dependencies. 
Without knowing how structures evolved over time allowing the concept “university” to 
spread all over the world (considerably contributing to world-languages like Latin or English), 
it is not possible to interpret present decisions, effects and consequences. 
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Universities were not only founded to educate people or conduct research but also used – even 
if not always meant to be – as an instrument of governance. The motivation to found and 
maintain of universities had various facets, be it a student-initiated matter of education in 
language and law like for the oldest university in Bologna 1088 (University of Bologna, 
2018), a strategic matter like for Sorbonne supporting the Roman pope and opposing the 
antipope in 1268, a theological matter like in the oldest university of Germany Heidelberg 
1386 (Meusburger & Schuch, 2011, p. 42 ff.), or a pragmatic matter to reunite all sciences to 
support navigation like in Portugal under Prince Henry the Navigator in 1431 (Davies, 1964). 
The installation ensured and supported on the one hand the attraction of promising and 
qualified scholars, the development of the region by expanding administration and prestige for 
the regent. On the other hand, it was a typical group building phenomenon (like the guilds for 
craftsmen, the orders for knights or cooperatives for economic, social or cultural needs) in the 
Middle Age as an end in itself in terms of studying and developing ancient scripts 
(Burtscheidt, 2010, p. 39 f.). 
In this context, the German universities developed starting in the fourteenth century. The 
foundation of a university had to be officially approved by the Pope. The usual application 
was issued by a regent like the princes or bishops (e.g. Würzburg, 1402, Rostock, 1419) or 
more rarely initiated by city councils (e.g. Erfurt, 1379 – one of the biggest cities in medieval 
times offering a studium generale, Cologne 1288 – a strong bishop and the effects of the 
reversing French king’s decision to support the antipope at the closely located university of 
Sorbonne might have helped) that hoped for a positive economic development. The 
organization consisted of in the beginning four hierarchical faculties (theology, law, medicine 
and arts), a “primus inter pares” was elected to fulfill representative tasks while the 
council/senate was steering the university according to the collegial principle. In Germany, 
territorial sovereigns installed a chancellor to control the rector with regards to their financial 
contributions (Burtscheidt, 2010, p. 42 ff.). 
In the territory of the Holy Roman Empire that evolved from the late 12
th
 century struggles for 
power, resulting uncertainty and inconsistencies made it difficult to ensure permanence for 
research and teaching activities (and with this steady progress) that were likely to be liable to 
the respective current ruler (different houses of nobility or church). This supported the 
upcoming of institutions, which could grant stability and permanence independent and 
relatively autonomous from the actual power relations. That this uncertainty played a 
considerable role is retrievable from Table 1: University foundations and backgrounds in 
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Germany It is observable that especially the free and imperial cities
1
 did not (or very rarely) 
have the necessity of establishing a university as they were purely giving account to the not so 
randomly changing emperor. Except for Cologne and the until today special status cities 
Bremen and Hamburg, no other free or imperial city established a university. In addition, 
most of the university foundations in those cities were taking place after the breakdown of the 
Holy Roman Empire in 1803 (Principal Decree of the Imperial Deputation) and the following 
dissolution in 1806. The former free or imperial cities were taking advantage later – during 
the education expansion and as part of location policy. In general, universities were likely to 
be founded in times of crisis (like during and after the reformation, after the dissolution of the 
Holy Roman Empire or after World War I), need (industrialization or education expansion) or 
location policy (also in times of reformation, after World War II in the occupation zones or 
after the unification of the two Germanies). 
 
  
                                                 
1
 They were directly allocated to the emperor and had the same obligations and rights as nobility or church 
governed territories. 
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Table 1: University foundations and backgrounds in Germany (own research). 
City 
Period free or 
imperial city 
Foundation 
Closing, re-
foundation 
City 
Period free or imperial 
city 
Foundation 
Closing, re-
foundation 
Heidelberg  1386 
 
Frankfurt am Main 1356-1806, 1815-1866 1914  
Cologne 1288-1794/97 1388 1798, 1919 Hamburg 1510-1806, 1815 1919  
Erfurt  1388 1816, 1994 Weimar  1919  
Würzburg  1402 1430, 1582 Berlin TU  1946  
Leipzig  1409 
 
Hildesheim  1946  
Rostock  1419 
 
Lüneburg  1946  
Greifswald  1456 
 
Berlin FU  1948  
Trier  1473 1798, 1970 Saarbrücken  1948  
Tübingen  1477  Erlangen-Nuremberg 1219-1806 (Nuremberg) 1961 (Nuremberg)  
Mainz  1477 1823, 1946 Regensburg 1207/1230-1803 1962  
Frankfurt (Oder)  1506 1811, 1991 Lübeck 1226-1806 1964  
Marburg  1527  Bochum  1965  
Jena  1558  Düsseldorf  1965  
Giessen  1607  Konstanz 1192-1548 1966  
Kassel  1632 1652, 1971 Mannheim  1967  
Duisburg-Essen 1170-1290 1655 1818, 1972 Ulm 1184-1803 1967  
Kiel  1665  Dortmund TU 1236-1803 1968  
Halle-Wittenberg  1691  Bielefeld  1969  
Bamberg  1733 1803, 1979 Augsburg 1276-1805 1970  
Göttingen  1736  Bayreuth  1970  
Erlangen  1743  Kaiserslautern TU 1276-1313/57 1970  
Braunschweig TU  1745  Coblenz-Landau  1970  
Freiberg TU  1765  Bremen 1186/1646-1806, 1815 1971  
Münster  1773 1818, 1902 Paderborn  1972  
Berlin HU  1810  Siegen  1972  
Bonn  1818  Wuppertal  1972  
Hohenheim  1818  Oldenburg  1973  
Karlsruhe  1825  Osnabrück  1974  
Munich  1826 1848, 1848 Hamburg-Harburg TU  1978  
Dresden  1828  Passau  1978  
Hannover  1831  Chemnitz TU 1290-1308 1986  
Munich TU  1868  Magdeburg  1987  
Aachen TH 1166-1794/97 1870  Cottbus TU  1991  
Stuttgart  1876  Potsdam  1991  
Darmstadt TU  1877  Ilmenau TU  1992  
Freiburg  1889  Flensburg  1994  
Clausthal TU  1912  Vechta  2010  
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The financial situation of universities during the time of absolutism was marked by 
authoritative structures and donations by patrons, as closing of universities were no curiosity 
as one would consider it nowadays. However, at least officially autonomy from the ruler (who 
was usually also a financier) was important due to an otherwise negative effect on student 
attraction (Hüther, 2010, p. 44 ff.). One prominent example for royal despotism and claim for 
autonomy is the University of Munich: Ludwig I. first moved the university from Landshut to 
Munich and later reacted on the depreciation of his mistress by student fraternities with its 
closing, which he had to take back one day later due to protests (Haus der bayerischen 
Geschichte, 2018). Based on discoveries like the sea route to America, the solar system, or the 
world being spherical, the concept of science changed to a gaining of knowledge (rather than 
interpretation of existing knowledge). The mortality of universities (more than 50% of 
universities were closed between 1792 and 1818) was driven by a loss of prestige as many 
inventions and discoveries that brought human kind forth were made outside of universities. 
Universities were acclaimed to be as rigid as guild systems, reflecting a pseudo-punditry, 
nepotism and educating rude students sticking to outdated theories and knowledge (with the 
hint that nowadays critique is not so new after all, Burtscheidt, 2010, p. 43 ff.). With the 
upcoming of utilitarianism, secularization and in the light of the French revolution, Wilhelm 
von Humboldt
2
 shaped our modern understanding of purposeless science and following 
reformations of universities. He formulated as ideal principles of universities the freedom of 
science, academic self-governance and the unity of research and teaching (von Humboldt, 
1809).  
The re-calling of the newer university history is important in order to understand the 
relevance of universities and their governance nowadays. As universities have been an 
instrument of power and progress, the picture of universities that we see today has to be 
interpreted as a result of the influences of various regents and governments. In this context, 
the quality and performance of universities was a sensible case out of their very nature latest 
in the tradition of von Humboldt and as integral part of the industrialization.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 And his contemporaries Friedrich Schelling, Johann Fichte and Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
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The status of science in this time was demonstrated by the introduction of the Noble Prize as 
heritage of Alfred Nobel, a prosperous industrialist, who is up until today one of the most 
prestigious prizes for scientists and awarded in six categories (see Table 2: Number of 
German Nobel Prizes according to field.). As additionally illustrated in Figure 1: German 
Nobel Prize winners 1901-today. Germany had a considerable contribution to high-class 
research gaining three times nearly 30% of the 25 prizes in a 5-year period in the first half of 
the century.  
Figure 1: German Nobel Prize winners 1901-today 
Including all Nobel Prize Winners that were either born in (in this time) Germany (36), worked for a 
(in this time) German affiliation when winning the Nobel Prize (25) or both (41) summing up to 102 
Nobel Prizes from 1901 to January 2018. The total amount of prizes in a 5-year range sums up to 25 in 
the years 1901-1968, to 30 from 1969 due to the adding of the economic prize. Source: own 
illustration based on The Official Web Site of the Nobel Prize (2018). 
 
Table 2: Number of German Nobel Prizes according to field. 
Including all Nobel Prize Winners that worked for a (in this time) German affiliation when 
winning the Nobel Prize. 
Field 
Number of 
Nobel Prizes and 
Laureates 
 Peace  6 
 Chemistry 31 
 Literature 10 
 Physics 28 
 Physiology or Medicine 24 
 Economic Sciences (since 1969) 1 
7 
5 
3 
4 
5 
7 7 
5 
3 3 
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6 6 6 
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Driven by technical progress and nationalism, nearly all German higher education institutions, 
signed by various professors and docents, clearly demonstrated their unconditional support for 
the war in the advent of WW I. They indicated that the Prussian militarism was uniting the 
German army, nation and science, which were supporting war and fighting for cultural 
superiority in Europe (Erklärung der Hochschullehrer des Deutschen Reiches, 1914).  
Figure 2 shows a rough overview of the periods identified after WW I in German university 
history and some events of importance for this work. I begin highlighting in detail the periods 
starting in 1919 as this marks the turn from the German Empire with an unelected imperator 
to the democratic Weimar Republic. Citizens could now participate in politics and arrange the 
higher education system according to their ideals and needs, independent from an (more or 
less) unquestionable and powerful regent. The eight phases outlined in Figure 2 led to the 
system as we know it today, which is heading to being differentiated and at the same time 
resistant to change. The reforms came into effect and re-shaped the construction and 
understanding of universities affecting it externally by governance mechanisms like contests 
or internally by new management structures.  
The different phases will be structured by first introducing to the societal and political 
situation to understand events in a historical context, major reforms and developments within 
the higher education context will be outlined. The main content and the interplay of reforms 
and context will be summarized in a short recapitulation of each phase.  
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Figure 2: Overview on history of German universities. 
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2.2 Where did the Emperor go? Collegial self-governance (1919-1933) 
“[…] my picture of German universities is confused. It could not be otherwise: the 
universities and the nation at large are also confused.”  
(Abraham, 1968, first edition 1930, p.360)  
 
The timespan 1919-1933 is interesting due to the unique mix of lacking resources, freedom 
and a spirit of optimism with the introduced democracy leading to a golden age of science 
(see also Table 2: Number of German Nobel Prizes according to field.). Apart from the 
societal and political situation this phase will be outlined according to (i) the internal 
perception of academia, as the role and relation of academics to their outside was to be 
reflected and (ii) Post-war threats and reactions in the German higher education system 
comprising national and international pressures to German academia and respective solution 
strategies. 
Societal and political situation  
In the period from 1919 to 1933, Germany was affected economically and socially from the 
First World War’s consequences. Reparation payments that were set in the Treaty of 
Versailles had to be met in foreign currencies or material assets and were therefore not 
influenced by the incipient, soon galloping and finally hyperinflation. The societal, industrial 
and political crisis, e.g. manifested in the Ruhr-crisis, caused a distinct lowering of living 
standards and an aversion to the young democracy (Berman, 1997; Feldman, 1993, pp., p. 327 
ff., p. 327 ff.).  
The situation stabilized with the introduction of the Dawes-Plan in 1924 that was endorsed by 
the American government to support the recovery of the German economy. The plan was 
intending to enable Germany to pay the full amount of reparations by reducing payments and 
further connecting them to economic development (Ritschl, 2002, p. 11 ff.). The following 
Golden Twenties were characterized by a creative, liberal and progressive spirit as well as the 
artistic avant-garde movement (Kolb, 2004, p. 86 ff.). Aside rose the national socialist 
ideology that was advanced by the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and a worldwide economic 
crisis. The dependency on American financial resources particularly affected Germany. 
Scarce resources and deflation caused mass-unemployment and radicalization, which led to 
the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 (Ritschl, 2002, p. 13 f.). 
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Internal perception of academia 
Academia was influenced by pre-war experiences, when the German higher education system 
enjoyed a high reputation. This reputation was mainly based on the Humboldtian principles 
including the ideal of unity of research and teaching and the scientific freedom (Kehm, 2004). 
Wilhelm II e.g. glorified German universities by seeing them as evidence of an “empire of 
thought” and the German superiority (Abraham, 1968, p. 312). Universities enjoyed a 
relatively broad academic freedom that was perceived and used as a measure of participation 
for the bourgeoisie. At the same time, academic personalities were subject to ideology, values 
and hierarchies in place, e.g. patriotism or pursuit of truth, etc., and thus, limited by state 
censorship (Asche & Gerber, 2008; Hammerstein, 1999, p. 22). For the 23 after-war 
universities (30 including the technical universities; Abraham, 1968, p. 315) in the eight 
federal states
3
 applied the same frame: relative freedom based on the goodwill of the federal 
states – in particular the ministry of education – which were responsible for higher education 
policy and administration.  
In the course of democratization, the awareness of politicization and external interference 
rose. Despite sharp criticism, the first national socialist minister in Thuringia, Wilhelm Frick, 
imposed against the university’s will the appointment of a race researcher (Hans Günther) at 
the University of Jena. Though, assuming that professors were not political would be wrong 
as they positioned themselves to the Treaty of Versailles, cultural policy, democracy and so 
forth (Oberdörfer, 1994). As from the late 20’s wish for an exclusive academic freedom as 
fundamental right – rather than a facet of freedom of opinion – rose under the particular 
influence of Rudolf Smend (Krausnick, 2012, 7 ff.).  
Post-war threats and reactions in the German higher education system  
The de facto exclusion of German science from the international scientific stage by “The 
Interallied Conference of Scientific Academies” in 1918 was justified by the political 
positioning of the German scientific community during WW I. Although the “science 
embargo” could not fully unfold as intended, the scientific community was ostracized even 
longer than the political quarantine of Germany lasted (Hammerstein, 1999, p. 28 ff.). 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Reichsländer, after WW II Bundesländer or Länder. 
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German universities and their professors experienced both, international isolation, which 
enlarged the distance to other countries academically, as well as severe national funding cuts, 
which enlarged the distance practically. One of the stepwise attempts to burst the isolation and 
build bridges between academic Europe – especially France – and Germany was the opening 
of the municipal University of Cologne in 1919 initiated by Konrad Adenauer. The aim was a 
stronger positioning in the Rhine region and the approximation to the University of 
Strasbourg and its tradition (Meuthen, 1998). In this context, the powerful and newly 
introduced Kuratorium – one of the precursors of the German Hochschulräte (university 
boards) – was chaired by the mayor and included seven municipal representatives and three 
university representatives (Meuthen, 1998). 
Both issues – national funding cuts and isolation – were approached by the scientific 
community and the founding of several associations such as the “German Rectors’ 
Conference” (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz) in 1913, the “Federation of German Higher 
Education Institutions” (Verband der deutschen Hochschulen) in 1920, the “Emergency 
Association” (Notgemeinschaft) in 1920 or the “German Academic Exchange Service” 
(Deutscher Akademischer Auslandsdienst) in 1925 (Oberdörfer, 1994). The “Emergency 
Association” – later the “German Research Association” (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 
DFG) – should be mentioned in particular. Its aim was to solicit and promote resources and 
prevent a collapse of the German university system. During the 1920’s the budget of the 
Emergency Association reached 8 Million Reichsmark, which was more than the university 
budget of the largest Reichsland. Still, it was not fully recovering the prior funding cuts. The 
resources were allocated for libraries, travelling and research scholarships as well as 
experimental research. In general, funds were provided by the central state and federal states 
as well as occasionally by industrialists. The latter group was skeptical as they wanted to 
oversee their sponsorships and obtain a right to say. The discussion in society on the influence 
of industry on science, the disputed benefit of arts and social sciences and the use of basic – 
not targeted – research was intensified (Hammerstein, 1999, p. 52 ff.).  
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As from the mid 20’s the German academia came back to the international scientific 
community as Abraham (1968, p. 360) stated:  
“And though, amidst economic distress, political turmoil, and social upheaval, the universities 
have suffered, the intellectual quality of the faculties and the permanent officials in the 
ministries is so high, the prestige of the universities so great, and their contribution to the 
nation’s life so vital that, even if some problem can never be solved to the satisfaction of all, 
adjustments will be reached that will restore and perhaps even increase the efficiency of 
secondary and higher education.” 
Abraham’s compared American, English and German universities with sympathy for the 
German system. American universities were considered spoiled institutions with focus on the 
general average not on the extraordinary, English universities as authoritative institutions that 
show a combination of private and official agencies for public purposes and the German 
universities as working comparably well given the lack of financial resources (Abraham, 
1968, p. 305 f., p. 360).  
Recapitulation 
This phase was marked by a post-war confusion, academic decline and rise as well as self-
organization and the perception of political influence. Universities were organized by 
management of professors (Ordinarienuniversität) who were appointing a rector for one year 
and dealing with the business in committees of the faculties. The cultural autonomy as such 
rested with the states (Abraham, 1968, p. 317). Main challenges were the overcoming of the 
international isolation of German academia as well as handling funding cuts. Academia faced 
this situation by a self-governing approach including the founding of associations and 
attraction of funds from industry, which was accompanied by the recovery in the Golden 
Twenties. The transformation of the university system started with the seizure of power by the 
Nazis in 1933. 
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2.3 Ideological governance (1933-1945) 
“[…] und würde die Welt auf einige Jahrhunderte dem deutschen Professor überantwortet, so 
würden nach einer Million Jahren lauter Kretins bei uns herumwandeln. Riesenköpfe auf 
einem Nichts von Körper.“ 
 
„ […] and if the world was given to German professors for some centuries, nothing but 
Kretins would roam around in a million years. Huge heads on some nothingness of body.” 
(Adolf Hitler, 1942, cited after Hammerstein, 1999, p. 119, free translation) 
 
The time of collegial self-governance and reflection was followed by ideological governance 
of the national socialist regime from 1933-1945 that had little use for science and universities 
except for war preparation and conduct. The restructuring of the university system orientated 
as in all governmental areas on the Führerprinzip. Corresponding re-structuring and personal 
replacements as well as a re-interpretation of university interests are the visible parts of 
ideology in academia. 
Societal and political situation  
In 1933, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party came to power with the appointment 
of Adolf Hitler as Reichskanzler by Reichspräsident Hindenburg who hoped for an easing of 
his radical positions. Paradoxically, this moment was preceded by an easing of the main 
constraints of the after-war period and the Treaty of Versailles, e.g. the end of reparation 
payments in the course of the conference of Lausanne in 1932 or the permission of 
rearmament (Wirsching, 2001, p.54 f.). The hope of moderate political forces remained 
unfulfilled: In the course of the Reichstag fire in February 1933, Hitler announced the 
Reichstag Fire Decree (Reichstagsbrandverordnung) followed by the Enabling Act 
(Ermächtigungsgesetz) in March. This suspended fundamental rights and enabled Hitler to 
enact laws without the approval of the Reichstag (Wirsching, 2001, p. 58f.).  
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As from this point, the Nazis centralized and used their power to eliminate groups that were 
supposed to be “terrorists” like Jews, political opponents or non-compliant journalists. The 
regime was backed by the strengthening of the Sturmabteilung (SA) and the Schutzstaffel 
(SS) as well as by the installation of concentration camps. A broad part of society was willing 
to accept the trade-off between enforced stabilization and loss of freedom. The regime 
benefitted from elaborated plans that previous governments developed to reduce 
unemployment and enhance living standards by investments retrieved from economic 
recovery, e.g. in infrastructure, and leisure facilities like the Hitler Youth (Wirsching, 2001, p. 
66 ff.). The internal ideology of superiority combined with the international appeasement 
policy lead to World War II in 1939 with the attack on Poland and ended with the 
unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945 (Wirsching, 2001, p. 73 ff.). 
Führerprinzip in higher education 
With the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933, the German university system changed from 
the collegial and decentral self-governance to the centralizing Führer principle (Führerprinzip) 
(W. Weber, 2002, p. 176). Particularly Jewish students and professors were subject of 
reprisals and persecution. Fritz Haber can serve as an example, the vice-president of the 
Notgemeinschaft and Chemistry Nobel Prize winner, who vacated all his offices and 
emigrated in 1933 due to the pressure he was exposed to (Hammerstein, 1999, p. 93). 
Research changed according to the regime’s ideology and the German Research Association 
supported new research areas with projects on Germanity or race hygiene (Hammerstein, 
1999, p. 103, 107).  
However, a central overall national socialist science program was never issued. This might be 
because of the skepticism of Hitler to the bourgeoisie per se, the particular condemnation of 
academia or the ongoing conflicts between the competing central institutions that were newly 
responsible for universities. Nevertheless, he was aware of the usefulness of science in some 
points – e.g. propaganda, self-contained economy and war optimization (Hammerstein, 1999, 
p. 118 ff.). The combination of Hitler’s disinterest and tolerating science as necessary evil 
made academia believe that if one only submitted to the principles of the state – science and 
research will be more or less free due to its objective and apolitical nature (Hammerstein, 
1999, p. 143).  
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Ideology in Academia 
The law on release and relocation of professors to reconstruct the German higher education 
system
4
 from 1935 was not shaped particularly ideological but allowed to release or relocate 
professors easily with the justification of university interests. This resulted in a massive wave 
of redundancies and a corresponding academic brain drain. 18.6% of the German university 
teachers were affected by the law (with a high variance from 4% Tübingen – 36.5% Berlin, in 
total: 939 teachers; Grüttner and Kinas, 2007). They included emeriti, urged “voluntary” 
resignations and excluded voluntary resignations with a political background in the 23 
German universities. The higher resignation rate of – the quantitatively very low number of – 
women (38.3%, in total: 23 teachers) can be explained parallel to the restriction of admission 
to study for women by the Nazi politics (Grüttner & Kinas, 2007; Kehm, 2004). The 
replacement with often young and opportunistic academics loyal to the regime advanced the 
ideologization of the university system. The increase of national and industrial funds might 
have appeased criticism as financial measures did for most of the rest of society.  
In this context, the regime and industry pushed especially the medical, natural, technical and 
agricultural sciences as preparation and support for war (Hachtmann, 2010). The selection of 
war-relevant disciplines combined with ideological steering by ministries resulted also in the 
advancement and professionalization of young disciplines like psychology or business as well 
as in the use of e.g. history as source of propaganda (Ash, 1999, p. 48). 
In the course of economic recovery and preparation for war universities lost students and 
junior scientists that preferred a military career. Potential students and staff were restricted by 
gender or being non-Aryan or simply had good job prospects without an academic education 
(Hachtmann, 2010). The number of students reduced within five years from 121,000 in 1933 
to 56,000 in 1938 (Kehm, 2004). During WW II German academia was convinced to 
contribute to the victory of Germany, e.g. by the self-initiated “war deployment of social 
sciences
5”, the funding of armament research initiated by the Reich Research Council 
(Reichsforschungsrat) or interdisciplinary research supporting the general plan East 
(Generalplan Ost) supported by the DFG (Wagner, 2010). Student protests like the White 
Rose in Munich were seldom and operated in the underground (Lippman, 2000).  
 
                                                 
4
 Gesetz über die Entpflichtung und Versetzung von Hochschullehrern aus Anlaß des Neuaufbaus des deutschen 
Hochschulwesens. 
5
 Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaften. 
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Recapitulation 
Professors and students were a reflection of the German society itself. They were actively and 
passively making the Nazi regime possible. Their conduct might be characterized as 
collaborative alignment. Still, in this phase members of higher education subjugated to 
contemporary policy and norms while at the same time making use of them. The structural 
changes that already began in the Weimar Republic were continued, namely with the 
professionalization and differentiation of new research areas, the use of industry or (semi-) 
governmental institutions as financiers and place for research as well as the embedding or 
assimilation of research ambitions into the ambitions by the state (Ash, 1995b). The German 
university system can be profiled into three important aspects (Hachtmann, 2010; Ash, 
1995b): war orientation based on ideology (including personnel decisions and 
professionalization of research areas), polycratic fragmentation on the governance level as 
well as a tunneling of resources. To state what this meant: Research programs were mainly 
orientated on the national socialist ideology, unwanted personnel was systematically excluded 
affecting on average nearly one fifth of academic personnel and academic self-governance 
was effectively abolished or at least rendered harmless.  
 
2.4 Occupation and decentral reconstruction of the university system (1945-1956) 
„Es ist unmöglich, neue politische Katastrophen zu vermeiden, wenn die Akademiker ihre 
menschliche Pflicht im Volkskörper nicht zu erfüllen lernen […]. Gegen die zu weit gehende 
Unzufriedenheit mit der Hochschule ist zu sagen, dass die Hochschulen Träger einer alten und 
im Kern gesunden Tradition sind.“ 
 
“It is impossible to avoid new political catastrophes if academics do not learn to fulfill their 
human duty within the nation […]. With regards to the exaggerated discontent with the 
university it has to be noticed, that the universities are holding an old and in its core sound 
tradition.” 
(The Blue Report, 1948, free translation) 
 
After WW II the university system was – mostly due to the experience of the dictatorship and 
the fact of occupation – decentrally reconstructed partly under the guidance of the Allies in 
the time from 1945-1956. In particular, the Allied higher education policy aimed at 
reconstructing a proper standard of science without supporting too much strength with 
perspective to the future while War consequences on higher education institutions needed to 
be handled by institutions themselves. The Blue Report was issued by UK allied forces and 
consisted of points that continued to have an effect even after the reunification of Germany. 
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Societal and political situation  
After the unconditional surrender of Germany the results of six years of war became apparent: 
(a) 55 million dead, 11 million of them died in concentration camps, (b) 5.6 million refugees 
mainly from Eastern Europe alone in 1946 that summed up to 12 million in total, whereas the 
German population in 1946 counted roughly 39 million (for the three Western allied zones) 
(c) a halving of the housing space, (d) deficient supply with food and a quasi non-existent 
economy resulting in black markets (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 11 f.). The reprocessing of the 
Nazi regime started reserved. The understanding of a systematic mindset in society was 
widely refused by both Germans and allies (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 11 f.). 
The four allied forces – USA, Great Britain, France and UdSSR – divided Germany into four 
occupation zones. The consequences and socio-economic effects of two wars made the 
question of Germany and its ability to afford reparations highly controversial. The allies 
postponed the question to an eventual peace treaty, respectively they handled it as zone-
specific question (Wirsching, 2001, p. 87 ff.). The four central aspects of the occupation 
policy in the Western zones were: demilitarization, denazification, decentralization and 
democratization (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 18). Only 24 remaining persons were convicted to be 
major war criminals in the Nuremberg Trials in 1945/46 chaired by the allied forces. In 1949, 
the Bundesrepublik Deutschland was founded and lead by the first chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer. The denazification as such was officially closed in 1950 and Germany was 
released to (partial) sovereignty in 1955 including the accession to NATO.  
A crucial role for the economic development of Germany played The European Recovery 
Program, known as Marshall Plan. It was introduced by the USA in 1947 to support Western 
Europe with financial and material resources and moderate potential transnational tensions. A 
spirit of optimism, supported by the win of the soccer world championship, financial support 
and stability (London Agreement on German External Debts), further expansion of the world 
market, growing domestic demand and the social market economy were the basis for the 
German “Wirtschaftswunder” in the 50’s and 60’s (Wirsching, 2001, p. 99 ff.).  
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Allied higher education policy 
Before the founding of the federal republic of Germany, allied policy for higher education 
was of relatively minor relevance, even though the importance of “re-education” was noted. 
Two arrangements seem prominent: law number 25 and the Treaty of Königstein. Law 
number 25 by the Allied Control Council passed in 1946 and determined that fundamental as 
well as applied research with a military purpose was forbidden. However, the realization was 
handled comparatively flexible – likely because of the interests of the allied in German 
researchers (Ash, 1995a). The Treaty of Königstein from 1947 arranged the financing of 
institutes with national importance like the Max Planck Society (previously Kaiser Wilhelm 
Society) or the DFG. The Treaty was extended several times before it was replaced in 1975 in 
the course of the national education planning (Führ, 1998).  
The principle of Kulturhoheit was installed with the German constitution in 1949, which 
made the federal states responsible for education (Pasternack, 2011). The necessity of a 
certain degree of homogeneity in the three Western zones led to the installation of the 
Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the federal states 
(Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder) in 1948 (Lengwiler, 2010). 
Higher education policy in the 16 universities and 9 technical universities (West-Germany) 
was driven by the respective occupying force (Kehm, 2004). The strategy that most – 
remaining – scientists had can be characterized as two-sided: externally distancing from the 
Nazi regime and on the quiet trying to save former reputation and facilities. Mass dismissals 
at universities in the early after war years were soon withdrawn by practical considerations. 
Although, universities were part of the denazification process, more than one out of four 
practicing professors was a former NSDAP member in the late 40’s. Yet, they were mostly 
holding a denazification certificate that classified them as “follower”. This development was 
often explained by the supposed apolitical and universal nature of science, especially the 
technical sciences (Ash, 2010).  
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War consequences on higher education institutions 
While the question of monetary reparations was postponed, the so-called and until today 
barely investigated “intellectual reparations” caused a brain drain for the young Republic. 
Researchers were relocated to diminish their benefit to other forces, e.g. in the Operation 
Paperclip and the Operations T-Force, or they emigrated due to depressing prospects. This 
development was accompanied by removals of research facilities. The willing and unwilling 
emigration of young academics was triggered by strategic and political considerations, a lack 
of job possibilities as well as by more attractive conditions in the USA (Ash, 1995a, 2010). 
The teaching conditions were strongly affected by the destruction and chaos of post-war 
Germany. Teaching activities were revived restrictively already in winter 1945/46, although 
reconstruction of buildings was the primary focus (Ash, 1999, p. 60 f.). Student numbers soon 
reached 100,000 but university places were limited due to reduced physical place and the fear 
of academic poverty. Yet, veterans and handicapped persons got privileged access. The 
limitation lead to an under-supply of academic graduates in the following Wirtschaftswunder 
(C. George, 2010, p. 13).  
With the re-installation of a self-governing approach, the focus was on professors and their 
Chairs as well as on the re-foundation of self-governing institutions like the senates. They had 
extensive competencies to decide upon questions regarding the university management 
(Dobbins & Knill, 2015). Further, professors advocated for themselves in institutions like the 
West-German Rectors’ Conference (Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz) by the Rectors of the 
three Western zones (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz, 2016).  
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The Blue Report 
The report to the higher education reform from 1948 was an influential and frequently 
highlighted contribution to the reconstruction of the German university landscape – due to the 
cover also called the Blue Report. The British zone issued the report, which initiated e.g. the 
foundation of the West-German Rectors’ Conference (Ash, 2010). The aim was to model a 
university system suitable for democratized Germany. Although not all recommendations 
were implemented, the report serves up until today as discussion basis for higher education 
policy. The characterization of the university system was a balancing act as the quote in the 
beginning of this chapter shows: On the one hand, partial responsibility of academia for the 
Nazi regime was exposed; On the other hand, basic integrity of the system was attested 
(Phillips, 1995, appendix p. 3). In this context, the definition of the Humboldtian freedom of 
research and teaching was remarkably clarified: Research and teaching must be independent 
of any political steering. However, this freedom is limited by the responsibility and 
consideration for others (Phillips, 1995, appendix p. 12 f.). 
Further, they formulated recommendations to build a modern university system and prevent a 
repetition of the role universities played during the Nazi regime. The recommendations 
included: (1) integration of all social classes to university education including an opening for 
students with former apprenticeship, no tuition fees and if necessary a subsistence allowance, 
(2) an independent link between state and university in form of a strong university council 
consisting of members of society, (3) introduction of a studium generale to acquire general 
knowledge and critical sagacity, (4) enrichening of the education by including a focus on 
practice and a strengthening of social sciences especially at the technical universities to 
generate spillover effects, (5) freedom of international movement for students in order to 
allow a broadening of their horizon, (6) expansion of the teaching staff to recruit junior 
scientists and improve teaching ratios (Gutachten zur Hochschulreform, e.g. in Phillips (1995, 
appendix p.119 ff.)). Not much of it was implemented instantly, still, some pilots like the 
Kuratorium at the Free University of Berlin were installed (S. Lange, 2010). 
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Recapitulation 
The post-World War II era of higher education was characterized by shortages and a decentral 
reconstruction of structures and competences. While re-education was a core purpose to 
democratize Germany and prevent new political catastrophes, the elaboration and realization 
of reforms proceeded slowly. The main object was to return to a system orientated on the 
Weimar Republic, namely a professor-centered Ordinarienuniversität and federal 
responsibilities. This might have been the case due to practical considerations – central 
institutions were not available – as well as tactical considerations – prevention of new 
centralism. A discourse on good governance of universities arouse and was presented e.g. in 
the blue report. Accounting for the past in form of denazification was initially corresponding 
to mass dismissals whereas returns of “followers” to academia, in other zones or positions, 
occurred soon and frequent. This was mainly justified by the otherwise missing expertise (due 
to war victims and intellectual reparations) as well as with the “exculpation” of scientists and 
disciplines.  
 
2.5 Centralized initiatives and planning euphoria (1956-1969) 
“Der bisherige wirtschaftliche Aufschwung wird ein rasches Ende nehmen, wenn uns die 
qualifizierten Nachwuchskräfte fehlen […]. Es steht uns ein Bildungsnotstand bevor, den sich 
nur wenige vorstellen können.“ 
 
“The previous economic boom will come to an abrupt end, when we are lacking qualified 
junior employees […]. We will be facing an education crisis only few can imagine.” 
(Picht, 1965, p. 1, free translation)  
 
The following will to draw on the decentral reconstruction a central frame and planning was 
observable during 1956-1969. Centralized initiatives were brought forth which underline the 
general trend and Urge for progress that was felt to be needed. 
Societal and political situation  
The characterization and success of the Wirtschaftswunder includes several aspects: (a) 
international (financial) support, not proscription, (b) increasing domestic demand and 
expansion of the world market, (c) societal advancement opportunities by individual 
performance allowing leisure time and consumption, (d) the inclusion of refugees and 
expellees – that counted nearly one fifth of the population – to the labor market, (e) social 
securities by an expansion of the welfare state including modern social security benefits, child 
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allowance or the dynamization of pensions that were connected to gross salaries. In this 
course, full employment was reached in 1958 and the shift of labor to the secondary and 
tertiary sector accommodated the demand for qualified employees (Görtemaker, 2002, p.101 
ff.). The organization in associations of post-World War I was replaced by the pursuit of 
individual and family interests. This was possible by promotion based on performance (rather 
than ancestry), social security (rather than “undeserved poverty”) and corresponding welfare. 
In order to support a peaceful and positive economic development in Western Europe, the 
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were founded 
in 1957. The aim was to establish a European trading market and administrating nuclear 
power (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 145 f.). The rivalry of capitalism and communism showed off 
e.g. with the Sputnik shock, the moon landing and the building of the Berlin Wall (Dickson, 
2001, p. 117 f.; Görtemaker, 2002, p. 155 ff.). The dissatisfaction of the after-war generation 
with the political situation, the economic system and in their eyes missing accounting for the 
past was a breeding ground for the movement of 1968 (Wirsching 2001, p. 106).  
Centralized initiatives 
An incremental approach of centralized measures can be detected in the Honnefer model, a 
precursor of the Federal Law on Support in Education (BAföG). Equal opportunities should 
have been promoted by providing study grants for disadvantaged students based on the Social 
State Principle (Flämig et al., 2013). Universities were identified as one factor of economic 
welfare, which is coherent with rising educational and financial demands. Thus, the need for 
at least some central coordination was identified to maintain consistent standards and arrange 
those financial requirements. In the spirit of a cooperative federalism, the German Council of 
Science and Humanities was initiated, which consists of the administrative commission 
(representatives of the federal states and federal government) and the scientific commission 
(scientists and public persons). Until today, recommendations are elaborated and proposed to 
the federal states and the central government (Wissenschaftsrat, 2015).  
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The re-naming of the Federal Ministry for Nuclear Affairs to Federal Ministry of Scientific 
Research in 1963 was based on the finance-function of research with a focus on aerospace 
research as result of the Sputnik shock (Lengwiler, 2010). An education ministry was not 
installed due to the constitutionally guaranteed Kulturhoheit. To distribute and use those 
financial resources by the Bund, associations like the DFG and the Max-Planck Association 
rose in importance (Ash, 2010; Pfetsch, 1994). The first government participation of the 
Social Democrats in 1966 might have caused a centralizing policy shift with the “deal” of 
financing university infrastructure for being able to formulate a general framework. The 
revision of the constitution in 1969 served as basis for an involvement of the federal 
government (Pasternack, 2011). 
Urge for progress 
Higher education was confronted with an overwhelming demand following the economic 
recovery: Growing request of qualified professionals, the demands of high birthrates, vertical 
opportunities for advancement and a changing perception of women’s place in academia 
(Dobbins & Knill, 2015). The development was accompanied by the perception of education 
as a civil right (Dahrendorf, 1965) and the influential statement of Picht (1965) on the 
“German education catastrophe”. The ratio of higher education teachers (15,927) to students 
(234,621) in 1961 was not considered satisfactory for a modern education policy and the 
needs of the labor market. Indeed, the massification of the university system can be 
demonstrated by student numbers that nearly tripled in 25 years: from 239,481 in 1960 to 
675,946 in 1975 (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2015). However, the 
teacher/student ratio at universities improved – also under the influence of the report – 
positively from ~15 in 1960 to ~9 in 1975 (Teichler, 1993).  
The international student protests of 1968 were smoldering already in the beginning and mid 
60’s but radicalized in Germany with the shooting of the student Benno Ohnesorg as well as 
with the passing of the emergency constitution (Wirsching, 2001, p. 107). In Germany, the 
protest was mainly an academic phenomenon that originated from the discontent with the 
accounting for the national socialist past, from a discomfort with authoritarian structures and 
lifestyles as well as from the perceived need for radical upheavals fed by international 
conflicts (Ash, 1999, p. 67 f.). In academic terms the central objective was to initiate reforms 
of structures that were in their eyes undemocratic and authoritative (Ordinarienuniversität) as 
well as morally reprehensible. A famous protest in Hamburg (1967) included the banner 
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saying “Unter den Talaren Muff von 1000 Jahren6” (for a picture see NDR, 2007). It became 
slogan of the movement and depicted both criticisms, on the impermeable and imperious 
university structures as well as on the Nazi past. However, the following reforms e.g. for 
university types, a right to a say for non-professors or new legislation were not exclusively 
inspired by the protests (Führ, 1998). 
Recapitulation 
In summary, the time from 1956 to 1969 was marked as the beginning of a massification and 
expansion period of the higher education sector. Higher education reform planning, political 
changes and societal turmoil initiated fundamental changes in the higher education sector 
including the plan to introduce universities of applied sciences, reform and group universities. 
In general, the effects of democracy arrived in university structures and higher education 
policy resulting in reforms and centralized initiatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Free translation: “Under the gowns is the fustiness of a thousand years.“ 
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2.6 Stimulation by legislation and reformation (1969-1982) 
“Meine Damen und Herren, Bildung und Ausbildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung stehen an 
der Spitze der Reformen, die es bei uns vorzunehmen gilt.“ 
 
„Ladies and Gentlemen, education and training, science and research are leading the reforms 
that we have to get to work on.” 
 
(Government statement by chancellor Willy Brandt, 1969, free translation) 
 
Supported by the centralized initiatives and planning euphoria the following legislative acts 
and reformations were issued in the light of a new social system and need for mass education 
from 1969-1982. Particularly mentioned should be not only the legislative changes but also 
their impact on the higher education landscape in general and university structures in 
particular. 
Societal and political situation  
Economically, the short recession in the late ‘60s was resolved by reforms and a growing 
economy. The vulnerability of the experienced welfare became obvious with the first oil 
shock in 1973 that caused a recession and high unemployment rates. The economic stimulus 
package by the government could hardly counteract the development which was soon 
followed by the second oil shock in 1979 (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 308 f.). In the same year, the 
NATO Double-Track Decision was issued by the social-liberal government as a reaction to 
the stationing of intermediate ballistic missiles by the UdSSR. The decision included the 
stationing of Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the need for bilateral negotiations to limit 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces.  
In this context, the protest culture emerged out of a societal structural transformation that 
included a new awareness for ecology, general wish for security and peace, changing 
perception of women, as well as the taken-for-granted state interventions for public welfare. 
Some protests led to radicalization, e.g. in the left-extremist Red Army Faction (Rote Armee 
Fraktion) peaking in the German Autumn in 1977 (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 273 ff., 313). 
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The installation of the European Council is considered one of the most important instruments 
for the European integration. Thus, following the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods System – 
the dollar was no longer anchor currency – European countries decided to establish their own 
currency system. The result was the European Monetary System (Europäisches 
Währungssystem, EWR) in 1978 – a precursor of the current European Monetary Union and 
the currency Euro (€) (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 311).  
Legislative changes 
The revision of the constitution in 1969 made several central initiatives possible that were up 
to then a matter of theoretical discussion. The aim was to make the financing transparent and 
avoid broad influence by defining a framework including administrative and executive 
competences. The Federal Ministry of Education and Science (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Wissenschaft) was often discussed and with the revision finally legally allowed 
to be founded. However, the realization of the influential Framework Act for Higher 
Education (Hochschulrahmengesetz, HRG) was not issued before 1976, which included e.g. 
the status of universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschule, FH) as tertiary institutions 
(Pasternack, 2011). The federal states had to adjust their legislation to the framework within 3 
years. The law included the recommendation of comprehensive universities 
(Gesamthochschulen), which was not further concretized (explaining why none was founded 
after 1976); it defined the participation of non-scientific and scientific personnel as well as 
students; the personnel structure was specified and hierarchy flattened; the organization of 
admission restrictions where needed (Gieseke, 2012).  
The Comprehensive Education Plan (Bildungsgesamtplan) by the Bund-Länder commission 
(BLK, since 1970) passed in 1973 and worked on several coordinative education issues 
during the ‘70s. The update failed due to crises and a corresponding rethinking of 
governmental financing as well as due to political strategies (Führ & Furck, 1998, p. 251 ff.). 
Thus, the reforms of this time can be characterized as structural reforms based on minimum 
compromises.  
The expansion of the higher education sector and introduction of a governmentally refused 
numerus clausus (NC) by universities of applied sciences caused tensions. The Federal 
Constitutional Court confirmed in 1972 on the one hand the claim of a place at university for 
entitled applicants; on the other hand, they confirmed the legitimacy of a NC to account for 
capacities and prompted the introduction of a central issuing agency (Bode, 2013). 
43 
 
The “Öffnungsbeschluss” in 1977 was succeeding the NC discussion. Based on demographic 
forecasts, government decided to generally abolish the NC regulation and the central issuing 
agency with exceptions like medicine or if freshmen numbers exceeded 15% plus additional 
load of the calculated study places. At the same time financial endowment was not enlarged 
based on the following compromise: universities must cope with the expected to be levelled 
down baby boom generation, due to demographic change student numbers should fall, and 
universities should continue with the same financing. However, student numbers and shares 
were constantly growing (Kehm & Lanzendorf, 2005). The upcoming idea of reducing 
inefficiencies at universities, e.g. by introducing and adhering to standard periods of study, 
counteracted the discussion on growing student numbers and differences in quality and 
reputation that rose in the late ‘70s (Oehler & Bradatsch, 1998, p. 431; Teichler, 1993). 
Impact on the higher education landscape 
The adoption of university-like institutions in place of former schools of engineering or social 
education to universities of applied sciences was passed based on the HRG with laws from the 
federal states starting in 1969 (Teichler, 1993). These specialized universities would have a 
focus on academic teaching with a practical orientation and conducted no research. The 
period of education was reduced due to the prerequisite of a shortened higher education 
entrance qualification and a shorter study path. Additionally to the strengthening of research 
institutions like the Max Planck Association, the adoption of universities of applied sciences 
marked a further shift towards an institutional differentiation and specialization subverting the 
Humboldtian tradition in the German university system.  
In order to cope with rising student numbers – newly entering students in FHs: 20,600 in 1960 
to 51,700 in 1980 – FHs introduced the NC and therefore could not provide the relief that was 
anticipated. For comparison: Newly entering student numbers at universities rose from 65,000 
in 1960 to 138,200 in 1980 (Teichler, 2014, p. 54).  
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Impact on university structures 
Group universities (Gruppenuniversität) were founded and the idea often translated to other 
traditional Ordinarienuniversitäten: inclusion of interest groups like students, non-professorial 
teaching staff and technical staff in decision-making faculty councils for a democratized 
university concept. Resistance came from professorate that criticized an organized 
irresponsibility caused by the lacking liability of the members, the inflated bureaucratic 
apparatus and a more complex decision-making. A verdict by the Federal Constitutional Court 
regulated in 1973 the non-uniform and often wide participative character. It granted 
professors superior influence in all essential aspects like the appointment of new professors or 
teaching concerns (Dobbins & Knill, 2015; Pasternack & von Wissel, 2010).  
In 1960, a further aspect of the expansion of the university system originated in the 
recommendation of the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat): 
connecting different study fields to one reform university was considered necessary in order 
to cope with the massification and the (re-)foundation of universities. The Universities of 
Bochum and Konstanz are examples of this practice. 33 universities in 1965 were the starting 
point for expansion, they grew to 49 in 1975 and to 70 in the 90’s (Teichler, 1993). 
Apart from the political alienation the participative model found its way into the university 
landscape (Kehm, 2004). This influenced the education of more and more students going 
through the system. While in 1950 only 5% of the corresponding age group studied, this share 
reached 15% already in 1970 and 19% in 1980 (Ash, 1999, p. 146). The opening of 
universities to all societal strata increased the relevance of financial support for lower income 
brackets. The instrument that was developed and based on the Honnefer model was the 
Federal Law on Support in Education (BAföG), partially financed by central state and federal 
states (Lengwiler, 2010).  
Recapitulation 
Although the communicated goal of the social-liberal government was to focus on education, 
plans were disrupted by external crises and the beginning strength of legislation. Thus efforts 
for reformation consisted, especially in the end, of minimum compromises. For the first time, 
central legislation in form of the HRG (1976) included the Bund to consider vital questions of 
education policy, including a general framework and e.g. BAföG. Growing student numbers 
were first counteracted by NCs and should but could not entirely be absorbed by FHs. A 
crucial turning point was the “Öffnungsbeschluss” that abolished central NC regulation and 
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opened universities for even higher student numbers with constant financial and personnel 
resources. Technological and medical progress were key drivers of research under the 
conservative government that wanted to provide human resources for the Wirtschaftswunder 
and create knowledge enabling to defend. In contrast, social sciences expanded under the 
social-liberal government which aimed at securing quality standards in teaching and taking 
account for the ’68 movement e.g. by participation possibilities.  
 
2.7 Post-experimental paralysis and introduction of competition thinking (1982-
1995) 
„Wettbewerb statt Bürokratie“ 
„Competition instead of bureaucracy“ 
(Official guideline of the Federal Government approved by the German Council of Science 
and Humanities and the Rectors' Conference, Burtscheidt, 2010, p. 87, free translation) 
The late cold war and the fall of the iron curtain was accompanied by an educational post-
experimental paralysis and the need to reunite the two Germanies and consequently, introduce 
mechanisms to make universities efficient and in doing so financeable (1982-1995). Major 
aspects are subsumed in Standardizing and confluence tendencies that tried to sort financing 
issues following economic distress and the need for becoming more effective which is also 
connected to the Rise of competitive thinking and the Integration of East German universities 
to the West German university system. 
Societal and political situation  
Helmut Kohl followed the overturned government as leader of the conservative liberal 
coalition and had to handle critical assignments: persistent high unemployment rate, national 
debts, inflation and stagnating economic growth (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 325 f.). Government 
counteracted those developments by reducing collective liability and supporting individual 
performance by the introduction of market mechanisms. Data on national debt, inflation rate 
and unemployment improved significantly to the mid ‘80s (Wirsching, 2001, p. 123). 
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Foreign affairs were held steady by applying the dual strategy to ensure both national security 
and easing of West-East relations. With the appointment of Michael Gorbatschow as General 
Secretary in 1985, his policy of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (transformation) as well 
as the end of the Brezhnev doctrine
7
 in 1988 was the basis for a peaceful revolution and Fall 
of the Wall in 1989 (Görtemaker, 2002, p. 342 ff.). In this course, the integration of the 
former DDR to the BRD was managed e.g. by a stimulus program “Aufschwung Ost”, a 
solidarity tax or a trust institution (Treuhand-Anstalt). The unemployment rate rose from 
7.3% in 1990 to 12.7% in 1997 mainly driven by the unemployment in East Germany peaking 
at around 19% and leading to a movement of labor force towards West Germany (Booth, 
2010). 
The Two Plus Four Agreement was the official approval by the allies that the two Germanies 
could reunite. It declared that Germany does not have further territorial claims, that it binds 
itself to military restraints (e.g. not using ABC-weapons) and regains full sovereignty (Conze, 
2009, p. 737 ff.). In this course, the European Union was developed to an increasingly 
political Union, which resulted in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 (Conze, 2009, p. 711). 
Standardizing and confluence tendencies 
Due to rising expenditures in social policy, higher inflation rates and less income, 
expenditures in the higher education sector were cut (Fabian & Klebig, 2015). In this context, 
the discussion about two-stage study degrees including Bachelor and Master or the 
replacement of six-year by four-year study programs took off in the 80’s targeting shortened 
study times to support the economy and eventually reduce the number of students in a long-
term (Teichler, 1993). Further, first intents came up to formalize the PhD-education in so-
called Graduiertenkollegs, which are graduate schools (Teichler, 1993).  
The EU directive of 1988 to accept a European diploma with a minimum of three years study 
time was in line with the (before outlined) study propositions of the Wissenschaftsrat (Oehler 
& Bradatsch, 1998, p. 441 f.). The signing of the Magna Charta Universitatum in the same 
year by 388 European university presidents demonstrated the will to establish a close 
cooperation within the higher education sector in the future (Observatory Magna Charta 
Universitatum, 2017). 
                                                 
7
 Brezhnev doctrine: Protection of the UdSSR’s supremacy by the UdSSR in the Eastern bloc countries including 
eventual interventions. 
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The “paralysis” is also reflected in the cautious revision of the Framework Act for Higher 
Education in 1985 mainly orientating on modern competition thinking. The controlling of 
professors and how they use competitively acquired funds should be reduced, the founding of 
private universities be facilitated, bureaucratic processes of coordination of the examination 
regulations simplified and the concept of the Gesamthochschule no longer be considered as 
prototype (Teichler, 1993).  
Rise of competitive thinking  
Competitive thinking in the German university system was broadly neglected as politicians 
were more engaged in the restructuring of the university system, handling the educational 
expansion and arranging with federalism. The aim of the horizontal differentiation was to 
establish a homogeneous minimum standard of institutionally differentiated but in doing so 
institution-wide comparable education and research institutions. With the relative easing of 
the university system the question of vertical differentiation and consequently, competition 
was raised (Teichler, 2014, p. 61 ff.). In the Anglo-American countries, competition became a 
matter of necessity following the neoliberal governments of Thatcher and Ronald Reagan as 
part of the university market. Competition was increasingly emphasized e.g. by the Ministry 
of Education and Science that explicitly recommended a policy of differentiation and 
competition and implicitly condemned the long time claimed equality – with perceived but 
unspoken differences (Fabian & Klebig, 2015; Krausnick, 2012, p. 21 ff.; Teichler, 1993). 
Although, rankings might be traced back until the beginning of the 20
th
 century (R. Lange, 
2010), they became most important as an information source in the Anglo-American spirit for 
students and governments. The first state-delegated research ranking in Germany was already 
conducted in 1975. However, the public interest in rankings began to rise in the 80’s and 90’s 
with magazine published rankings e.g. by Wirtschaftswoche or Manager-Magazin (R. Lange, 
2010; Teichler, 1993). First hinting at the complexity reduction for students and parents, they 
soon became part of budget negotiations (even if not explicitly incentivized) and connected 
organizational aims.  
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Integration of East German universities to the West German university system 
A brief overview on East German universities is necessary to understand the further 
development and to some extent still existent differences. The university system developed 
following reforms after WW II that introduced socialist educational principles. Central 
planning abolished the traditional institutional autonomy of universities. Study programs were 
seen as professional training including obligatory internships. The subsequent expansion in 
the 60’s was detached in the 70’s by reducing student numbers according to five-year plans. 
In the 80’s they started to introduce a differentiated system with generic universities that were 
offering multiple subjects and specialized universities e.g. in engineering sciences (Kehm, 
2004). This parallel to the West German system with the introduction of differentiation and 
specialization that distinguished only by the means not by the goal is allegoric for the entire 
East-West conflict.  
With the reunion, five central restructuring measures were identified by Kehm (2004, see also 
Oehler & Bradatsch, 1998, p. 437): First, depolitization aimed at eliminating all political 
Marxist-Leninist faculties and re-foundation of policy-related faculties like business and 
economy, social sciences or law. Second, research that was conducted outside the university 
was evaluated and re-introduced to universities. Third, specialized universities were 
transformed to universities of applied sciences (which were additionally founded new). 
Fourth, disciplines and subjects were restructured what resulted in curricula that were adjusted 
to the West German standards. Fifth, scientific personal was assessed out of a political and 
scientific perspective resulting either in dismissals or in the possibility to apply for the new 
positions. This merging of two systems lead to a still more teaching oriented self-concept of 
university members as well as to a stronger openness to experiences by East German 
universities that did not rely on hardened structures. The positive attitude of East German 
professors towards evaluations of teaching and research somewhat affected West German 
universities. It influenced the perception and ultimately permitted the introduction of such 
mechanisms. The instability of the situation was fueled by the massive necessity to invest in 
this restructuring, which caused cuts in other fields, e.g. the BAföG, and by the liberal 
education minister Rainer Ortleb who had to resign in 1994 due to problems with alcoholism 
(Leinemann, 1994). 
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Recapitulation 
Two poles marked this period: standardization and competition in terms of differentiation as 
well as by the Fall of the Berlin Wall. New ideas to shorten the study cycles, formalize until 
then not formalized academic education and the change of the HRG were coming up. The 
competitive thinking that was unfavored until then was gaining traction following the 
neoliberal developments in the Anglo-American countries. Rigid bureaucratic structures and 
protests paralyzed progress. The biggest challenge however, was the reunion, corresponding 
reconstruction and merging of the two German university systems that were separated for a 
considerable time. While some spot a missed opportunity of restructuring also the West 
German university systems, it was basically an integration of the East German universities to 
the West German system (Kehm, 2004; Oehler & Bradatsch, 1998, p. 437).  
 
2.8 New Public Management (1995-2005) 
“[…] Performance Indicators in political competition may be as important as prices in market 
competition.” 
(Johnsen, 2005, p.15) 
In the light of New Public Management, competitive thinking and new university structures, 
which were discussed previously, took shape. The legislative basis was laid from 1995-2005 
with Reforms in the New Public Management spirit and the implementation of the European 
harmonization. 
Societal and political situation  
Based on the new sovereignty of Germany, the will to stabilize the situation and to become an 
established international player, a closer cooperation in inter- and supranational organizations 
like the EU (e.g. expressed will for joint external affairs) and NATO (e.g. military 
intervention in the Kosovo War) was promoted. Global crisis like in Kosovo, the stock market 
crash (“Dot-com bubble”), the terroristic attacks in the US on September 11th 2001 and the 
resulting war in Afghanistan increased insecurity worldwide and resulted in a further claim 
for peace and safety.  
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In 1998, government changed to the social democrat Gerhard Schröder who was subsequently 
chancellor when the Euro as new European currency was introduced in 2002 (Görtemaker, 
2002, p. 392 ff.). He initiated and implemented the reforms called “Agenda 2010” broadly 
orientating on innovation policies addressing challenges of knowledge societies and social 
cohesion. The introduction of job market, education and social security reforms massively 
influenced economy and society. This curing of Germany, the “sick man of Europe” (The 
Economist, 1999) aimed to prepare the labor market and social system for upcoming 
challenges like demographic change or financial crises. In this context, the eastwards 
enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was not only a result of contemporary political 
reasoning but also a consequence of both the breakdown of communist regimes and the need 
to cope with international competition on labor markets (Black, Engbersen, & Okólski, 2010, 
p. 7 ff.). 
Reforms in the New Public Management spirit 
Following the big and mostly unexpected upheaval of integrating the East German university 
system, the late 90’s were denoted by a “Reformstau”, which became even word of the year 
in 1997/98 (Conze, 2009, p. 787). The spirit of New Public Management rooted in the 
Thatcher and Reagan era. It was mainly targeting the introduction of private management 
measures in public organizations as well as the privatization of many sectors – universities in 
Germany however, were not affected until the mid or late 90’s (Schimank & Lange, 2009). 
The German university system was considered rigid, inefficient and not competitive. Cost 
pressure of scarce financial equipment and financial cutbacks as well as new demands in 
teaching and research quality were planned to be solved by subsidiarity. Politicians tried to 
counteract this mood of deadlock by some of the most determining decisions for German 
higher education up until today:  
The amendments to the HRG in 1998 and the early 2000s aimed to foster market principles by 
deregulating the higher education sector and introducing performance related incentives, 
turning away from state control to more autonomy for universities, junior professorships, 
quality assurance and comparability of studies or university-owned selection processes for 
students (Pritchard, 2006; Schimank & Lange, 2009). This caused a number of innovations 
ranging from (i) the necessary adjustment of professor remunerations to (ii) discussions about 
study fees, (iii) the establishment of policy measures like the German Excellence Initiative 
(see chapter 3.1 for the background of higher education policies and 4.3 for the empirical 
examination of the Excellence Initiative), (iv) the introduction of organization intern control 
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mechanisms rather than steering from a distance (see chapter 3.2 for the theoretical basis of 
boards and chapter 4.4 for a descriptive analysis) or (v) the departure from the traditional 
participative principle to a strengthening of faculty and university management (see also 
chapter 3.3 for theoretical considerations of power distribution and for the empirical 
evaluation chapter 4.5). 
European harmonization 
The education ministers from France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain issued the joint 
Declaration of Sorbonne (a specification of the Magna Charta Universitatum) to harmonize 
the architecture of the European higher education system. The influential Declaration of 
Bologna in 1999 established the Bologna process to foster mobility, international 
competitiveness and employability. Based on the Bologna process several changes had to be 
organized and implemented: two-cycle study programs including a uniform credit system, 
quality controls including regular study course evaluations and accreditations as well as 
mobility of students and lecturers (Keeling, 2006). The red-green coalition’s core mission for 
higher education was the sixth amendment to the HRG. It specifically defined the goal for 
international and European exchange resulting in the support of English course offers and the 
development and implementation of Bachelor/Master programs (Burtscheidt, 2010, p. 114 
ff.). As a consequence, foreign student numbers increased from 1999-2003 by roughly 60% 
(Pritchard, 2006). 
Recapitulation 
The end of the Cold War briefly eased the situation, as important but due to integration efforts 
postponed projects had to be realized. Amendments to the HRG formally introduced 
principles of New Public Management to the German university system of which the elements 
were discussed but left aside in the 80’s. European states cooperated closer in various other 
fields, e.g. with a joint currency or the eastward expansion and in particular, in the higher 
education sector. While Erasmus programs were long established, mobility, quality, 
employability and comparability were emphasized and implemented. 
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2.9 Differentiated university system – that should not be called this (2005-today) 
„[Deutsche Universitäten] kämpfen im internationalen Vergleich mit sehr kurzen, stumpfen 
Spießen. […] Mehr Geld ist immer gut! Und ich würde sagen, die deutschen Universitäten 
haben zum Teil für das was sie leisten zu wenig Geld. […] Es muss soweit kommen, dass 
man es in Deutschland nicht mehr als tabu sieht, dass unter den knapp hundert Universitäten 
solche sind, die ein eher elitäres Forschungsprofil im alten Stil pflegen und solche, die eben 
mehr auf Massenausbildung setzen.“ 
“[German universities] are fighting with very short, dull lances. […] More money is always 
good! And, I would say that German universities receive too little money for their 
performance. […] It has to come to the point that it is no longer a taboo in Germany to 
consider some of the almost one hundred universities to have an elite traditional research 
profile and some that are focusing mass education.” 
(Imboden, cited after WirtschaftsWoche, 2018, free translation) 
The phases outlined so far led to the system apparent today, which is not meant to be called or 
discussed like this but still, differentiated through all of the university missions. The aspects 
mostly influencing German higher education landscape today is found in its Federalism 
making country-spanning changes particularly difficult. The introduction of competitive 
thinking lead to the Effects of the reforms: the introduction and withdrawal of study fees and 
new initiatives emerged that lead to an observable Differentiation of universities. 
Societal and political situation  
After Gerhard Schröder lost a no-confidence vote, snap elections had to be held. In 2005, 
Angela Merkel was elected and became new chancellor in a Great Coalition. Starting in 2007, 
the global financial (“Lehmann”), later economic and government debt crisis hit also 
Germany and the Euro zone. This lead not only in Germany to the strongest decline of GDP 
after WW II. As globalized answer international institutions, e.g. the International Monetary 
Fund, issued supportive programs. The Great Coalition and later the conservative liberal 
coalition were sustaining German banks and economy by guarantees and economic stimulus 
packages (e.g. subsidies to promote sales of new cars or to finance reduced working hours) 
that were financed by credits. Germany coped rather well during the crisis – thanks to prudent 
policies and previous reforms – while Greece, Ireland and Portugal struggled massively (for 
German success factors see Audretsch & Lehmann, 2016).  
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The European Stability and Growth Pact could barely survive. A bailout package was 
constructed by the European Union, which included rights as well as duties (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2018). If not liability, it certainly shows the dependency that was created over 
time between the European states. The situation was at the same time posing and stemming 
the “German question” of supremacy. In 2012, however, the EU was rewarded after more 
than 50 years of joint policy with the Peace Nobel Prize for engaging in peace, reconciliation, 
democracy and human rights (European Union, 2018a).  
Further global crises erupted, to mention just a few influential ones: the annexation of Crimea 
by Russia in the course of the Ukraine conflict (2014); Religious extremism in Near East 
resulting in shooting wars, terroristic attacks (e.g. in the name of the “Islamic State”) and 
corresponding refugee movements towards Europe, which re-strengthened right-populist 
parties in many European, also the German political scene; The “Brexit” (2016) meaning the 
withdrawal of UK from the European Union, was made possible by the exit option defined in 
the Treaty of Lisbon that was coming into force in 2009 (European Union, 2018b). 
Despite diverse global crises, the German population started to integrate: For instance, with 
the World Championship in 2006 that generated a unprecedented situation of social coherence 
(Ohmann, Jones, & Wilkes, 2006), unemployment rates were and still are consistently 
declining being comparably marginally affected by the economic crisis (also due to an absent 
real estate bubble), the German economy recovered quickly, enabled a balanced household 
and even allowed some costly social policies. 
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Federalism  
After the federalism reform II in 2006 and a corresponding draft law of 2007, the HRG 
became supposed to be repealed. However, up until today the HRG is held in accordance with 
central higher education associations that would prefer to actually even enlarge the financial 
influence of the central government (Gieseke, 2012). The German Basic Law guarantees in 
article 30 cultural sovereignty to the federal states (including education) which is a de facto 
ban of cooperation conceived to prevent misuse. Article 91b in the Basic Law was a 
compromise following the federalism reform II. It allows cooperation in case of fulfilling 
common tasks (which means help for financially weak municipalities) and reciprocal 
financing including a consent of the federal states for research funding. The discussion about 
repealing or holding the cooperation ban is ongoing and the current great coalition included a 
further loosening in their coalition agreement (Coalition Agreement of CDU CSU and SPD, 
2017, p. 28 ff.). 
Effects of the reforms: the introduction and withdrawal of study fees 
In Germany, general tuition fees were not allowed by the HRG (Bruckmeier, Fischer, & 
Wigger, 2015). Some exceptions were if students exceeded the duration of studies drastically, 
if students came from third countries or if studies were extra occupational. In 2005, the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) repealed the respective passage of 
the HRG (version 2002) as it was interfering legislative powers of federal states. 
Kauder and Potrafke (2013) and Bruckmeier et al. (2015) point out the ideological discussion 
about introducing and abolishing tuition fees. Critiques were concerned about even less 
freedom to choose among educational paths for students from socio-economic disadvantaged 
families and about a potential substituting effect for state funding. Most conservative parties 
saw tuition fees as incentive compatible and fair cost involvement – introducing them in 
seven federal states – while social democratic parties considered them as socially unjust – 
abolishing them after a change of or involvement in government (except for Bavaria). 
However, the political decision on the introduction and abolition was barely if at all based on 
scientific findings but rather lead by electoral motives. All states withdrew study fees again 
with Lower Saxony being the last federal state to do so (Fischer & Wigger, 2016). 
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Operationally, this resulted in states without study fees (Berlin, Brandenburg, Hesse, 
Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, Rhineland-Pfalz, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia), states 
with a state-specific general rule with a fix amount of tuition fees to be paid (Baden-
Württemberg, Bremen, Hamburg, Niedersachsen) and the allowance of a range where 
universities could choose (Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland). The maximum fees 
for regular studies were €500 per semester while the before mentioned exceptions remained in 
force without maximum threshold. Those fees were exclusively to be used for teaching 
purposes. Interestingly, without considering further third-party funds, the contribution by 
tuition fees ranged on average roughly around 2.8%. Substitution effects could not be found 
as public university funding seems to be triggered more by competitive mechanisms rather 
than free-riding on their neighbor’s cost or tuition fees (Fischer & Wigger, 2016).  
Differentiation 
A traditional characteristic of German universities were neither a vertical nor a broad 
horizontal differentiation. The before mentioned deregulation, power shifts and 
internationalization resulted in a number of structural changes and initiatives that started to re-
shape the whole university system – slowly as they are bureaucratic, policy-dependent 
institutions – but consistently. While it has been a taboo for a long time, differentiation in the 
German higher education system was introduced “by the back door” on all three university 
missions. 
The changed payment modalities (former C-wages changed to the new W-wages system 
including also the possibility of a small share of performance-based pay) had no direct impact 
on general teaching habits. Still, both groups differ significantly in terms of perceiving 
themselves as agents and being extrinsically motivated. A differing behavior in the following 
cohorts is expected (Wilkesmann & Schmid, 2012). The introduced study fees are a further 
step that opened the possibility to differentiate one university and one federal state from 
another. Bruckmeier, Fischer, and Wigger (2013) showed the “funding competition” between 
federal states. Descriptively one can see (see also the mapping in 4.1 Systematization of the 
current governance system in Germany), that teaching oriented universities from East 
Germany are more likely to be above average teaching workload (54% of the East German 
universities) while only 45% of West German universities teach above average. Competitive 
proximity of universities and federal states have among other factors the strongest effect on 
student mobility and corresponding profile (Bruckmeier et al., 2013; Mitze, Burgard, & 
Alecke, 2015). 
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The research mission was affected by the introduction of the German Excellence Initiative of 
which the aim was (and still is) to support some universities in their research activities in 
order to make them internationally competitive. As unlikely as the Agenda 2010, the idea of 
establishing elite universities came from the social democratic minister of education. The 
funding was exclusively intended (i) to support high-class research for economic reasons, (ii) 
to mobilize and keep talents in the German system for higher education as well as for 
knowledge intense sectors, (iii) to support interdisciplinary cutting-edge research confronting 
demographic changes and international competition, and (iv) to improve ranking positions of 
identified elite institutions to compete with the strong Anglo-American and fast catching up 
Asian universities (Kehm, 2013). The first round of the initiative tendered additional funding 
for 40 graduate schools that should bring about a structured education for PhDs (1 Mio. € per 
year), 30 Clusters of Excellence consisting of differing locational and interdisciplinary 
cooperation partners (ca. 8 Mio € per year) and if successful in the other two categories an 
application for ca. 10 institutional development concepts was possible resulting in being 
named Excellence University (ca. 25 Mio € per year; Kehm, 2013). The initiative started with 
the first two rounds in 2005/06, and was followed by the third round in 2012. The Excellence 
Initiative will be replaced by the Excellence Strategy starting in 2019 with only two funding 
lines – Excellence Clusters and Excellence Universities (DFG, 2018). The initiative (and 
following strategy) is the most direct indication for a differentiation in the German higher 
education system.  
The third – and most controversial – mission of universities to generate a societal benefit for 
instance by innovations was also evolving by modified laws and university managements. 
After the professors’ privilege to patent for himself (instead of the employer as usual for job-
related inventions) was abolished in 2002, The German Employee Invention Act was further 
adjusted in 2009 resulting in a legal entitlement of the employer for an invention even after 
the existent deadline for claim of four months expired (Soudry, 2011, p. 218 f.). The aim is to 
foster technology transfer and commercialization of knowledge generated by universities 
(Cuntz, Dauchert, Meurer, & Philipps, 2012). Because of the change in legal frameworks, 
universities invested in institutional strategies like technology transfer offices that should 
support innovation and patenting processes. The third mission performance of universities and 
the employed technology transfer offices still are dependent on the specialized profile of the 
university (Hülsbeck, Lehmann, & Starnecker, 2013). 
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Recapitulation 
The political and economic situation in Germany supported a further expansion of the higher 
education system. Strong debates on federalism, competitiveness and benefits of labor 
division and specialization marks this period. The traditionally homogeneous universities 
were either indirectly influenced by patenting laws or the introduction of study fees or even 
directly encouraged by research competitions like the Excellence University to differentiate 
themselves. 
The evolving and development of universities has always been a task of primarily knowledge 
transfer towards students, the academic circle or for societal application. Academics today 
need to learn and research differently, adapting to speed, globalization, competition and 
societal participation. The optimal interplay of political and managerial measures is crucial in 
dealing with the ongoing challenges. The following will thus, try to map and understand the 
determinants and mechanisms that were put into place to reform and improve the German 
higher education system. In particular, policy initiatives, institutional and individual elements, 
their role in higher education and measurement issues will be discussed 
3 Determinants of Corporate Governance in higher education  
Higher education in Germany comprises particular institutions that are in the tension of 
autonomy and state dependency based on three major determinants as parts of its Corporate 
Governance: Policies, Institutions and Individuals. 
First, policies are building the broad framework in which universities and their management 
are embedded and get granted and designed their room to act. Due to the federal structure and 
decentral distribution of competences in Germany, this is a particular challenge: decentrality 
is coming at the cost of potentially uneven resource allocation (e.g. in weak and strong federal 
states) but also at the benefit of flexibility (e.g. shown in the different handling of study feest). 
The role of differing policy approaches (sprinkler, subsidizing disadvantage and picking the 
winners concepts), the measurement of those policy approaches an in particular for the higher 
education sector in national concerns will be addressed. 
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Second, institutions are the narrow organization-specific shell in which actors are finding 
themselves incentivized and/or controlled for the fulfillment of the institution’s purpose. The 
installed institutions like university boards in the higher education context contribute to a 
balance of interests that were addressed in the New Public Management discourse showing 
both: an interaction between stakeholder groups inside and outside the university as well as a 
monitoring body for the university management. After discussing the theoretical basis of 
boards in Corporate Governance, their role and connected measurement issues will be 
discussed. 
Third, individuals are the manning of organizations which depends on personality and 
behavior of corresponding leaders inside just as outside the university context. The role of 
power, power distribution and leadership is in particular intriguing within the specific nature 
of universities and the state-granted right of freedom in research and teaching. After a 
discussion on the role of power and leadership, the question on whether leaders are born or 
made will be addressed and further backed by how to grasp the leaders concept within the Big 
Five personality measurement framework.  
3.1 Policies 
Parts of this chapter are orientated on the German Italian comparison made by Civera, Lehmann, and Stockinger 
(2017). 
3.1.1 The role of policy approaches 
Governance of universities as state institutions is highly dependent on the context that policy 
is framing. As could be shown in chapter 2 History of German universities we observe that 
path dependencies in higher education systems are highly reliant on the Zeitgeist and 
respective political decisions. To understand the interdependencies, aims, costs and benefits 
of differing policy approaches a respective categorization is outlined as follows (for an 
overview see Table 3. Approaches of higher education policies by Civera et al. (2017, p. 
29).).  
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Table 3. Approaches of higher education policies by Civera et al. (2017, p. 29). 
 Characteristics Benefits Costs Examples 
Sprinkler 
Approach 
Basic financial 
resources, evenly 
distributed 
Widespread access and 
availability of education, 
research and spillover 
effects 
Freeriding, risk of 
incentivizing the 
maximization of inputs; 
costs caused by asymmetric 
information 
First funding source by 
central or decentral, state-
oriented governments 
Subsidizing 
Disadvantage 
Compensation of 
regional, structural 
or political 
disadvantages 
Securing a minimum 
standard of quality; 
Reduction of inequalities 
Focus on disadvantaged  
above average might not 
fully exploit possibilities; 
Asymmetric information 
causes difficult definition of 
subsidy-worthy situations 
Unification of DDR & BRD, 
BAföG, Subsidies for 
regionally weak regions (e.g. 
during financial crisis) 
Picking the 
winner concept 
Competition to 
trigger and support 
positive behavior 
Supporting high-class 
research; Enhancing 
international attractiveness; 
creating bandwagon effects; 
Quasi-markets prevent 
problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard 
Focus on high performers; 
Performance linked to the 
award moment; Damage by 
loss of title; Might uncouple 
few from the rest 
Excellence Initiative, 
Rankings 
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(1) Sprinkler Approach  
Ever since the founding of universities, monarchs and/or governments invested in universities 
to generate knowledge, well-educated human capital, academic and societal discourse, new 
inventions, reputation, and so forth. The calculus nowadays has not changed and includes the 
positive balance that is expected for the society per se as well as for the economy (Andersson, 
Quigley, & Wilhelmsson, 2009; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Emrich, Koch, Meyer, & 
Gassmann, 2016). Thus, politicians are interested in ensuring a basic level of education, 
whilst in particular knowledge-intense societies additionally rely on higher education. 
Different shares of taxpayer support in higher education are designed depending on the 
interpretation of e.g. education as common good vs. individualized benefit. However, most 
industrialized countries invest at least a minimum of financial resources for public universities 
that are provided by a sprinkler approach (Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008; Salmi & 
Hauptman, 2006). This funding mechanism is the predominant one in more state-oriented, so-
called “idealist” systems like Germany while so-called “functionalist” Anglo-Saxon countries 
focus on contributions by students and performance-related mechanisms (Auranen & 
Nieminen, 2010; Ferlie et al., 2008). 
In the sprinkler approach, basic resources are allocated evenly to all universities based on 
history and formula according to e.g. size, functional departments, etc.. The Times Higher 
Education stated in a German context that “the fact is that egalitarianism has been the 
watchword of much of German higher education policy […]” (Morgan, 2016). A basic 
standard of education can be ensured in terms of facilities and teaching resources, research 
can be realized by investments in equipment or human capital, and thus, spillover effects are 
made available in an area covering and to some extent standardizing manner.  
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However, this approach comes at the cost of asymmetric information manifested in freeriding 
and incentivizing the maximization of inputs instead of performing efficiently (Besley & 
Coate, 2003). The mechanism is explained by Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey, and Tirole (1988) 
who argue that differences of public and private organizations are not only a result of the 
manager’s objectives but rather of differing structures of control. Thus, when we observe a 
guaranteed input and managers can take advantage of information asymmetry, a moral hazard 
problem arises. This implies that it would be in the interest of the firm’s manager – in this 
context university – to destroy resources or act inefficiently. The spending rush among 
universities at the end of the fiscal year to avoid budget cuts in the following year – the so-
called December fever –serves as an example to illustrate this problem (Brede, 2005, p. 133 
ff.).  
(2) Subsidizing Disadvantage 
Another mechanism to provide funding to universities is subsidizing disadvantage. It is used 
to compensate regional or political disadvantages, e.g. after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
universities located in former East Germany were re-organized and subsidized to adjust to the 
education system of the Federal Republic of Germany (Kehm, 2004). This policy measure is 
mainly based on two developments: (a) focus on public welfare including education as 
elementary and (b) expansion of universities and their role especially after WW II. 
Inequalities that are too big to be handled by the universities (or states) themselves should be 
balanced and a minimum standard of quality should be guaranteed regarding personnel, 
equipment and facilities (Morgan, 2016). Furthermore, in times of education expansion, 
universities were not solely seen as educational institutions but also as economic factor that 
could be beneficial for certain regions (Oser & Schroeder, 1995; Pasternack, 2009). 
However, this allocation mechanism focuses on disadvantaged institutions or regions. 
Universities that are above average do not receive any additional support that could help to 
fully exploit their potentials. The definition of what is considered worthy to be subsidized is a 
further critical aspect. Asymmetric information between universities and governments or 
between central government and regions as well as the risk of maximizing input instead of 
optimizing allocation to institutions in need may question an efficient distribution of 
resources. Monitoring in this context is even more difficult as universities are predominantly 
state granted monopolies, which causes a lack of information about really comparable private 
universities (for instance in the German context if at all comparability is highly questionable), 
market prices or market pressures (Caillaud et al., 1988).  
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(3) Picking the Winner 
Governments face the challenge to fund universities as key drivers of societal, economic and 
technological change that brings benefits back to society (Crespi & Geuna, 2008). However, 
politicians are confronted with the above-mentioned problems when providing resources in a 
sprinkler or subsidizing disadvantage approach. Asymmetric information creates a university-
specific agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kivistö & Zalyevska, 2015). Both of the 
previously mentioned approaches are mainly based on historical data and the egalitarianism 
principle. German universities for instance are constitutionally autonomous and self-
administered. Politicians (in this case the principal) of the federal states negotiate budgets 
with the university management (in this case the agent) at a three to five year interval. Still, 
agreements remain vague and they cannot control or monitor opportunistic behavior (der 
Smitten & Jaeger, 2012). This is part of the explanation that inefficiency could only be 
reduced in a long-term perspective (Gralka, 2018). 
Thus, in order to avoid inefficient spending of taxpayers’ money, many systems introduced 
market-oriented mechanisms to allocate funding. Linking performance and funding should 
help to overcome problems of ex-ante adverse selection of inappropriately chosen recipients 
as well as ex-post moral hazard as a positive performance gets incentivized (Aghion, 
Dewatripont, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, & Sapir, 2010). While especially the Anglo-American 
countries have in general more financial dependency and traditionally rely on this funding 
mechanism, Continental European countries introduced this competitive mechanism more 
cautiously (Auranen & Nieminen, 2010; Hicks, 2012; Williams, 1997). As an alternative, the 
Chinese system is based on a central decision made in 1998 on boosting handpicked 
universities to become or stay world-class within a 10-20 years schedule comprising a huge 
amount of money (Ngok & Guo, 2008). What seems to be advantageous about the Chinese 
approach is the prevention of the contest situation (e.g. avoiding a rat race effect) and a 
concentrated, goal-driven investment, but it comes at the cost of disregarding other potentially 
world-class institutions and limiting the autonomy and academic freedom of universities 
(Ngok & Guo, 2008). Interestingly, the Anglo-American as well as the Chinese system create 
a similar situation in terms of cost and benefits: establishment of world-class universities and 
the “rest” – reflected by existent (America) or emerging (Chinese) ranking positions (Deem, 
Mok, & Lucas, 2008). 
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The Picking the Winner strategy aims to introduce quasi-markets to a traditionally public and 
thus, non-market sector like higher education. Predecessors of modern research assessments 
and performance based state funding are third-party funding contests that started with the 
founding of associations like the DFG in Germany. Based on New Public Management, which 
emerged roughly within the last 25 years, universities became also part of efficiency 
considerations (Hicks, 2012; Schimank & Lange, 2009).  
The imperative for supporting lighthouses within the German university system expressed 
Mrs. Quennet-Thielen, state secretary in the Federal German Ministry of Education and 
Research: “If you want to compete in the research world, you have to have some top 
universities that play in the first league” (Morgan, 2016). Accordingly, the introduction and 
support of quasi-market structures that are marked by competitive elements like contests, 
rankings, etc. should trigger performance of universities. Problems of adverse selection 
connected to e.g. the December fever or moral hazard can be minimized as positive behavior 
is incentivized. The competition and will or force to participate should not only have an 
impact on the high performing universities that win the contest but also on the overall system 
(Rebora & Turri, 2013). However, the corresponding incentivizing mechanisms have to be 
chosen appropriately. Otherwise, one runs the risk to observe the paradox that A (e.g. research 
quality) is expected but B (e.g. research quantity) gets supported and consequently, the 
initiatives do not lead to the desired outcomes (Butler, 2003; Kerr, 1975). Critics further 
outline that an uncoupling of few from the rest would harm university systems and that 
performance efforts are potentially connected to the award moment (Hartmann, 2006, 2010). 
For instance, a prestigious affiliation of authors biased judgments by referees or editors 
(Judge, Cable, Colbert, & Rynes, 2007). In the worst case, Non-Excellence Universities might 
experience discrimination just for not being labelled. 
In this Picking the Winner context, the German Excellence Initiative was introduced as 
additional, non-compulsory, funding source. As the German system is considered a European-
Continental hybrid between the two extremes of the market-oriented Anglo-American and the 
state-oriented Chinese higher education system, this initiative will be the focus of the 
following public policy evaluation (especially chapter 4.3 Higher Education Policies in 
Germany: The Excellence Initiative). 
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3.1.2 Measurement of policy approaches 
“Whether dealing with monkeys, rats, or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that 
most organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do 
(or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not 
rewarded.” 
(Kerr, 1975, p. 769) 
The role of higher education policies changed especially in the period after WW II roughly 
until the 80’s. Developing from a steering mechanism by restrained interventions – explained 
in Germany by the experiences from to the National Socialist regime – to the period after 
1980 from which on public policy was considered active actor. This included behavior rather 
than outcome modification by comparably subtle incentive systems. This shift in policy 
perception represents the change from an interventionist to an evaluative governance (Ferlie 
et al., 2008). The measurement and evaluation of policy initiatives confronts research with 
many controversies reflected by discussions on theoretical, methodological, and empirical 
aspects as well as on normative stances. The questions that have to be asked and answered 
prior to any evaluation include on a broad level: What is the intention behind policy 
mechanisms? And, do the implemented higher education policies work?  
To be more specific, the process of evaluation is accompanied by questions scrutinizing how 
criteria are defined according to which policies are measured. The nature of outcome should 
be questioned as well: Is there a differentiation on a quantitative and qualitative scale and if 
so, how can we measure outcomes quantitatively and qualitatively? Further, even if one 
knows what to measure, the question remains how to isolate the pure policy effects from other 
confounding influences (such as economic distress, changes in laws, etc.). In this context, 
how should we define “before” and “after”? In addition, to which extent are results 
comparable and transferable to other contexts (Civera et al., 2017; Ferlie et al., 2008; Izsak, 
Markianidou, & Radošević, 2015; Lehmann, Meoli, Paleari, & Stockinger, 2018)? Although 
university missions imply teaching as well as research the performance aspect will be mainly 
focusing research. This was the major aim of the later evaluated Excellence Initiative due to 
German legal requirements and is the aim most policy initiatives follow (Auranen & 
Nieminen, 2010; Bolli & Somogyi, 2011; Bruckmeier, Fischer, & Wigger, 2017; Gawellek & 
Sunder, 2016; Haeussler & Colyvas, 2011; Menter, Lehmann & Klarl, 2018; Möller, Schmidt, 
& Hornbostel, 2016; Vogel, Hattke, & Petersen, 2017). 
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Intention of policies  
Due to the autonomous nature of universities, policy makers face a multi-facetted problem: 
First, they are only able to track performance and usage of measures in a limited way – at 
least in Continental European systems like in Germany. Ultimately, professors as civil 
servants cannot be forced to publish or do “good research” whereas in market-oriented 
systems professors receive mostly performance-linked payments (Auranen & Nieminen, 
2010; Shin, 2010). Second, policy makers have a need for information, which they try to fill 
with data on conventional indicators that allow them to draw conclusions about where and 
how to react. Those indicators could be graduates or artificial market mechanisms like 
rankings (Breakwell & Tytherleigh, 2010; Dill & Soo, 2005). Third, information is costly as 
one typically needs to invest time and effort to obtain it – however, appropriate measures are 
as important for political competition as prices in market competition (Johnsen, 2005). Fourth, 
distributing resources through one channel means less resources for remaining channels, 
which is a specifically complex challenge due to the multi-product character of universities 
that cannot be broken down on one key objective like profit maximization for shareholders for 
instance (Schulze-Cleven, Reitz, Maesse, & Angermuller, 2017). 
In terms of universities and Picking the Winner approaches, politicians might hope to boost 
locational advantages by earning international reputation through higher educational quality. 
Either policy-makers orientate on obligatory evaluation systems based on peer-review that 
include funding consequences like in the UK, Italy, or Australia (Bornmann, 2017; Rebora & 
Turri, 2013) or they establish incentive systems that are organized as contest with 
participation by choice like in Germany or Spain (De Filippo, Casani, & Sanz-Casado, 2016; 
Menter et al., 2016). The first mechanism includes the benefit that all universities are subject 
to monitoring while critiques may outline that especially those universities at the bottom of 
the ranking experience a loss in reputation from which they cannot easily recover. The 
voluntary mechanism has the advantage that universities are not obliged to participate. Only 
capable universities should participate while the others might benefit from a political vision 
that reflects what is required by society/politicians (Haeussler & Colyvas, 2011). However, 
universities could even fall in efficiency due to lacking resources for the application and they 
could suffer even more from subsequent negative consequences after being downgraded 
(Bruckmeier et al., 2017; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Hubbard, 2016). 
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Thus, the definition of quality is crucial for politicians and university managers alike. While 
quality of higher education institutions represents international visibility for politicians, the 
operationalized reality for universities might be to enlarge international reputation e.g. by 
ranking positions that are not necessarily related to quality but rather quantity (R. Lange, 
2010; Olcay & Bulu, 2016; Vinkler, 2017). The perceived benefits and unintended 
consequences of the resulting “publish or perish” approach are discussed in detail by Moosa 
(2018). The definition of what quality means, how costly it is to measure and what is really 
coherent with basic intentions raises the question of effectivity and efficiency of policy 
measures. Van Raan (2005, p. 140) reports in this context that “[…] responsible science 
administrators in national governments and in institutions […] are aware of [the] insufficient 
quality level [of bibliometric indicators], but they want it ‘fast’, in ‘main lines’, and not ‘too 
expensive’.” 
Deduction of performance measures in higher education for Picking the Winner approaches 
The understanding of policy effects benefits from the differentiation between effectivity, 
meaning the goal achievement, and efficiency, meaning an economic output production 
(Kenny, 2017). Policy makers should be more interested in effective initiatives that translate 
public money to desired outcomes in terms of value for society, but are too often interested in 
short-time viewable results (Bornmann, 2012, 2017; Ferlie et al., 2008). Initiatives should 
trigger high-class, internationally renowned universities and bandwagon effects for the system 
in order to promote locational advantages. As costs for attaining the visibility goal 
achievement of productivity are lowered (incentivized by the initiative) they try to attain more 
of it – becoming effective (Downs, 1965; McGrail, Rickard, & Jones, 2006). Additionally not 
as substitution, besides research productivity rather research quality or impact gets 
increasingly attention inside the science community and can be seen as efficiency at work 
(Bertoli-Barsotti & Lando, 2017; Chen, 2017; Fiala, Mareš, & Šesták, 2017; Kenny, 2017; 
Vinkler, 2017). The outstanding research performance is seen as most important driver of 
spillovers – illustrated e.g. by the Silicon Valley Model (Audretsch, 2014; Audretsch, 
Lehmann, & Paleari, 2014).  
Thus, one can identify two major measures that are relevant for policy evaluation: 
- Visibility by quantity (research productivity, effectiveness according to political 
criterion)  
- Visibility by quality (research impact, effectiveness according to scientific criterion) 
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3.1.3 Measurement: Research quantity and quality for Picking the Winner policy 
approaches 
Visibility by quantity  
Research productivity is frequently used not only as evaluation method (Rebora & Turri, 
2013), but also regarding the trade-off of research and teaching (Taylor, Fender, & Burke, 
2006), departmental structures and strategies (Fabel, Hein, & Hofmeister, 2008; Lee & 
Bozeman, 2005; Su, 2011), impact and influencing factors of “stars” or unproductive 
researchers (Abramo, Cicero, & D’Angelo, 2013a; Ajay Agrawal, McHale, & Oettl, 2017; 
White, James, Burke, & Allen, 2012), individual characteristics like age or gender inequalities 
(Abramo, D’Angelo, & Caprasecca, 2009; Oster & Hamermesh, 2006), subject specificities 
and comparability issues (Abramo, Cicero, & D’Angelo, 2013b; Batista, Campiteli, & 
Kinouchi, 2006) or national and international policy evaluation (Auranen & Nieminen, 2010; 
Butler, 2003; Coccia & Rolfo, 2007; Defazio, Lockett, & Wright, 2009; Menter et al., 2018).  
In terms of quantity, research productivity is traditionally measured by publications or a 
publication ratio that reflects research productivity of universities (Auranen & Nieminen, 
2010; Vinkler, 2017). Concerning the “publish or perish” paradigm, it is often argued that 
productivity itself is not an indicator for quality of the work but it is rather a contemporary 
necessity that leads to higher rankings, additional funds or promotion and potentially to 
research misconduct (Moosa, 2018, pp. 18 ff., 56 ff.). This is supported by upcoming salami-
slicing strategies or incentives to increase the number of publications within a short 
timeframe. As a respective example might serve the Graduate Schools in the German 
Excellence Initiative that include structured doctorate programs with small timeframes which 
lead likely to less monographies and the fastest and not highest-quality publications (Baader 
& Korff, 2015; Martin, 2013). It is a comparably immediate and controllable measure based 
on peer-review – at least for the academic world in which citation, publication or patenting 
activities are rather time-intense. In this context, institutions are unable to measure and 
maximize what they should or might be achieving – research quality. In consequence, they 
will increase their efforts to maximize what they can immediately measure and promote – 
research quantity (S. Lehmann, Jackson, & Lautrup, 2006). 
 
 
 
68 
 
Research Quality 
While research quantity is a comparably immediate measure, research quality is more 
complex to define due to differing quality concepts. The differentiation is a case-specific one, 
often comprising a qualitative evaluation based on peer review (Hicks, 2012; Moed, 2008; 
Paul, 2008; Rebora & Turri, 2013) or bibliometric data for instance, which relies on clearly 
defined measures. Although, relations between peer review and bibliometric evaluation exist, 
they are not a substitute but rather complementary (Jarwal, Brion, & King, 2009; Van Raan, 
2006).  
Previous studies considered and discussed collaboration (Franceschet & Costantini, 2010; 
Lawani, 1986), innovativeness (Stremersch, Camacho, Vanneste, & Verniers, 2015), citation 
indices like h-index, citation frequency, (contextual) impact factor (Bertoli-Barsotti & Lando, 
2017; Chen, 2017; Moed, 2010; Moed et al., 2012; Saha, Saint, & Christakis, 2003) or 
consolidated ranking data like journal or university rankings (Dill & Soo, 2005; W. Locke, 
2014; Paul, 2008; Van Raan, 2005; Vogel et al., 2017). Studies focus on individual papers 
(Gingras & Khelfaoui, 2017; Jarwal et al., 2009; Tahamtan, Afshar, & Ahamdzadeh, 2016; 
Vogel et al., 2017), journals (Mingers & Xu, 2010; Moed, 2010; Stremersch et al., 2015; 
Tahamtan et al., 2016), researchers (Ajay Agrawal et al., 2017; Judge et al., 2007; Tahamtan 
et al., 2016), departments or research groups (Ajay Agrawal et al., 2017; Franceschet & 
Costantini, 2010; Van Raan, 2006), universities (Abramo & D’Angelo, 2015; Menter et al., 
2018) or countries (Crespi & Geuna, 2008; Lin, Chen, & Yang, 2014).  
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In particular, citation analyses have become prominent recently. The assumption is that 
visibility inside the scientific community reflects importance and represents an independent 
two-stage peer review – first stage publication (including a review process) and second stage 
visibility inside a research community (Chen, 2017). The evaluation method also comprises 
dysfunctionalities as higher citation rates are by their nature sensitive to specificities of 
science, e.g. to elaborated quantitative methods (Antonakis, Bastardoz, Liu, & Schriesheim, 
2014; Judge et al., 2007) or review articles (Antonakis et al., 2014; Judge et al., 2007). 
Citations might be the outcome of supportive behavior by scientists or as negative example 
so-called “citation cartels” (Tahamtan et al., 2016). The interpretation of measures has to be 
dealt with cautiously as for example practical relevance and article citations do not necessarily 
correlate with each other (Flickinger, Tuschke, Gruber-Muecke, & Fiedler, 2014; Judge et al., 
2007) and innovative work is hardly identified by any journals (Siler, Lee, & Bero, 2015). 
Thus, the benefit that politicians expect and which are outlined above can at least be 
questioned. 
Dysfunctionalities in evaluating higher education  
All described research policy evaluation measures – efficiency, quantity and quality – have in 
common that they try to make the complex process of scientific work measurable and 
interpretable. They are comprehensive measures with a high degree of validity if they are 
accurately and properly used (Moed et al., 2012). They also reveal dysfunctionalities 
regarding the risk of manipulation or disorder, misinterpretation or unintended consequences.  
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Potential forms of manipulation are found in the intentional shift of efforts that could be either 
undesired but legitimate in terms of the so-called salami slicing, excessive self-citation or 
even illegitimate in terms of (self-) plagiarism or coercive citations (Butler, 2003; Martin, 
2013). Strategic behavior of researchers, managers and editors might lead to manipulated 
citation rates, impact factors and so forth (Anurag Agrawal, 2005; Reedijk & Moed, 2008; 
Szklo, 2008). Additionally, exogenously given factors or chosen databases (Tahamtan et al., 
2016) influence positions, exemplary the role of proximity towards the predominant US 
system might create biases (Crespi & Geuna, 2008; Gingras & Khelfaoui, 2017; Van Raan, 
2005). Crespi and Geuna (2008, p. 576) explain e.g. the spillover differences from the US to 
the OECD countries: “[The greater impact and quality of spillovers in the US] may be due to 
the size of the science investment in the US (€ 142 per capita against € 89 per capita in the 
EU-15 in 1999),
 
but also to the fact that although the EU has a similar or even higher 
publication output than the US, the EU countries achieve excellence only in a small number 
of fields […].” 
One of the pioneers of bibliometric approaches, Eugene Garfield (1970, p. 137), emphasized 
the role of interpreting bibliometric measures: “Like most other scientific discoveries, this 
tool can be used wisely or abused. It is now up to the scientific community to prevent abuse of 
the SCI by devoting the necessary attention to its proper and judicious exploitation.” When 
interpreting bibliometric measures one should keep in mind that differences among disciplines 
like nature and social sciences might distort the picture (Abramo, D’Angelo, & Caprasecca, 
2009; Nederhof, 2006). For instance, rankings that base their results not only on current 
bibliometric data are problematic in terms of the specific observed moment, such as Nobel 
Prize winners and their respective affiliation might introduce biases (Bowden, 2000; Van 
Raan, 2005). Productivity must be distinguished from impact or quality and vice versa. 
Extraordinary achievements become often (not always) not visible before a rewarding 
moment (like a Nobel Prize; Garfield, 1970; Moed, 2008; Siler et al., 2015; Stremersch et al., 
2015). 
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As far as unintended responses and strategic behavior of higher education politicians, 
managers and researchers is concerned, one should consider the type of incentive including 
the respective reward. As shown by Butler (2003) in the Australian context, performance-
related funding lead to productivity gains which meant more publications in bottom Journals 
and not top Journals. Another aspect in motivating researchers is a potential crowding out 
effect: Well-qualified scientists respond less to monetary incentives but rather according to 
their individual motivation and interests (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Kenny, 2017; 
Liefner, 2003). This could result in eliminating intrinsic for extrinsic motivation. 
3.2 Institutions 
3.2.1 Theoretical basis of Corporate Governance 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the role of policy for the higher education system as an 
external governance mechanism to lower transaction costs, namely costs of coordination and 
motivation, by providing incentives. The outside steering mechanisms of policy were 
outlined, which assume that inside of the organization actors have the same interests and 
tastes and are acting against the factual policy framework. The description of this institutional 
governance mechanism will be the focal point of chapter 3.2 Institutions and descriptively 
elaborated and discussed in chapter 4.4 Corporate Governance of higher education in 
Germany: University boards.  
Corporate Governance can be both positive observing the status quo as well as normative 
trying to give answers on how a good Corporate Governance should look like. Thus, 
Corporate Governance theories want essentially to contribute to core questions of 
organization studies: Why do we observe organizations and organizational problems? In a 
positive perspective, why and which organizational problems do we observe in terms of 
coordination and motivation? In a normative perspective, how can organizational problems be 
solved in accordance with the interests of relevant stakeholders?  
The neoclassical economic theory assumed organizations as result of market failure. In 
general, actors are rational, utility maximizing and markets are perfect. This school of thought 
is often giving normative answers to reduce state intervention in order to overcome market 
failure (based on ideas of e.g. Smith (1776, reprint 2007), Ricardo (1817, reprint 2015) or 
Veblen (1900)). The new institutionalist economist theories are advancing this perspective by 
examining institutions as a reflection of social and legal norms assuming bounded rationality, 
utility maximization and imperfect markets (based on ideas of e.g. Coase 1937, 1960; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Holmström 1999, or Grossman & Hart, 1983). Organizations are a result 
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of cost advantages of a hierarchical (versus market) design (Hart & Moore, 1990). Thus, the 
question rises how transactions within a firm differ from those between firms. The 
fundamental differentiation of both streams of thought is their answer to a chicken-and-egg 
problem: neoclassical theories assume that organizations are the consequence of imperfect 
markets, while new institutionalist economist theories assume that imperfect markets are the 
result of organizations.  
Approaches in the new institutionalist economist theories are examining asymmetric 
information and incomplete contracts, which both are an immanent consequence of the 
separation of ownership and control: Asymmetric information is the unequal distribution of 
information between involved parties, potentially benefitting the more informed party at the 
cost of the more uninformed party. Incomplete contracts are partly determined by asymmetric 
information and partly by the in general, unpredictable future events and actions. The result is 
a discretionary room to maneuver and the conduct and/or anticipation of a potential 
(mis)behavior out of opportunism or simple unknowingness. If it is not possible to perfectly 
contract a relationship on the one hand and as involved parties can never be fully informed 
about the motives of the partner on the other hand, all parties run the risk to under-invest in 
relations and miss out chances. Depending on what focus the analysis takes, differing theories 
can contribute to the understanding of the organizational problems and possible mechanisms 
of corporate governance that may help to overcome them by monitoring and incentivizing. In 
the following I will make use of parts of property rights theory for understanding legal 
arrangements, transaction cost theory for contextual factors influencing the organizational 
arrangement and agency theory for performance relationships within the university landscape. 
Property rights theory 
While neoclassical theories broadly were analyzing organizations entities that are made up by 
their assets, property rights theory is more distinctive. In this perspective, organizations exist 
not purely as an accumulation of assets but as a nexus of contracts that help to reduce 
(contracting) costs and complexity. The question addressed in property rights theory is 
essentially, whether integration or contracting is the right strategy for a product or working 
relation based on the allocation of property rights (Hart & Moore, 1990). Transactions 
between or inside firms are dependent on the value of the bundle of property rights that are 
exchanged. In general, those rights concern assets of the firm and the control over them. In 
particular, property rights comprise the right to use, to offer, to advocate, to convert and to 
transfer (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). While contracts can help to specify several intensities of 
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making use of an asset, the purchase of the residual rights guarantees ownership and with it, 
the right of full control (Hart & Moore, 1990). The integration of e.g. a supplier to a firm can 
solve problems of asymmetric information, re-negotiations and specific investments. 
However, integration can potentially lead to harmful effects if property rights are not 
allocated efficiently or if the size of an organization and with it complexity rises. Namely, a 
changing over of property rights can create distortion as loosing incentives (e.g. ownership 
and connected revenues) might change the perspective of the agent causing harmful 
opportunistic behavior.  
The legal arrangement side becomes particularly interesting looking at the so-called 
Hochschullehrerprivileg (privilege of professors) in German universities. After WW II and 
based on the freedom of teaching and research, inventions that were made by scientific 
personnel in universities were considered independent inventions (in contrast to job-related 
inventions). Professors, lecturers or scientific assistants did not have to advice nor to disburse 
their employer (the respective federal state) and had the full right to dispose and to 
economically exploit the invention (Deutscher Hochschulverband, 2015). The rationale was 
that professors were thought to be more motivated to make and exploit important inventions if 
they have the before mentioned property rights and their personal benefit from it. However, 
inventions stagnated and experiences with the Bayh-Dole Act in the USA showed that if not 
the Act per se (Mowery et al., 2001) at least a shift of focus in policy making and legislation 
can trigger more inventions (Shane, 2004; Cunningham, Lehmann, Menter & Seitz, 2018). In 
2002, the law was revised in Germany and persons affiliated to the university must now 
advice the employer about the invention. This is consequently handing over the right for 
commercial use of the invention if not rejected within four months by the employer. The right 
for scientific disposal remains with the scientist (Deutscher Hochschulverband, 2015). 
Particularly, this is in line with the interest of society to get returns on their investments in 
universities. Professors in Germany are civil servants (with the benefit of earning less than in 
industry but having a life-long job perspective) so they tend to be creative for research 
purposes but not to have an entire entrepreneurial interest as they would otherwise 
presumably start a business themselves. The costs of coordinating activities in the market are 
too high within their rationality than within a hierarchy, alluding to the role of transaction 
costs that may explain why joint ownership might case-wise be optimal. 
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Transaction cost theory 
Transaction cost theory adds to the discussion of “making versus buying” (hierarchy versus 
market) the dimension of what motivation and coordination costs if a transaction is delivered 
within or between organizations. Costs are no longer pure production costs but the “costs of 
running the economic system” (Arrow, 1969, p 501) meaning the sum of costs that need to be 
put up for coordination and motivation. In contrast to the classical property rights theory that 
is evaluating ex ante contracting incentives, transaction cost theory takes into account 
transaction costs that may lead to ex post negotiations (Müller & Schmitz, 2016). 
Coordination is concerning the structure of transactions, e.g. the organizational structure and 
processes or the legal arrangements within a market. Motivation consists of (extrinsic and 
intrinsic) incentives, e.g. bonus payments in the organization or direct returns in the market. 
The combination of both is contributing to the transactional setting. Organizations exist where 
the costs of a centralized, hierarchy-oriented coordination and motivation are less than those 
compared to a decentralized, market-oriented coordination and motivation and vice versa.  
On the one hand, coordination within a decentralized setting comprise costs of ex-ante 
initiating a transaction, in particular searching for and screening the right transaction partner, 
as well as ex-post contracting costs, namely (re-)negotiating and agreeing on a transaction as 
well as unintended and inefficient contracting consequences (Arrow, 1969; Williamson 1989, 
p 20 ff.; Lehmann, 2017). Motivation costs in a decentralized setting are those of securing 
reputation and contract adaption as well as costs to enforce the contract eventually with a 
court proceeding. On the other hand, coordination costs within a centralized (or hierarchical) 
setting are the design, maintenance and change of an organizational structure as well as costs 
arising within an organization in terms of decisions and information. To motivate involved 
parties comes at the costs of controlling and monitoring activities, evaluating performance, 
dealing with consequences of not intended decisions and costs of conflicts inside the 
organization (ibid.).  
Which form of organizing transactions is more beneficial is dependent on specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency (Williamson 1985, p 52 ff., p. 78 ff.). The more specific an 
investment – be it specific in terms of facility, location, experience, etc. – the higher the 
relative dependency. Consequently, the probability of lock-in effects (resulting in high 
changing costs), hold-up (resulting in re-negotiations) or breach of promise, which is in 
particular endangering the ex-ante less informed or ex-post more dependent party. The 
transformation from an ex-ante unspecific to an ex-post specific relation in this context is 
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called fundamental transformation, which determines the kind and extent of costs, the 
negotiation power of partners as well as the potential for malfunction or misbehavior 
(Williamson, 1985, p 61 ff.). The more insecure a transaction is (be it uncertain in terms of 
behavioral assumptions, exogenous disturbances or their interaction with the before 
mentioned specificity) the higher the costs to establish a trustful or efficiently contracted 
transaction (Williamson, 1985, p 56 ff.). A higher frequency of transactions justifies the costs 
of specialized structures (e.g. in terms of contracting, processes, etc.) which are most suitable 
for large or very specific transactions which are additionally establishing trusting 
relationships. As outlined in the previous paragraph, hierarchical mechanism can contribute to 
handle connected problems of being locked-in, experiencing hold-up and breach of promise 
by the party that is less informed or more dependent on the transaction. Grossman & Hart 
(1986) show that integration as a centralized setting is beneficial if one party is particularly 
dependent on the transaction relative to the other, while contracting should be chosen if both 
consider the asset or transaction as more or less equally important. 
Universities are an institution with the main activities of teaching and research (and 
increasingly the third mission as engaging with the industry/society). Teaching is 
characterized by frequent interactions and repetition as well as it is considered specific in 
terms of codified and subject-specific knowledge. This justifies just as for teachers the costly 
status of professors as civil servants. Research as well as the third mission are a highly 
specific and uncertain activity with regards to the produced and disseminated knowledge. 
Additionally, the outcome cannot be fully determined as innovation is a creative process and 
cannot be contracted ex-ante (Hart, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Hart & Moore, 1990). A certain 
degree of autonomy, which is granted by the basic law as the freedom of teaching and 
research, can be considered a measure of motivation (Audretsch, Seitz & Rouch, 2017) for 
university members, as their activities are barely controllable. However, a certain degree of 
dependency (ascertained by financing) is desirable out of a state perspective to support and 
make use of technological and societal progress generated inside universities. Thus, the 
development of universities as stable institutions between financial dependence and activity 
freedom within the German society described in Chapter 2 is not surprising out of the 
theoretical perspective. However, within a hierarchical setting new problems of coordination 
and motivation arise because the evaluation of the value generated by the transaction (i.e. 
performance) is difficult and uncertainty rises. Additionally, as goals of the involved parties 
(society, policy, university managers, scientists) might differ this leads to issues which are 
examined in detail in agency theory. 
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Agency theory 
While transaction cost theory deals with the questions how economic transactions should best 
been coordinated – market vs. hierarchy, de-centralized vs centralized – agency theory asks 
how contracts could and should best been enforced. The core question is connected to how 
contracted performance relations between an agent and a principal within an organization can 
be optimized under the assumption of asymmetric information (second-best solution). The 
principal-agent relation is existent due to the benefits of cooperation and the separation of 
ownership and control. The principal is the contracting or ordering authority, typically the 
owner of an organization, i.e. the shareholder. He or she is interested in safeguarding the 
highest returns on investment (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) of which the necessary actions 
to do so cannot – or even if at extremely high costs – be completely contracted. The agent is 
the provider of a contracted activity controlling and deciding upon assets that are owned by 
the principal, typically the appointed manager of an organization, i.e. a stakeholder (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). His interests lie in maximizing the utility of his work in financial (i.e. 
compensation) but also non-financial (e.g. reputation, self-fulfillment, work-life balance, etc.) 
terms. Both, the principal and the agent, seek to maximize their individual utility within the 
contracted relationship while the individual goals might conflict and lead to an anticipatory 
under-investment and/or a loss of welfare. The utility of the principal is dependent on a proper 
management of his or her assets and thus, on the actions of the agent, of whom the efforts are 
not (or at prohibitively high costs) verifiable. As a result of this dependency and the potential 
of opportunistic behavior, the principal tries to safeguard his investment while the agent tries 
to get the best position possible to fulfill his needs at least efforts (i.e. potentially at the cost of 
the principal; Eisenhardt, 1989). The connected so-called agency costs are the sum of costs of 
screening by the principal, signaling by the agents and “residual costs” for the welfare loss 
resulting from the second best to the best solution (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The reduction 
of information asymmetry and an alignment of interests for the benefit of those that are 
considered relevant stakeholders (be it shareholder-centered or including others like 
employees, society, etc.) can be analyzed and optimized ex-ante or ex-post contracting 
(Lehmann, 2017).  
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Ex ante, hidden characteristics can cause problems in the principal agent relation. Agents 
might hide undesired traits or attributes in order to be selected by the principal and to get a 
position they might not be particularly suited for. This so-called adverse selection roots in 
asymmetric information as the principal is the uninformed while the agent is the informed 
party. The informed party can signal and reassure the principal in his decision by signaling, 
e.g. with certificates, references or guarantees. The uninformed party might reduce the 
probability of adverse selection by screening the applicant and setting up self- selecting 
mechanisms that allow to align interests (counteracting mechanisms are most prominently 
described with the market for “lemons” by Akerlof, 1970). Exemplary, professors should be 
highly motivated and committed personalities that like to teach and research in a steady, say 
risk averse, manner. In order to be selected as professor the agent needs to show previous 
performance in teaching and research certified by the doctorate and habilitation, which is with 
12 years of uncertainty a comparably time consuming and risky investment comprising high 
changing costs by the agent (i.e. signaling his aptitude and willingness). The selection panel 
including professors and other stakeholders are responsible for screening his suitability. 
Further, a self-selection mechanism is system-immanent: professors have the benefit of a high 
degree of freedom and life-long security as civil servants but at the cost of lower 
compensations and an uncertain qualification phase, which should attract individuals that are 
creative and risk-averse but as much committed that they take those costs.  
Ex post, the principal can encounter problems of moral hazard and hold up. The work results 
of the agent are dependent on himself as well as on environmental factors, which opens a 
discretionary room to maneuver. In case the agent hides his actions (not observable efforts) or 
information (not knowable factors), the principal can barely disentangle the quality of the 
output between the agent’s effort or the influence of the environment (Holmström, 1999). 
Monitoring as a hierarchical mechanism can help to sensitize the agent for factors considered 
relevant and prevent inappropriate behavior such as tunneling, entrenchment strategies or 
extravagant investments. Fama and Jensen (1983) show the consequences and benefits to 
separate control, i.e. ratifying and monitoring, from management, i.e. initiating and 
implementing, and risk bearing of decisions. Decision hierarchies, mutual monitoring systems 
and boards are general mechanisms, which are outlined to counteract moral hazard behavior. 
Further, incentivizing as a form of alignment of interests may help to overcome goal conflicts, 
e.g. by considering human capital development, bonus payments or profit-sharing 
(Holmström, 1999). Nevertheless, even if characteristics were well-known, actions observable 
and information available, the intentions of the agent might be hidden. The fundamental 
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transformation on this individual level implies the risk of hold-up and renegotiations. The 
principal is locked in due to the already specific investment in the agent (sunk costs), and 
thus, no or little power to influence the behavior of the agent ex post. Thus, the relation-
specific investment and uncertainty about relevant factors opens room for the agent to act on 
his own benefit at the cost of the principal. This might be counteracted by generating 
guarantees – which however, could be seen itself a new “contract”.  
The outcome of universities is highly specific, highly uncertain, involved parties have 
typically a long-term relationship, and the “owner” is not as definite as e.g. shareholders in 
the business context are. The agent might be defined as the university management with the 
president at the top as primus inter pares. The principal is ultimately society and in narrower 
terms the federal state’s government consisting of politicians and bureaucrats. Decision 
management and control are diffuse in universities with global budgets and its collegial self-
governance and thus, the danger of moral hazard behavior is prevalent. Market mechanisms 
are difficult to implement: disciplining managers by an impending loss of job (Fama, 1980; 
Manne, 1965) is barely feasible due to the civil servant structure and the university-defined 
period of office. The introduction of a quasi-market and a resulting competition can be seen as 
policy instrument making use of measures of the private sector like with the Excellence 
Initiative (see Chapter 3.1 and 4.3). University boards as an instrument of monitoring can 
contribute to reduce moral hazard behavior in behavior-based contracts, which exist 
predominantly in universities (in contrast to outcome-based contracts; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
First, they make relevant information transparent, and second, the agent is more likely to 
behave in the interest of the principal if the principal obtains information on the behavior of 
the agent – what long has not been the case for the “ivory towers” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). In addition, university boards are considered motivated to control decisions, as 
nonprofit boards consist of members that serve out of willingness to provide expertise, to get 
prestige and not predominantly due to financial payments (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Basic Criticism  
The assumption of purely opportunistic behavior of actors is one of the major criticisms 
mainly coming from psychological research. Social norms and influences, assessment of the 
specific transaction partner and avoidance of dissonance can influence the behavior and 
attitudes of individuals, which are mostly ignored (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). However, purely 
opportunistic behavior, that e.g. successful psychopaths or to some extent “normal narcissists” 
show, can have considerable job advantages in Western economies and respective governance 
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systems. Thus, the simplifying assumption that individuals act opportunistic might not be 
totally misleading at least for the current time and cultural frame (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 
2010; Boddy, Ladyshewsky, & Galvin, 2010; Hall & Benning, 2006; Sedikides, Rudich, 
Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Research on human behavior emphasizes that proposed 
solutions like monitoring and control can even increase the probability of opportunism and 
misperformance (Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). The question 
of who monitors the monitor remains unanswered (if the answer is not the imperfect market). 
Further might be criticized the pure utility maximization approach. This is firstly touching the 
distributional question and differentiation between shareholder and stakeholder approach as 
well as which utility should be maximized. Secondly, philosophical considerations question 
the normative evaluation and ethical appropriateness
8
 of a pure utility maximization approach. 
As an interim conclusion, Corporate Governance is a mechanism comprising of a set of 
instruments that manages the risk of under-investment and welfare loss. The design is 
dependent on the organization and its stakeholders, because interests, contribution and 
participation of stakeholders as well as the room for action of university stakeholders are not 
static. The context and relevant stakeholders determine transaction and agency costs of the 
organization. The problems arise (i) from the incompleteness of contracts and a discretionary 
room to maneuver and (ii) from individual or organization goals that might differ with those 
of other stakeholders or organizations. In the German university landscape we observe an 
interesting setting: high uncertainty about outcomes and high specificity leading to a high 
degree of internalization as universities are public organizations as well as to a comparably 
high degree of autonomy as universities predominantly rely on collegial self-governance. As 
has been shown, the current university system can partly be explained theoretically, 
confronting problems of distribution of property rights, transaction costs within a hierarchy, 
adverse selection, and moral hazard. While chapter 3.1 addressed incentivizing mechanisms 
in form of policy approaches and chapter 3.3 will address selection processes within 
universities, the remaining chapter 3.2 will specify the role of boards in higher education 
institutions and critical measurement issues.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 For example pure utilitarists would argue that the death of one (healthy) person could be justified if all organs 
would be transplanted to people in need so that they can live on (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). Similarly, one could 
argue that for the advantage of shareholders, redundancies and illegal behavior was acceptable, neglecting e.g. 
societal responsibility and compliance.  
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3.2.2 The role of boards in higher education institutions 
Some authors argue that the differentiation between public and private organizations is 
obsolete if organizational models were more accurate – however, such an abstracted theory 
does not exist up until now. Parameters set in new institutionalist economic theory are existent 
in public such as in private organizations but they should be defined and refined according to 
the specific institutional context. Apart from the definition of principal as investor and agent 
as manager, the distinction of the uninformed and informed party as well as the detection of 
goal conflicts should be highlighted in the university context as it will be used in the 
following categorization. This allows to understand role ambiguities and functions in the 
decision process.  
Theoretical perspective of German university boards 
Society as starting point is ultimately the principal of universities indirectly financing them by 
tax payments (while also those individuals are agents in their role of being employees) in the 
hope for a proper spending, and resulting security, progress and welfare. However, the 
spending of taxpayer’s money is not fully transparent and they can deliberately choose neither 
where their money is going nor how it is spent. The government, consisting of politicians and 
bureaucrats, are in their role as agents controlled by elections and their interest lies in being 
re-elected and potentially broadening their area of influence by input maximization. They 
essentially administrate and manage the distribution of tax resources. The university 
management represented by the president is managing and coordinating the university and is 
responsible to motivate members of university faculties and departments. Due to the nature of 
a primus inter pares, the position traditionally promised more non financial rewards like 
prestige and doing something for the common than a great financial bonus. The president as 
informed member of the respective university can be considered agent towards the 
government (and eventually principal towards the remaining organizational members). This 
chapter focusing on university boards concentrates on the last mentioned interface of public 
administration (principal) and universities (agents). While universities have the interest to stay 
with as much autonomy possible, public administration calls for accountability in terms of 
providing human capital and knowledge (Kivistö, 2008).  
This tension was taken into account in the course of new public management evolving in the 
beginning of the 90’s. Incentive-giving initiatives with the Excellence Initiative, more self- 
responsibility for students with study fees or a more performance-oriented salary concept are 
just some examples in the German higher education landscape. Autonomous decisions (i.e. 
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decentralization) were supported by the introduction of global budgets to ensure an efficient 
resource allocation by organizational experts – namely the president who was considerably 
strengthened in his position. At the same time behavior rather than a static outcome should be 
facilitated by incentives, e.g. W-wages of professors, and monitoring, e.g. university boards 
(Schimank & Lange, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989). Where Fama & Jensen (1983) suggest to 
separate decision control and management, the decentralizing policy further disentangled the 
public controlling function: public controlling split to a framing and monitoring of decisions. 
Full monitoring of the effect by a central bureau was no longer realizable at justifiable costs. 
The introduction of university boards was the institutional answer to the self-regulating 
freedom that was given to universities: they are ratifying and monitoring decisions of the 
president not at a distance but at proximity (see an overview on the tasks of university boards 
in Table 11: Overview on the federal state's designs of university boards in 2012.). The new 
strength of the president and the arising risk of moral hazard behavior was hoped to be 
governed properly. Apart from making information transparent and with this expecting a 
positive influence on the behavior of the president, members of society could participate in 
decision making processes, which was ought to increase acceptance and show an opening of 
the “ivory towers”. In doing so, the senate as internal control committee of academic self-
governance was disempowered (Schimank & Lange, 2009; Heinze, Bogumil, Grohs, and 
Gerber, 2007). Thus, in the university context one needs to differentiate decision framing 
(policy), decision control (university boards) and decision management (president). However, 
one has to face new challenges like differing interests, resource dependencies or board 
composition with the introduction of boards, which will be examined in 4.4 Corporate 
Governance of higher education in Germany: University boards. 
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University boards in hybrid, decentral and central systems 
The traditional European governance systems relied on autonomy of their comparably big 
universities and usually – if at all – did not have a powerful board of trustees. A remarkable 
exception is the oldest European university of Bologna at its beginnings, where a student gilde 
could force professors not to leave the campus (or only in return for a depository) or that 
could fine professors for bad lectures (Hermalin, 2002). Funding was connected to “hard” 
outcome factors like student numbers and control of internal decisions was brought through 
self-governing committees like the senate, where professors – even if other stakeholders were 
recently added – essentially had the power to control and manage themselves. With the shift 
from outcome to behavior steering recently introduced boards, e.g. in Germany and Austria, 
were seen as advisory and included various types of stakeholders to the “Ivory Tower” (S. 
Lange, 2010; Röbken & Schütz, 2013). The alternative to control decisions centrally can be 
observed in France, which fully controls universities and also internal decisions via the 
responsible ministry (Broadbent, Gallop, & Laughlin, 2010).  
The Anglo-American model is traditionally more focused on funding by students and donors 
– reflected in their use of university boards. The UK employed faculty gildes, e.g. in Oxford 
before 19
th
 century, and more recently, boards have been implemented to monitor the 
university (Broadbent, Gallop, & Laughlin, 2010). As from the 17
th
 century the young 
American faculties employed students to tutor courses and boards exercised considerable 
control over most and important issues. Those boards did not consider “typically youthful, 
inexperienced, and transient teaching faculty” to be able to govern themselves (Gerber, 2014, 
p. 14). Additionally, in light of the strong dependence on donations and religion (rather than 
state funding like in the continental European model), boards were installed to control by 
having both, a framing and monitoring function, e.g. in one of the first American universities 
in Harvard shortly after the founding in 1642. Up until today, their approach is based on 
intense control, market and shareholder orientation (W. O. Brown, 2014; Hermalin, 2004). 
This does not only mean considerable influence but also network (Mathies & Slaughter, 
2013), gender effects (Ehrenberg, Jakubson, Martin, Main, & Eisenberg, 2012), conflicts and 
the pursuit of own interests of board members what calls to memory the question who 
monitors the monitor (Bastedo, 2009a, 2009b). Studies evaluated conceptually and 
descriptively the work and embeddedness of university councils (Amaral & Magalhaes, 2002; 
Hermalin, 2004; Mayntz, 2002; Rytmeister, 2009; Trakman, 2008). As for companies, the 
size of university boards was analyzed (Ashbrook, 1932; W. O. Brown, 2014) finding a 
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positive relation between university size, religious affiliation and university type. Discussing 
university and board performance includes a positive relation to board size (W. O. Brown, 
2014), private or public nature of a university as well as the interlocks, role perception and 
conflicts of members (Arslan, 2013; Kezar, 2006; Kretek et al., 2013; Pusser, Slaughter, & 
Thomas, 2006). The board structure (state-wide vs. individual) is found to be influenced by 
political shirking strategies (Toma, 1986), and public universities can be influenced positively 
by governing bodies responsible for only one university (Toma, 1990). The Anglo-American 
system is strongly decentralized and also a matter of private interests (students, donors, etc.), 
which explains that powerful boards are partly compensating a lack of steering and partly 
fulfilling a representation of interests. 
The Chinese university system is centralistic after its nationalization and the influence of the 
Soviets in the 50ies. The central government majorly funds universities as well as the living 
of students. Personal benefits by economic activity, tuition fees and corresponding supporting 
programs were introduced lately to cover under-investments. Serving mainly as provider of 
work force in planned job assignments, universities were structured and specialized according 
to fields and under supervision of the respective ministry (around 60 ministries involved, not 
one science ministry). Research institutions were operating independently and organized by 
the Chinese Academy of Science. Although recent merges and a light market-oriented re-
organization of higher education the controlling of them is not – like in the European or 
Anglo-American institutions – a matter of multiple specificities (Min, 2004). A combination 
of structural, cultural and political circumstances created observing advisory, so-called 
“academic councils” with little power. Governance is strictly hierarchical and broadly shaped 
by a strong dean or president and ultimately by the political guidance (Hao, 2016). 
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Thus, the European university board is a mechanism between the Anglo-American steering of 
universities via boards and the Chinese administration via a political agenda. As a 
consequence of the introduction of more market-oriented measures, boards and their analysis 
are upcoming for the European context (Kretek, Dragšić, & Kehm, 2013; Röbken & Schütz, 
2013). Research is broadly orientating on the Anglo-American context with the most powerful 
construction. Results are by no means extensive and due to the described path dependencies 
sometimes misleading (W. O. Brown, 2014; Hermalin, 2004; Pusser et al., 2006; Rytmeister, 
2009). The juxtaposition of corporate governance theories to (American) university councils 
and the proposed research agenda by Hermalin (2004) discusses the most critical aspect of 
applicability concluding that differences are found in the degree and not in the substance of 
corresponding boards. This point is valid in particular, for the American boards and their 
function. Just as the literature of boards distinguishes between one-tier and two-tier boards, 
the specific function of boards as well as the institutional context needs to be taken into 
account.  
3.2.3 Measurement: Critical issues 
Previous research in this context can be divided into shareholder (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) versus stakeholder orientation (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Luoma & 
Goodstein, 1999) and hybrid approaches (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 2000; 
Roe, 1993). The three most discussed questions are as follows: first, whether and what 
determines size and composition in terms of insider/outsider (Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; 
Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009; Pfeffer, 1972); second, if applicable at all, what role does the 
board play for firm performance with measures like strategic performance in mergers, Tobin’s 
Q and other key performance indicators (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; 
A. Klein, 1998); third, the endogeneity problem (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). 
Measuring composition, performance or success of boards in higher education is difficult due 
to theoretical considerations on measurements and corresponding applicability. The questions 
that define the research agenda: What shall be measured? How should it be measured? Is it in 
general possible to find appropriate measures? What is reasonable to measure at all? 
In particular, no unique goal exists in the university context and thus, no specific performance 
indicator can be measured. Universities follow the research, teaching and third mission 
(Keeling, 2006) – which would be the one to be evaluated? Non-parametric approaches like 
the Data Envelopment Analysis account for this multi-dimensional outcome problem 
(Agasisti & Pohl, 2012; Lehmann et al., 2018; Lehmann & Warning, 2004; Thursby & Kemp, 
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2002). However, they are highly sensitive to the “subjective” choice of variables and outliers. 
Choosing only a single mission one faces the difficult decision that was already discussed in 
3.1.3 Measurement: Research quantity and quality for Picking the Winner policy approaches: 
What could be an adequate indicator for teaching (graduates per professor, evaluation results, 
etc.), research (publications per professor, citations, etc.) and third mission (patents, third-
party funding, etc.)? 
The indicators that should affect performance (or vice versa should be affected by the 
organizational environment) are also questionable. As Hermalin (2002, p. 5) points out: 
“many of the board characteristics that have been hypothesized to matter in the corporate 
context are either not meaningful or difficult to define in the higher-education context.” As an 
example might serve the insider outsider ratio, where presidents are the only director and 
students cannot be ascribed as internal or external stakeholder.  
Nevertheless, even if this discussion was solved to a tolerable extent, the existence of the 
endogeneity problem and misleading implications from causal relations in this context is 
crucial (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010; Wintoki, Linck, & 
Netter, 2012). As Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) correctly bring forward: 
Endogeneity is the major pitfall of parametric estimations out of theoretical as well as 
empirical considerations. Single evidences might separate e.g. the director’s role from more 
general perspectives (A. Klein, 1998), the basic contradiction in logic remains: assume 
organization A has trouble in terms of goal attainment and – as usually in moments of crisis – 
involved parties blame a poor board performance (be it out of structural configurations or 
personal attributes). However, one should ask one more crucial question: why was this 
structure (or composition or size etc.) initially chosen? If not pure coincidence, one would 
expect that this solution was the optimal one that organization A could and wanted to realize 
in order to face its individual governance challenges. Out of the empirical perspective, the 
afore mentioned governance choices are considered to be unobservedly correlated with the 
error term in regression estimations and uncertainty of the lag structure that should predict the 
outcome of governance choice on organizational performance.  
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3.3 Individuals 
3.3.1 The role of power and leadership in Corporate Governance  
The previous discussions of Corporate Governance contributed to questions (i) how to 
allocate scarce (public) resources e.g. with a quasi-market competitive approach and (ii) how 
institutional structures coming from private industry can help to balance or overcome market 
imperfections and differing personal interest. Not considered so far was the hierarchical part 
of governing organizations including cost-advantages of concentrating power at the top level. 
Universities as hierarchical coordination mechanism include knowledge transfer to students, 
research and technological progress in an environment independent from (private) market 
pressures. While in former times universities seemed to rely on collegial self-governance (be 
it with ordinaries or cooperative committees), the call for a strong leader at the top is not only 
present in society per se but even more in the university context. If this means that 
concentration of power at the top is superior to a decentral, collegial steering, it is of crucial 
interest who gets this position of a primus inter pares and how he leads. The list of leaders 
which are charismatic but poor in leadership abilities (by intention or inability) causing 
distress for organizations and subordinates is long. Putting those thoughts together, the last 
fundamental questions in Corporate Governance and interdisciplinary fields will be 
addressed: Who rules? And, what is good ruling? The following chapter will first address the 
basic question on how leaders are constructed. Based on those fundamental considerations I 
will outline aspects of emerging and effective leaders and differing leadership traits and 
styles. This is supported by the attempt to formalize and measure these traits with a focus on 
the Big 5 personality categorization and initiating structure and consideration as categories of 
leadership behavior. The conceptual framework will be applied to German universities and 
their presidents in chapter 4.5 Leadership in German universities: Of presidents. 
The definition of leadership is intriguing because it is as intuitive as it is meticulous. Ever 
since, human mankind organized itself in groups, reducing exclusively selfish interests in 
order to pool those interests and gain safety generated by pure number of people (Hogan & 
Kaiser, 2005). The benefits of this organizational approach are the concentration of 
information at the top, which allows all-embracing beneficial and fast decisions for the group 
and their implementation. Consequently, group members have a potentially higher 
identification with the group and expect respective synergy effects. The disadvantages are as 
follows: a potential misuse of power on the expenses of the groups and the strong dependence 
on characteristics and abilities of one person. 
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The question who is or should be leading has been raised and answered in the respective 
context but always in light of power concentration. The “law of the strongest” was not found 
suitable for bigger societies, so first democratic principles depending on classes were applied 
in Greece or Rome. This power distribution was refined by religious, indisputable but 
formalized power structures that were based on the doctrine of divine right. The experiences 
and costs of the absolute, sometimes called Machiavellian, leaders resulted in analyses and 
(normative) theories of social contracts and the state. They evolved at the time of 
enlightenment, tried to prevent misuse of power and to conceptualize domination, leadership 
and societal interrelations in the context of absolutistic monarchies. Hobbes (1651, reprint 
1972, p. 11), having experienced the English civil war, concentrated on a social contract with 
a strong but – if not benevolent – potentially dangerous leader (Leviathan) that could manage 
the human nature of “homo homini lupus”. (J. Locke, 1698, reprint 2014, p. 89 ff.). The 
sympathy for people as moral background and people looking for their own individual 
commercial advantage was basis of Adam Smith’s (1776, reprint 2007) influencing work on 
the Wealth of Nations. The turn away from the mercantilist paradigm to the classical 
economics paradigm emphasized the market as self-regulating mechanism that is in being 
self-regulated by people’s interests and the invisible hand contributing to the benefit of all. In 
this line of confronting mercantilist and absolutist structures, Baron de Montesquieu (1748, 
reprint 2001) referred to the danger of too powerful leaders and argued in favor of checks and 
balances supporting interests of the population and advocating a restriction of power. One of 
the most far reaching concepts rejecting constitutional monarchies was developed by 
Rousseau (1762, reprint 2011) and his concept of direct democracy.  
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Those theorists show the range of how to deal with hierarchy meaning a concentration of 
power on the one side and market meaning decentralized power distribution on the other side. 
During mercantilism, the superior goal was to increase wealth of the absolutist, thus, 
production of goods was organized in small organizational entities while the largest 
organizational design was found in the state administration (e.g. feudal system). Although, 
businesses like those of the Fugger or Welser family existed and had considerable influence, 
all interventions subordinated to mercantilist ideas. The French revolution resulted in the right 
to own property and generated new social and market structures. This new distribution of 
property rights essentially motivated subsequent technical progress during industrialization. 
Big, economic organizations of today can only be understood in light of the possibility to 
pursuit self-interests, to capitalize returns and eventually re-invest them. Universities were on 
the one hand always considered rigid and not progressive in applicable terms. On the other 
hand, their basic research and stabilization of knowledge played a considerable role of the 
philosophical, political as well as technological development (see also 2.1 Introduction to the 
relevance of the history of universities (until 1919)).  
The combination of those theories does not only explain problems and possible solutions of 
today’s Western state constructs but also the way societies try to govern companies. Good 
leaders were necessary for both to persuade involved individuals for group conform behavior 
and to realize corresponding group advantages (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). Himself living in 
times of social upheaval with the second wave of industrialization and experiencing the 
upcoming of big bureaucracies in form of corporations as well as witnessing the political 
change from monarchies to democracies, M. Weber (1925) observed and formulized the 
resulting socio-economic relations and constructs for the first time including economic 
bureaucracies.  
Organizations are seen as a stählernes Gehäuse (iron cage) and can equally be state 
institutions or non-state corporations that underlie rationalized principles. In contrast to 
exclusive power
9
 he defines Herrschaft (in the following: authority) as additionally being 
dependent on obedience and legitimation. Thus, leading and being lead requires a group of 
people, the allocation and ascription of power. The creation of authoritative relations is 
characterized by an interest to obey which might be for whatever reason including habituation 
or instrumental rationality as well as the belief of legitimation. The belief of legitimation can 
                                                 
9
 Power defined as “every chance to enforce one’s own will in a social relation even against resistance, 
regardless of what this chance is based on.” (free translation based on M. Weber, 1925, p. 28) 
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be justified rationally (based on legal rules), traditionally (based on historical claims) or 
charismatically (based on exceptionality and trust; M. Weber, 1925, p. 122 ff.). Power and 
authority as specific form of power are a portrayal of specific interest constellations. The 
differing kinds of power can be summarized as follows: expert, referent, reward, coercive, or 
legitimate power in a wider (French, Raven, & Cartwright, 1959) or narrower sense (Hinkin 
& Schriesheim, 1989). 
This more positivistic and functionalist perspective of power and authority was further 
elaborated by constructivist and postmodern theorists that emphasize the relational and 
performative side of power as constructed by collective action (Weick, 1995, p. 4 ff.; 
Weiskopf, 2005). Consequently, power gets distinguished into traditional, visible power that 
is exercised mainly by surveillance and punishment and disciplinary, subtle power coming to 
effect by motivation and incentives. This perspective is no longer analyzing “mechanically” 
the concentration at the top but rather the dynamics and constant negotiation process between 
and within the ruler and the ruled whilst focusing on knowledge, actual practices and 
interpretative processes (du Gay, Salaman, & Rees, 1996; Foucault, 1982).  
Thus, we observe that the definition of leadership has two sides: the technical one and the 
ability-based one. Leaders can be defined as those who have formally the position to exert 
their will and those who are “born” or “made” leaders legitimated without any formal 
ascription. The allocation and ascription of power and legitimacy is a result of implicit and 
explicit negotiation processes, which are endogenously dependent on structural factors and 
vice versa. The outcome is a trade-off: limiting “freedom” of each individual for the group’s 
sake while at the same time this limitation is authorizing leaders to be responsible for the 
group’s advantage. The discussion about the appropriate level of freedom in several aspects is 
ongoing (Audretsch, Seitz, & Rouch, 2018; Lehmann & Seitz, 2017). In modern 
organizations, the group’s advantage depends on the shareholder or stakeholder perspective. 
Separation of ownership and control in bureaucracies (be it as state or private enterprise), a 
frequent call for strong leaders and the possibility to choose the leader motivate the question 
about the personality and leadership style of the “corporate Leviathan”. This examination 
must include the extent of checks and balances and the levelling of differing interest groups.  
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3.3.2 Born or Made: The role of leadership characteristics and style in leadership 
emergence and effectiveness 
The way of how an organization is lead and the extent of motivation of its employees may 
have an enormous influence on organizational success or dysfunctionalities, which motivates 
the necessity to underpin theoretically the evaluation of leadership as concept (Baum, Locke, 
& Smith, 2001; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984). It has to be differentiated between (a) leader 
traits and characteristics which might be found in demographics, task competences or 
interpersonal attributes leading to leadership emergence, (b) leadership behavior or style 
which is partly influenced by leader traits and might be classified in various ways, and (c) 
leadership effectiveness as a result of (a) and (b), which reflects itself in goal attainment for 
an individual, group or organization (Derue, Nahrgang, Wellman, & Humphrey, 2011). This 
breakdown is broadly covering the assumptions of being a “born” or “made” leader in a socio-
economic context, which is discussed in the following. 
Development of leadership research  
A vast literature is surrounding leadership that shall be first divided into two main streams: 
anecdotal evidence, guides or expert opinions (exemplary Iszatt-White & Saunders, 2017; 
Johnson, 2015; Peter & Waterman, 1982) and research-based evaluations on leadership 
emergence (who becomes a leader) and effectiveness (how is the leader's performance 
evaluated, for a qualitative and quantitative review see Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002). 
A very comprehensive and worthwhile review of the vast leadership theory, research and 
managerial applications from the beginning of the last century until today was published and 
is regularly updated by Bass and Bass (2009). Theorists mainly focused on characteristics of 
the leader or on “great man” theories until the late 40’s (Cowley, 1928; Lewin, Lippitt, & 
White, 1939), which was followed by personal leadership styles (until 60’s; Fleishman, 
1953b; Prentice, 1961). The emphasis on an interplay of situational and personal characters of 
the leader and his followers was roughly evolving until the 70’s (House, 1976; Tucker, 1968). 
This was further developed in social sciences to transactional, transformational (Harms & 
Credé, 2010; Hater & Bass, 1988; Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987) and in economics purely 
transactional (Baum et al., 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) approaches dealing with how to 
choose and who is a leader allowing also for indirect effects (Herron & Robinson Jr, 1993; 
Naffziger, 1995), which are most prominent up until today (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 46).  
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Leader traits and characteristics 
Traits are defined as “[…] individual characteristics that (a) are measurable (b) vary across 
individuals, (c) exhibit temporal and situational stability and (d) predict attitudes, decisions, or 
behaviors and consequently outcomes” (Antonakis, 2011, p. 270). Traits and characteristics of 
leaders are consistently related to effectiveness and emergence of leadership (Judge, Bono, et 
al., 2002). With reference to genetic and co-twin studies, personality traits explain roughly 
24%-30% of the variance in emergence as leader (Arvey, Rotundo, Johnson, Zhang, & 
McGue, 2006; De Neve, Mikhaylov, Dawes, Christakis, & Fowler, 2013).  
Heritable and partly influenceable traits that are related to leadership were found in several 
fields: Physical characteristics are related to leadership emergence and performance as it has a 
positive impact on personal living conditions and social acceptance (Pfann, Biddle, 
Hamermesh, & Bosman, 2000; Rule & Ambady, 2008). This effect is for instance examined 
in terms of proactivity (as follower dependent, Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011), appearance 
(Halford & Hsu, 2014; Judge, Hurst, & Simon, 2009; Pfann et al., 2000), or age (as 
moderating effect; Ng & Sears, 2012). Intelligence as one of the most valued traits in Western 
economies was studied frequently: The intelligence of a leader is usually and most 
conveniently slightly but not massively higher than the average of his followers (Bass & Bass, 
2009, p. 84). Good-looking leaders do not have an advantage compared to intelligent ones, 
but having both is summing up (Judge, Hurst, et al., 2009). However, a meta study by Judge, 
Colbert, and Ilies (2004) shows that the relation is smaller than often assumed. The 
differentiation of technical and emotional intelligence in this context is addressed as being 
correlated to effective leadership (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 2006; L. Gardner 
& Stough, 2002; J. M. George, 2000). Further personality characteristics like confidence 
(Judge, Hurst, et al., 2009), humor (Avolio, Howell, & Sosik, 1999; Crawford, 1994), task 
competence or non-conformity (Ridgeway, 1981) have a positive influence on effective 
leadership or mediate the relation. 
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Charisma: Between trait and style  
Charismatic leadership overlaps broadly with inspirational or transformational leadership 
style and might even be used synonymously (Anderson & Sun, 2017; Bass & Avolio, 1989; 
Conger & Kanungo, 1987). If differentiated at all, transformational leadership considers the 
“technical” influence on attitudes and building commitment of organization members 
(sometimes also named “management”) while charismatic leadership is more likely an 
idealization of the leader (G. Yukl, 1989). This concept was evolving from a loose, normative 
framework (M. Weber, 1925), to localizing a leader’s charisma mostly in a political context 
(Willner, 1984), introducing the importance of the context (Blau, 1963; Friedland, 1964) and 
developing a theory of relational dynamics (Bass, 1985). 
Charisma is one of the contemporarily most discussed leadership traits – be it self- or external 
assessed. It shows a positive effect on organizational outcomes such as performance and 
leadership effectiveness (Baum et al., 2001; Chandler & Jansen, 1992; Conger & Kanungo, 
1987; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Nohe, Michaelis, Menges, Zhang, & Sonntag, 2013) or leader-
follower relations, e.g. in terms of less psychological threats or higher motivation (Babcock-
Roberson & Strickland, 2010; Banks et al., 2017; Howell & Shamir, 2005; Seltzer, Numerof, 
& Bass, 1989).  
Charismatic leaders are considered to generate not only halo-effects but also to motivate their 
followers better because of their positive and inspiring demeanor, e.g. being eloquent or 
reflecting positive emotions (Bono & Ilies, 2006; Judge, Bono, et al., 2002; Mio, Riggio, 
Levin, & Reese, 2005). Being charismatic is associated with expressiveness (Bass & Avolio, 
1989), self-confidence and corresponding low level of internal conflict (Conger & Kanungo, 
1987; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004; Howell & Shamir, 2005), showing self-sacrifice 
(De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004), and a high sense of meaningfulness (Babcock-
Roberson & Strickland, 2010). 
However, existent evidence is mixed and also does not find any relation e.g. of 
transformational leadership and organizational performance or emotional intelligence (Agle, 
Nagarajan, Sonnenfeld, & Srinivasan, 2006; F. W. Brown, Bryant, & Reilly, 2006) or even 
negative outcomes, which are explained by harming narcissist effects, polarization of 
employees or misuse of power (Maccoby, 2000; G. Yukl, 1999). As authors assume a 
positive, negative or no effect of charisma empirical literature discusses this inconsistency in 
findings mostly at the sidelines (Agle et al., 2006). Usually, the classic argument which was 
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brought forward by M. Weber (1925, p. 143) is used: Charisma is defined as being 
extraordinary, transitory and ephemeral such that it is contradictive to stability and has to be 
either traditionalized or rationalized (legalized) or both if this type of leader wants to establish 
a stable situation. Thus, charisma is not an attribute to be possessed per se but rather a process 
in social relationships (Ehrhart & Klein, 2001; Tucker, 1968).  
The discussion about the “good and bad theories” or “bright and dark sides of leader traits”, 
which is obviously connected to the differing findings, were addressed occasionally to leave 
the “holy grail” of charisma describing benefits and costs of the characteristic (Bass & Bass, 
2009, p. 46 f.; Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009). Some attempts tried to explain those 
findings by differentiating charismatic leadership as purpose-oriented socialized (serving a 
collective interest, egalitarian behavior, empowerment) versus personalized (dominance, self-
interest, exploitive; House & Howell, 1992), situation-oriented as “office charisma” and 
personal charisma
10
 (Etzioni, 1961, p. 316 ff.), or distance-oriented as close or distant 
relationship between leader and follower (Shamir, 1995).  
Leadership styles  
Leader behaviors explain more variance in leadership effectiveness than leadership traits, 
which is especially true for a moderating effect (Derue et al., 2011). This might be in parts 
caused by the importance of experience, e.g. in terms of extraversion and neuroticism, which 
is more determining after the age of 30 than genetics (Viken, Rose, Kaprio, & Koskenvuo, 
1994) or the strong mediating effect of social environments (Zhang, Ilies, & Arvey, 2009). 
The development and training of leadership styles is thus, the side of “making” a leader, 
which is to some extent possible (Avolio & Bass, 1998; Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996). 
A reduced but widely used classification that shows the range of autocratic to democratic, 
directive to participative, or task- to relations-oriented leadership (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 439 
ff.) includes a hierarchy-driven authoritarian leadership style in which everything is decided 
by a central authority, a democratic leadership style that allows group discussion and 
decision-making, and a laissez-faire leadership style which is characterized by a complete 
nonparticipation of the leader (Lewin et al., 1939). The more recent leadership styles and most 
important differentiation in terms of economic theories is transactional leadership, as 
exchange relationship, which incentivizes and contingently rewards positive behavior as well 
                                                 
10
 A nice quote illustrates the idea: “Top executives, heads of state, and kings, who have charisma in the eyes of 
the public […] may have little or [… none] in the eyes of [their] private secretaries, valets, and cabinet 
ministers.” (Etzioni, 1961, p. 316). 
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as it manages by exception to satisfy self-interests. Transactional conceptions were most 
prominent up until the late 80’s. This might be complemented or substituted by a 
transformational or charismatic leadership style, defined as motivational leadership 
transforming individuals and groups from self-interested goal attainment to self-actualization 
(Bass, 1985; Bass, Avolio, Jung, & Berson, 2003; Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 618 ff.). The 
situative combination of methods – based on transactional, transformational and laissez-faire 
styles – is called the Full Range of Leadership (Antonakis, Avolio, & Sivasubramaniam, 
2003). The question on leadership styles in this context remains: should leadership be 
executed (e.g. by reward motivation, per ordering etc.) or lived out (e.g. by personal 
motivation, participation, empowerment, etc.). 
Which way of leading is considered “appropriate” is strongly dependent on the situation and 
expectations: An autocratic leadership can have positive effects if team power struggles are 
low but there are negative effects if team power struggles are high or employees report to 
experience abusive supervision (De Hoogh, Greer, & Den Hartog, 2015). In times of crises, 
need of fast (and sometimes unpopular) decisions and discipline (e.g. military) or if 
knowledge is asymmetrically distributed benefitting the leader, an authoritative style can be 
beneficial for the overall performance (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 445 ff.). However, this style 
comes at the costs of generating potentially groupthink effects, if asymmetrically distributed 
knowledge is benefitting the subordinate, or if power is executed punitively (Bass & Bass, 
2009, p. 445 ff.). The democratic style can have positive effects if leaders are supported by a 
higher authority and their subordinates as well as if a trustful atmosphere exists. The 
participative approach can lead to less absenteeism, higher levels of motivation and better 
health of subordinates (L. Murphy, 2005). The negative effects are adverse to the authoritative 
style in times of crisis etc. Bass et al. (2003) show a mix of styles and that being adaptive to 
the situation can have considerable performance advantages but requires flexibility and 
realistic assessments of the leader. 
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3.3.3 Measurement: The Big Five 
As could be shown in the previous chapter, research on leadership traits brought out numerous 
studies and empirical findings that are not located in a standardized integrative framework. As 
charisma is mostly related to personality rather than to management by exception and as 
executives tend to not to want to reveal their weaknesses a measurement of personality traits 
seems rational. Theoretical and pragmatic considerations suggest proxies rather than an 
evaluation of leadership behavior. Among others, one of the most prominent questionnaires to 
measure leadership-relevant traits is the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ). The 
general structure of personality is expressed by the five-factor model, which will be briefly 
outlined in the following.  
Many studies use questionnaire-based data to examine personality traits either self- or 
externally assessed, concluding both leadership emergence and even more likely behavior 
(Bass et al., 2003; Chandler & Jansen, 1992; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; Nohe 
et al., 2013). The MLQ measures transformational and transactional leadership behavior on 
nine scales, which was developed by Bass and Avolio (1989). However, this data provides 
like most questionnaire-based data problems of correlating scales (especially within the 
defined leadership behaviors), socially desirable responses, selection biases or 
misconceptions. It is further challenging or even not possible to get self-report data by 
executives on a representative scale (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006; Resick, Whitman, 
Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009). 
Already in 1936, Allport and Odbert (1936) proposed a taxonomy of personality traits by 
making use of a linguistic approach. The upcoming application was connected to the strong 
evidence of factorial universality of the five personality traits roughly starting in the 90’s 
(McCrae & Costa Jr, 1997). Table 4 shows the resulting classification, which is called the 
five-factor model or The Big Five and consists of the following characteristics (for a 
comprehensive description and evaluation of the five-factor model poles see Goldberg, 1990; 
or John & Srivastava, 1999): 
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- Neuroticism: Persons loading high on this factor are pessimistic, anxious and have low 
self-confidence. Thus, as leaders they are expected to avoid responsibilities or changes 
(Bono & Judge, 2004). 
- Extraversion: Scoring high in this category means that the person is talkative, 
energetic, socially dominant and seeking excitement. The personality is triggered by 
affiliation and agency (Bono & Judge, 2004). Extraverted leaders are expected to be 
charismatic, ambitious and able to generate enthusiasm among their followers (Judge 
& Bono, 2000). 
- Openness to Experience: This category is characterized by curiosity, 
unconventionality and creativity. An open leader is considered to show creativity and 
originality as well as the capacity to adapt to the other’s perspective (Judge & Bono, 
2000). 
- Agreeableness: Agreeable persons show a cooperative, affectionate behavior and 
avoid conflict. As charismatic leaders are also described as concerned about others 
they might be positively related to this leadership style (Judge & Bono, 2000). 
- Conscientiousness: Having a high load on this factor means, that the persons are 
organized, efficient and self-disciplined. For leadership this hard-working attitude is 
beneficial as it might include a clear goal setting and taking responsibility (Bono & 
Judge, 2004). 
 
Table 4: The Big Five. 
Table based on Goldberg (1990) and John and Srivastava (1999). 
Characteristic Pole Positive manifestation Negative manifestation 
Neuroticism Emotional Stability 
anxious, low self-confidence, 
nervous, emotional 
self-reliance, stable, 
unemotional, calm 
Extraversion Introversion 
talkative, outgoing, sociable, 
bossy, assertive 
quiet, reserved, silent, shy 
Openness to 
Experience 
Closedness to 
Experience 
wide interests, intelligent, 
curious, insightful, active, 
interest in travel 
commonplace, narrow 
interests, simple 
Agreeableness Antagonism 
cooperative, sympathetic, 
appreciative, affectionate, soft-
hearted, trusting 
unfriendly, stern, cold, 
aggressive, temper 
Conscientiousness Lack of Direction 
organized, planful, efficient, 
dependable 
careless, disorderly, 
irresponsible, inconsistent  
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Those personality traits were consistently proved to remain stable among adults and have 
become standard in personality and leadership research for disciplines like business 
economics, psychology or biology (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2012; Roberts & Del Vecchio, 
2000). Using this personality classification is found to predict transformational leadership 
(and in doing so positive leadership effectiveness) on a decent level (Judge & Bono, 2000; 
Judge & Piccolo, 2004). 
The theoretical basis on determinants of a Corporate Governance with focus on higher 
education was outlined in this chapter. Policies contribute to setting a framework in which 
courses of conduct are framed and set. Stakeholders are governed by using differing 
approaches – namely sprinkler, subsidizing disadvantage and picking the winner. While the 
more traditional funding in a sprinkler or subsidizing disadvantage approach follows 
egalitarian claims that are predominant in in many areas of the German welfare state, the 
picking the winner concept is a direct and recent result of the introduction of competitive 
thinking in the higher education sector (see also chapter 2.7). Thus, traditional measures that 
are connected to relatively stable university attributes (e.g. student numbers, medical faculties, 
research orientation and equipment) are no longer core focus in the picking the winner 
approach and new measures need to be identified in order to be able to evaluate performances 
on the missions of universities and correspondingly allocate money in a contest and 
performance-dependent. Institutions are set up to satisfy various interests of stakeholders, 
which can be observed in the German higher education context exemplary by recently 
introduced boards. The installation of such a monitoring instrument comprises benefits in 
terms of stakeholder participation and challenges that can be described as classical principal-
agent conflicts. Measurement and corresponding deductions must be reflected thoroughly, in 
particular, in light of theoretical and empirical measurement complexities. With the 
difficulties of a proper institutional frame the question of the proper staffing of those positions 
is consequently aligned. Based on the motives of distributing power the question on who 
should lead and if this is exogenous or endogenous is crucial and influences the further 
examination of leadership personalities, qualities and corresponding measurement. The Big 
Five framework can serve as adequate instrument to grasp personality attributes of leaders. 
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4 Governance and management in the German higher education system 
As the current differentiation in the German university system, which was outlined as 
consequence of the foregoing decades of higher education policy (see chapter 2), needs to be 
considered, a brief systematization of the research object – German universities – will be 
presented to examine factors that need to be considered in the following analysis. A sketch of 
the variables and the corresponding dataset specification connected to German higher 
education will be given in chapter 4.2, described more in detail, and refined according to the 
specific empirical analyses. Based on the theoretical considerations and observations on the 
research object, the following chapter will make use of the previously made assumptions and 
measurement issues to explore the impact and effects on a political (chapter 4.3), institutional 
(chapter 4.2) and individual (chapter 4.5) level. 
4.1 Systematization of the current governance system in Germany 
Since the differentiation of the university system is targeting a more professionalized 
governance of universities, it is advisable to map the status quo at a glance in order to 
understand the existing structures. If one assumes that universities do not only exist but also 
actively adapt to their environment, one comes to conclusion that this adaption originates in a 
mix of strategic decisions of universities and politicians as well as environmental factors like 
locational advantages. The strategic level is considering the two basic missions of 
universities: teaching and research. Universities will be categorized according to their 
teaching and research output into different strategic profiles: stuck-in-the-middle universities 
(1), teaching (2) or research (3) orientation, as well as being above (4) or below (5) average in 
both missions. Thus, universities with a high teaching output and low research output are 
considered teaching universities, universities with a high teaching and high research output 
are considered peak performing universities and so forth. The reference group stuck-in-the-
middle is the group around the means, ranging from the third to the sixth quantile of both 
dimensions. 
The measure of teaching output will be the number of graduates per professor, which is a 
solid indicator of workload standardized by a size measure like the number of professors 
(Lehmann et al., 2018). The argument that graduates are not an adequate measure for teaching 
in terms of quality is correct. It is a quantitative measure that is corresponding to the number 
of rewarded degrees and thus, indicates the number of (serious) students that had to be 
supervised. The argument that this ratio is just a number easy to manipulate is confronted with 
the minimum standards that are to be fulfilled in the German university context. As discussed 
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previously (see part 3.1.3) a measure for research quantity (publications per professor) and 
quality (citations per publications) will be applied for comparison and will outline the 
differences between the quantity and quality perspectives (for an in depth discussion on 
performance measurement of research quantity and quality see also 3.1.3.). In the following, 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the strategic mapping of the German university landscape.  
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Figure 3: Strategic mapping of German universities according to research quantity and teaching. 
Research quantity (x-axis, publication/professor) and teaching (y-axis, graduates/professor) in 2012, axes intersect at respective mean values. The box displaying stuck-in-the-middle is placed 
at lower and upper thirds. Full universities comprising an university hospital are indicated in green, East German universities by a blue border, being an Excellence University (2005/06) by *. 
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Figure 4: Strategic mapping of German universities according to research quality and teaching in 2012. 
Research quantity (x-axis, citation/publication) and teaching (y-axis, graduates/professor) in 2012, axes intersect at respective mean values. The box displaying stuck-in-the-middle is placed at 
lower and upper thirds. Full universities comprising an university hospital are indicated in green, East German universities by a blue border, being an Excellence University (2005/06) by *. 
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One could assume that each state (insofar that it has a sufficient number of universities) has 
an interest in having purely peak universities. However, as this would be costly to achieve, 
another strategy is specialization, resulting in at least one teaching oriented university that 
concentrates on the supply with human capital and one research oriented university that 
concentrates on high-class research activities allowing spillover effects and being beneficial 
for local progress. Stuck-in-the-middle universities and low performing universities would not 
be favorable as they cannot take the cost advantages of division of labor and specialization but 
need to accomplish everything themselves.  
German universities are primarily fulfilling two missions that are also protected by the 
German constitution: research and teaching. In order to evaluate how intense they pursue 
those goals Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the profiling that was outlined before. A list of 
universities, their respective profile and a statement whether they are consistent in one profile 
can be found in Attachment 1: List of university profiles according to research quantity 
(publications/professor) and teaching (graduates/professor). and in Attachment 2: List of 
university profiles according to research quantity (citation/publication) and teaching 
(graduates/professor). 
Based on the mappings, German universities in general tend to do both teaching and research. 
The spread is small for the majority indicating that they follow the Humboldtian principles. 
Reflecting the results presented chapter 4.3, roughly half of the universities do not remain in 
the same category if one considers research quantity or research quality as a criterion. Those 
with a low profile are most likely to be stuck in this position in both maps (72% of those that 
are low profiled, 18% of all universities). Those with a research or a teaching profile also tend 
to hold their position while excellent and stuck-in-the-middle universities are not as resistant 
to the research perspective. The differing groups can be described as follows: 
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(1) Stuck-in-the-middle: Those universities do not show any explicit strategic orientation, 
they are basically following the Humboldtian principle of engaging both, research and 
teaching activity and thus, are average in both. As an example might be mentioned the 
university of Leipzig that looks back on a long history and had to readjust after the 
unification of the two Germanies (Universität Leipzig, 2017).  
(2) Teaching orientation: Such a university focuses on teaching as the transfer of scientific 
knowledge to students who get prepared for a scientific or economic career. The 
University of Vechta is an example for an institution that developed from a 
pedagogical school to a university with a clear educative profile (Universität Vechta, 
2018). 
(3) Research orientation: Research oriented universities concentrate on basic and applied 
research often connected to a dependence on third-party funds that support extensive 
research projects. For example, the University of Ulm is in this category. As a 
relatively young university it specialized in medicine and technology to show their 
internationally renowned research interest (Universität Ulm, 2018). 
(4) Peak performing: In this category universities invest a lot in the education of students 
as well as they contribute to research. In contrast to the Excellence Universities that 
will be examined in chapter 4.3, this category is simply defined as being above 
average in teaching and research activities. The Karlsruhe Institute of Technology is 
found here and “coincidentally” it was rewarded excellent in the competition (they lost 
this status in the last round). Due to the merging of the university and research center 
both qualities could obviously benefit from their competences and generate the often 
wished for synergies (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, 2018). 
(5) Low performing: Low performing universities are below average in terms of teaching 
as well as research output. This category does not intent to devaluate single 
universities by associating them with it but the categorization is based on the average 
values within the applicable data. An example might be the technical university of 
Cottbus, previously a school for building and construction, that suffered from closings 
and openings dependent on political opportunism and that experienced a merger 
shortly after completion the survey data (Lassiwe, 2013). 
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In terms of path dependencies, it is interesting to take a look at the structural differences that 
universities as institutions can have. Universities that have a university hospital obtain usually 
a higher amount of subsidies as well as they traditionally contribute to Journal publications. 
This explains why they show more research intense profiles. This picture is slightly mitigated 
in the research quality perspective, still, the domination is evident and due to the strong 
impact focus of medicine faculties (Vahl, 2008). Universities with an East German 
background are still having a teaching orientation that has its roots in the strong specialization 
and teaching focus of universities during GDR times (Kehm, 2004). The fear of critics of 
focusing quantitative rather than qualitative measures in the Excellence Initiative (Münch, 
2006) might be to some extent supported: those universities that became excellent in the first 
round produce a high quantitative research output while this changes considerably in the 
quality perspective. As an exception can be mentioned the Free University of Berlin that has a 
low performing profile in the quantity perspective or the university of Konstanz with a stuck-
in-the-middle profile. Both have a research intense profile in the quality perspective 
suggesting that the output they produce is low to medium while the impact they produce is 
high. The technical university of Munich has a reverse situation that is peak performing or 
Göttingen that is research intense in the quantity perspective but turning to a teaching (TU 
Munich) and low performing (Göttingen) categorization using the quality indicator.  
How this structure came into being and how it is influenced by governance mechanisms will 
be evaluated in the following chapters. The general dataset will be described (4.2) which is 
followed by three analyses: first, the policy intervention Excellence Initiative (4.3), control 
mechanisms in form of university boards (4.4) and power distribution for presidents that are 
the leaders of a university (4.5). 
4.2 Dataset description 
The basic dataset that is used for the empirical three studies will be described in the following 
while central variables that are relevant for the specific project will be outlined in more detail 
in the respective chapter. An overview on all variables, a short description and the sources can 
be found in Table 5: General description of all variables. 
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Table 5: General description of all variables. 
Dependent and institutional variables are measured yearly by president, university, or environmental variables on NUTS-2 level. SCOPUS is a database by 
Elsevier. Destatis is the Federal Statistic Office for Germany. DFG is the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) organizing the 
Excellence Initiative together with the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat). DHV is the German Association of universities (Deutscher 
Hochschulverband). HRK is the German Rectors’ Conference (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz). Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union. Table is 
sorted by level and alphabetically according to the variables’ names. 
 
Variable Name Operationalization Variable Description Type Usage Level Source Chapter 
Age Age Age of president. Data retrieved from CVs 
on the university's webpage or from web 
search. 
Discrete Control Individual hand-collected** 4.5 
Agreeableness Co-authors Number of co-authors listed in Scopus per 
president. Indicator for Agreeableness of 
the Big 5. 
Discrete Independent, 
Control 
Individual SCOPUS 4.5 
Conscientiousness Citations/publications 
President 
Citations and Publications listed in Scopus 
per president in the year under evaluation. 
Indicator for Conscientiousness of the Big 
5. 
Continuous Independent, 
Control 
Individual SCOPUS 4.5 
Emotional stability 
high 
Wikipedia with photo Dummy variable equal to 1 if a president 
obtains a wikipedia article including a 
picture of him/her, 0 otherwise. Indicator 
for high emotional stability as pole to 
neuroticism of the Big 5. 
Binary Independent, 
Control 
Individual hand-collected***, 
wikipedia webpage 
4.5 
Emotional stability 
medium 
Wikipedia entry Dummy variable equal to 1 if a president 
obtains a wikipedia article, 0 otherwise. 
Indicator for medium emotional stability 
as pole to neuroticism of the Big 5. 
Binary Independent, 
Control 
Individual hand-collected***, 
wikipedia webpage 
4.5 
Extraversion Extern Dummy variable equal to 1 if a president 
was is coming from outside the university, 
0 otherwise. Indicator for Extraversion of 
the Big 5. 
Binary Independent, 
Control 
Individual hand-collected** 4.4; 4.5 
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Leadership 
effectiveness 
Grade of DHV ranking Average grade rated by at a minimum 30 
DHV members indicating leadership 
effectiveness. 
Censored 
continuous 
Dependent Individual DHV-Ranking  4.5 
Leadership 
effectiveness 
(robust) 
Rank in the DHV 
ranking 
Rank of a president in the DHV ranking 
indicating leadership effectiveness. 
Ordinal Dependent Individual DHV-Ranking 4.5 
Leadership 
emergence 
Mentioning in DHV 
ranking 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a president 
is included in the DHV ranking, 0 
otherwise. Indicator for leadership 
emergence. 
Binary Dependent Individual DHV-Ranking  4.5 
Mobility of 
President 
University changes Number of universities that the president 
was prior to his current position. 
Discrete Control Individual hand-collected** 4.5 
Openness for 
experience 
International experience 
(in months) 
Number of months a president spent 
abroad. Indicator for Openness for 
experience of the Big 5. 
Discrete Independent, 
Control 
Individual hand-collected** 4.5 
Policy Frame Grade education 
minister 
Average grade rated by at a minimum 50 
DHV members 
Continuous Control Individual DHV-Ranking 4.5 
Selection of 
management 
personnel 
see Extraversion see Extraversion Binary  Individual hand-collected** 4.4 
Sex Sex Dummy variable equal to 1 if a university 
president is female, 0 otherwise. Data 
retrieved from CVs on the university's 
webpage 
Binary Control Individual hand-collected** 4.5 
Subject of President Natural sciences (1) Natural Sciences include: natural sciences 
and mathematics, engineering, agricultural 
sciences, nutrition, sports, veterinary 
medicine, medicine 
Binary Control Individual hand-collected** 4.5 
Consideration Google hits president/ 
google hits university 
Hand-collected data retrieved from google 
by using a web browser in anonymized, 
non-tracking mode searching for "first 
name"+"last name"+"name of university" 
and divide it by the hits of "name of 
university". 
Continuous Independent Institutional hand-collected**, 
google webpage 
4.5 
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Dependency on 
Third-Party Funds 
Third-party/state funds Relation of third-party funds to state-
provided funds. 
Continuous Control Institutional Destatis* 4.3 
Graduate Programs Graduate Programs Number of study programs for a 
subsequent professional qualification that 
require usually a first professional 
qualification, e.g. postgraduate programs, 
complementary studies or consecutive 
study programs. 
Discrete Control Institutional German Rector's 
Conference (HRK) 
4.3 
Hospital Hospital Dummy variable equal to 1 if a university 
has an affiliated hospital, 0 otherwise. 
Binary Control Institutional  4.3 
Initiating structure Third-party funds  Third-party funds in EUR provided by 
state, Federal Employment Agency, 
federal states, municipality, further public 
institutions, German Research Foundation, 
European Union, international 
organizations, associations for university 
funding, charity and industry. 
Continuous Independent Institutional Destatis* 4.5 
Innovation by 
university 
Patents Total number of patents listed in Scopus 
per university per year. 
Discrete Control Institutional SCOPUS 4.3 
International 
Students 
International students Number of students coming from abroad 
registered in the respective winter term. 
Discrete Control Institutional Destatis* 4.3 
Number of members Number of members in 
the university board 
Total number of internal and external 
members that are in the university board. 
Discrete  Institutional hand-collected** 4.4 
Personnel Structure Female/Male Personnel Share of the head count of full-time 
female to male scientific or artistic 
employees. 
Continuous Control Institutional Destatis* 4.3 
Regional inequality East/West Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
university is located in the territory of the 
former German Democratic Republic, 0 
otherwise. 
Binary Control Institutional  4.3 
Reputation see Treatment Group see Treatment Group. Binary Control Institutional DFG 4.5 
Research Quality Citations/publications 
University 
Citations recorded by publications listed 
in Scopus per university per year. 
 Dependent Institutional SCOPUS 4.3, 4.4 
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Research Quantity Publications/professors Number of publications listed in Scopus 
per professor per university per year. 
 Dependent Institutional SCOPUS; Destatis 4.3, 4.4 
Selection mode Selection mode of 
university board 
members 
Selection of university board members 
which is either purely university 
internally, shared by internal and external 
committees or purely externally 
depending on state law or university rules. 
Nominal  Institutional state university laws 
and/or university 
rules in 2012 
4.4 
Share of business 
representatives  
Business 
representatives/extern 
members 
Share of university board members with a 
business background by all external 
members of the university board. 
Continuous  Institutional hand-collected** 4.4 
Share of science 
representatives 
Science 
representatives/extern 
members 
Share of university board members with a 
scientific background (e.g. extern 
professors, research institutes, university 
of applied sciences) by all external 
members of the university board. 
Continuous  Institutional hand-collected** 4.4 
Share of society 
representatives 
Society 
representatives/extern 
members 
Share of university board members with a 
societal background (e.g. ministry, 
association, union, state institute) by all 
external members of the university board. 
Continuous  Institutional hand-collected** 4.4 
Teaching Workload Graduates/professor Number of students graduating in the 
respective year per professor. 
Discrete Control Institutional Destatis* 4.3, 4.4 
Technical 
orientation 
Share of natural 
sciences graduates 
Share of natural sciences (natural sciences 
and mathematics, engineering, agricultural 
sciences, nutrition, sports, veterinary 
medicine, medicine) of all graduates 
(diploma, bachelor, master, PhD) per year. 
Continuous Control Institutional Destatis* 4.3; 4.5 
Technical university Technical university Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
university is a "Technische Universität", 0 
otherwise. 
Binary Control Institutional  4.3 
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Treatment Effect Excellence University x 
Excellence Initiative 
Interaction of the dummy variables 
Excellence University and Excellence 
Initiative. Equal to 1 for universities after 
the Excellence Initiative, 0 otherwise. 
Binary Independent Institutional  4.3 
Treatment Group Excellence University Dummy variable equal to 1 if a university 
is considered an Excellence University, 0 
otherwise. 
Binary Independent Institutional DFG 4.3; 4.5 
Treatment Period Excellence Initiative Dummy variable, equal to 1 after 2006, 0 
otherwise. 
Binary Independent Institutional DFG 4.3 
Undergraduate 
Programs 
Undergraduate 
Programs 
Number of study programs for the first 
professional qualification, e.g. Bachelor 
programs, regular diploma, magister and 
state examinations. 
Discrete Control Institutional German Rector's 
Conference (HRK) 
4.3 
University size Students Number of students registered in the 
respective winter term. 
Discrete Control Institutional Destatis* 4.5 
Living Quality m² land prices Average purchase value of square meters 
building land in EUR. 
Continuous Control NUTS-2 Destatis 4.3; 4.5 
Regional situation Unemployment Number of people unemployed as a 
percentage of the labor force per year by 
NUTS 2 level. 
Continuous Control NUTS-2 Eurostat 4.3 
Regional Wealth GDP/capita Regional Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (purchasing power standard). 
Continuous Control NUTS-2 Eurostat 4.3 
*         
Charité hospital: belongs to Free University Berlin and Humboldt University Berlin, students must choose their “home university”, remaining data from Charité was matched 50%-50% 
based on information by the Charité Press Office. 
Universitätsklinik Schleswig-Holstein: belongs to University of Lübeck and University of Kiel; data from the hospital was matched 40% to Lübeck and 60% to Kiel according to the 
overall share of medical Chairs presented on the university websites. 
Universitätsklinik Gießen & Marburg: belongs to University of Gießen and University of Marburg, data was available subdivided.   
** Hand-collected primarily by information available from the University’s website (including archive data, Curriculum Vitae, management information), in rare cases by online 
available Curriculum Vitae or google research.  
*** Every wikipedia article is checked by the community according to content and violation of personality rights before publication. The German wikipedia version relies on the quality 
check of continuously sighted and validated revisions to prevent vandalism. The contributor has to declare that he/she has all copyright permissions necessary for the publication of 
information, pictures, etc. and forward the approval of the concerned person to Wikipedia (permissions-de@wikimedia.org). 
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The dataset consists of 73 German public universities partly at the individual (president), 
institutional (university) and regional (NUTS-2) level. Those universities can be considered 
“standard universities” according to the fact that they are engaged in teaching as well as 
research activities, awarding doctoral degrees and being mainly financed by the federal states. 
Specialized universities like those focusing on arts, theatre or music universities, universities 
of the German armed forces or church-associated universities were excluded from the sample 
as supported by previous research and because of different path dependencies, interests and 
structures (Lehmann et al., 2018; Warning, 2007). The hand-collected data is in a mostly 
balanced panel structure, generally ranging from 2004-2012 and shortened according to data 
availability or project logic.  
Chapter 4.3 Higher education policies in Germany: The German Excellence Initiative uses 
institutional data to evaluate the impact of policy measures, namely the Excellence Initiative 
on universities as an entity limiting the dataset to 2004-2011. The dependent variables are the 
performance measures research quality and research quantity. The independent variables are 
dummies based on the difference-in-differences approach (Treatment Group, Treatment 
Period, Treatment Effect) and it will be controlled for further institutional (Personnel 
Structure, International Students, Teaching Workload, Innovation by university, Dependency 
on Third-Party Funds, Technical orientation, Undergraduate Programs, Graduate Programs, 
Hospital and Technical University) and environmental variables (Regional inequality, 
Regional wealth, Living Quality). In chapter 4.4 Corporate Governance of higher education 
in Germany: University boards a descriptive analysis of university boards in 2012 will be 
made based on variables about university boards (Number of members, Share of business, 
science and society representatives, Selection of management personnel and selection mode) 
and some performance measures (Teaching Workload, Research Quantity, Research Quality). 
The last empirical analysis of chapter 4.5 Leadership in German universities: Of presidents. 
relies on ranking data that is available since 2009 ranging to 2012. The dependent variables 
are leadership emergence and leadership effectiveness. The independent variables are the Big 
5 personality traits (Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Emotional Stability) and leadership behavior (initiating structure, consideration). It will be 
controlled for further personal characteristics (Sex, Age, Mobility, Subject), institutional 
variables (University size, Technical orientation, Reputation), environmental variables 
(Regional situation, Living Quality) and one federal states level variable regarding the policy 
frame. The corresponding literature, theoretical foundation, methodology and descriptives on 
the data will be outlined in detail in the respective chapters. 
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4.3 Higher education policies in Germany: The German Excellence Initiative 
Parts of this chapter are orientated on the German Italian comparison made by Civera et al. (2017). 
4.3.1 Literature on the Excellence Initiative as a Picking the Winner approach in 
Germany  
As outlined in chapter 3.1 Policies Picking the Winner approaches are frequently used by 
policy makers to stimulate single “winning” universities and whole university systems with 
the introduction of competition for financial measures. Germany introduced in 2005/06 the 
so-called Excellence Initiative (Exzellenzinitiative) exactly in line with the outlined approach. 
The aim of the Excellence Initiative is to invigorate attractiveness, international 
competitiveness and positioning of the German university system by promoting high-quality 
research as well as excellence of German universities (DFG, 2013). The federal and central 
governments provided a total of € 1.9 billion to fund successful projects until the end of 2012 
in order to support the before outlined objectives. The DFG and the German Council of 
Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) organized the initiatives as such and called for 
three lines of funding: Graduate Schools to foster young scientists and researchers, Clusters of 
Excellence to promote top-level research, and Institutional Strategies to develop project-
based, top-level university research (Bornmann, 2016). The latter had to apply for all three 
funding lines, received the highest remuneration, and were named unofficially Excellence 
Universities (Pasternack, 2009). 
So far, there is some evidence on descriptive and qualitative outcomes and perceptions of the 
Excellence Initiative (Möller, Antony, Hinze, & Hornbostel, 2012; Sondermann, Simon, 
Scholz, & Hornbostel, 2008). Critical voices accompanied the introduction and the process. 
They deconstructed the concept of elite and claimed a reduction of diversity as every 
university should focus on the prescribed aims (Hartmann, 2006, 2010; Münch, 2006, 2007). 
Most other contributions were published as books discussing the concept, practical issues or 
consequences (Bloch, 2008; Leibfried, 2010; Markova, 2013). 
Scarce quantitative evidence exists that assess the effects of the Excellence Initiative. Möller 
et al. (2016) show in a bibliometric analysis that Clusters of Excellence (the second stream of 
the initiative) supported exclusively the “winners” of the competition, while the overall 
German research system did not experience benefits. Those established clusters strengthen 
existing network clusters and collaboration at least for natural sciences (Bornmann, 2016). 
112 
 
The closest research project to the present study are Bruckmeier et al. (2017), Gawellek & 
Sunder (2016) and Menter et al. (2018). Menter et al. (2018) give a good overview on the 
Excellence Initiative as such. Further, they show with a case study approach the 
announcement effect of the Excellence Initiative. The competition had a positive effect on 
research quality (citations/professor). Excellence Universities on the contrary, developed 
worse compared to the non-selected universities after the decision what can be explained by 
the efforts to win but no further efforts after the award moment.  
The working paper presented by Gawellek and Sunder (2016) demonstrates that the label 
“excellence” comes at high costs. Universities applying to become Excellence Universities 
lost efficiency compared to non-applying universities. Unsuccessful applicants recuperated 
from the efficiency loss. Excluding additional funding from the external funds output 
dimension of the Data Envelopment Analysis shows no further positive effect for winning 
universities. With this finding, the question on withdrawing the extra funding raises again. 
This adds to the discussion as universities compete for funds and the title rather than for 
excellence.  
Bruckmeier et al. (2017) – coming from Karlsruhe that recently lost the Excellence University 
status – analyzed the winning and loss of title. They provide evidence to the striking citation 
of Laband (1907) that “[…] the award of a title does not nearly elevate the awardee to the 
extent that the loss of the title debases him” (Bruckmeier et al., 2017, p. 177). Performance is 
not worsening because of a verifiable decline in university quality. 
Yet, it has not been evaluated by the use of bibliometric data if Excellence Universities could 
realize the aims of the Initiative. If we see an impact of the initiative, we lack understanding if 
this is true only for the quantitative or also qualitative dimension and whether only the 
winners of the competition could be triggered or if there exists a signaling effect for the whole 
university system. Thus, the research questions are as follows: 
- Which impact had the first round of the Excellence Initiative on the chosen Excellence 
Universities and the whole university system? 
- In addition, if an impact exists: Does a differentiation exist in terms of research 
quantity and research quality? 
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4.3.2 Exploratory hypotheses 
By introducing the Excellence Initiative, politicians aimed to trigger international visibility of 
German universities. The desired outcome “international visibility” is not directly measurable 
so indicators such as bibliometrics help to assess it. This study evaluates the positive effects 
and/or adverse effects of the Initiative. Ex-ante, a problem of adverse selection might exist as 
only those universities apply for becoming excellent that are already operating at the cost of 
some slacks or inefficiencies allowing them to vacate resources and to prepare three high 
quality applications – for each funding stream. This would result in a funding of universities 
that are not yet operating excellent but rather have either the pure size or the resource 
possibility to apply. Consequently, even if this award was of a pure symbolic nature positive 
outcomes of symbolic rewards are likely (Gallus, 2016). Ex-post, assigned universities could 
show moral hazard as most outcomes are not directly measurable by the principal and efforts 
made for the application might be tunneled towards undesired or unsupported efforts. In this 
context, one should hint to the discussion on incentive structures in chapter 3.1 Policies and 
the question why one should hope for A when one rewards B (Kerr, 1975). It is not clear a 
priori whether the Excellence Initiative could trigger any effect, motivational or adverse 
effects. Figure 5 depicts in an explorative way the potential positive and adverse outcomes: 
Figure 5: Exploratory framework for the "Picking the Winner" approach outlining 
possible outcomes for the treated universities and the whole university system. 
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Positive effects on universities with treatment 
Economic theory, in particular signaling and motivation theory, suggests that the stronger a 
signaling incentive is the more will the winner try to hold this advantage in order to handle 
information asymmetry and corresponding decision-making by policy makers, students, 
scientists, international science community, etc. (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). 
First, the strength of the additional reputation incentive is dependent on the visibility of the 
performance to the relevant audience (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). The German public as well as 
the international scientific community put attention to the Excellence Initiative. For 
universities that are operating already excellent and thus, gaining the excellence title this can 
constitute a strategic complementarity resulting in expanding the “publication fad” (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2002; Möller et al., 2016; Morgan, 2016). Second, the signal is stronger the higher the 
impact of effort on performance (Holmström, 1999; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). Applying this for 
the initiative, universities had to hand in proposals for all three funding lines demonstrating 
their ex-ante future strategies and will of ex-post performances. Third, the signaling incentive 
is even stronger the more informative the performance about talent (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). 
The rationale lies in the assumption that performance in terms of quantitative and qualitative 
research output informs about the “talent” in terms of competences, structures and strategies 
of the respective university (Bornmann, 2016). 
Theories on awards by psychological economists explain positive outcomes for the “winners” 
on the individual dimension that sums up in one organization by social identification, which 
further increases commitment (Gallus, 2016; Ren, Kraut, Kiesler, & Resnick, 2012). Losing 
the resource “positive reputation” includes for university managers and scientists career 
options, access to networks and so forth. Thus, extra efforts may be invested by those that 
already won the competition (Bloch, Lottmann, & Würmann, 2008; Bruckmeier et al., 2017; 
Huberman, Loch, & Önçüler, 2004). Additional public recognition by before unknown peers 
– that could be the international science community in this context – can strengthen 
motivation (Gallus, 2016; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). The evaluation potential theory supports a 
positive effect of the award as recipients might experience a remuneration of their good 
performance even if this cannot be exclusively traced back to their person (Gallus, 2016). 
 
 
115 
 
Putting the theoretical approaches together with existent empirical evidence positive effects 
for the winners can be explained by signaling and motivation. Evidence of peer-effects and 
award-winning effects exist, i.e. “super stars” increase the productivity of the group and 
rewards strengthen productivity and output quality (Ajay Agrawal et al., 2017; Chan, Frey, 
Gallus, & Torgler, 2013). On the institutional level, a disciplining effect of public 
competitively acquired funds for the winners was shown by Bolli and Somogyi (2011). The 
winners in the competition might benefit from additional reputation and be incentivized to 
further increase performance and productivity (Autio & Rannikko, 2016; Bolli & Somogyi, 
2011; Hegglin & Schäfer, 2015). A so-called halo effect could be expected – the efforts for 
publication and likelihood of citation should be increased because of the reputational gain for 
scholars from those universities (Amara, Landry, & Halilem, 2015). The phenomenon of an 
academic Matthew effect (Cassia, De Massis, Meoli, & Minola, 2014) – meaning that success 
in the past causes further success – was demonstrated for Nordic countries in centers of 
excellence (Langfeldt et al., 2015). 
Negative effects on universities with treatment 
The principal agent theory helps to explain a decrease of performance after winning the 
competition. The basic assumption is that external motivation – e.g. by competitively 
achieved funds – has a disciplining effect on agents. Marginal costs of passivity raise and vice 
versa, monetary benefit of performing raises (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 
1997). The efforts are increasing out of a rational choice. If intrinsic motivation is ruled out 
by external interventions this lowers the benefit the agent experiences by participating in the 
competition. Consequently, this affects the agent’s performance level negatively. This 
phenomenon is called crowding-out effect and can be triggered by two processes: first, the 
perceived reduction of the agent’s self-determination because he or she feels externally 
controlled. Second, the agent interprets external measures as depreciation or rejection of his or 
her motivation and competence, which leaves no chance to show the actual dedication 
resulting in a decrease of efforts (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Thus, 
scientists of rewarded universities could reduce efforts due to a perceived devaluation of their 
work – paradoxically because of an intent to appreciate their work. As academic work is 
highly associated with intrinsic motivation, those motivational aspects might cause scientists 
to decrease efforts in general or in specific areas as shown by Kenny (2017) and Liefner 
(2003). 
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Further, based on the ideas of Kerr (1975), transaction costs of the will to achieve a 
communicated goal are lowered. Opportunity costs become lower if the reward for the chosen 
activity becomes higher – for instance due to additional funds. As a rational choice, resources 
are transferred to this activity. However, doing more of one requires doing less for the other 
(Butler, 2003; Taylor et al., 2006). As the report of the Excellence Initiative’s organizers 
explicitly presents the development of ranking positions of Excellence Universities, they 
could rationalize to put efforts to e.g. ranking improvement (DFG & Wissenschaftsrat, 2015). 
In the case of universities, a multi-product organization, a direct steering of efforts is even 
more complex. 
A classical moral hazard behavior can also explain a decline. Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) 
provide evidence for the Probation Period effect, which is discussed in labor economics. Such 
an effect was already found in academia on an individual level. Research quantity and even 
more research quality of business and economics professors that recently got tenured 
decreased significantly (Brogaard, Engelberg, & Van Wesep, 2018). Excellence Universities 
might have invested efforts to win ex-ante and after this “Probation Period” (in our context 
the reward of becoming an Excellence University), efforts are reduced due to exhaustion and 
over-security without further incentives for continuing efforts leading to less performance 
(Menter et al., 2018).  
Adverse effects for research quantity and research quality 
Adverse effects could be explained within the two dimensions that will be considered for the 
analysis: As pointed out in 3.1 Policies one might observe that what is assumed to be 
necessary to sustain within the competition – quantity – is experiencing a positive 
development e.g. to improve ranking positions (DFG & Wissenschaftsrat, 2015). Whereas 
quality of the output decreases especially for the winning universities. Previous research 
suggests that research quality is lowered with a rise of research quantity following a 
competitive funding policy (Butler, 2003). Thus, the incentive triggers fast and many 
publications rather than long-lasting high-class publications, e.g. by Graduate Schools where 
Excellence Universities also had to apply for. If this holds, one should observe a positive 
effect on research quantity and a negative effect on research quality.  
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Positive effects on the university system 
The initiative should incentivize institutions to increase efforts to perform better (Autio & 
Rannikko, 2016; Gawellek & Sunder, 2016). The perception of scientists of what is valued 
“good work” and of what generates reputation determines where they put their efforts to 
(Haeussler & Colyvas, 2011). The Excellence Initiative can be considered role model if 
Excellence and Non-Excellence Universities will both invest in international visibility 
resulting in better outcomes. For the entire university system, we could expect the Academic 
Ratchet effect (Massy & Zemsky, 1994). This phenomenon is explained by game-theoretic 
assumptions (Ortmann & Squire, 2000). It is the general shift of faculty members’ 
discretionary time from not prestigious teaching or administrative duties to material and 
immaterial income opportunities realized by research or other prestigious activities (Massy & 
Zemsky, 1994). As the focus of prestigious and good behavior is clearly set with the 
Excellence Initiative, we should not only observe a positive effect on the winners but on the 
system per se. Thus, researchers shift their focus to these beneficial activities of publication – 
which are under their control – and quality as stated aim rather than e.g. teaching (Haeussler 
& Colyvas, 2011). 
Universities could benefit by an orientation towards societal and political requirements rather 
than the pure inner-scientific focus (Ajay Agrawal et al., 2017; Aksnes & Rip, 2009; 
Debackere & Rappa, 1994). This can create a so-called bandwagon effect, a phenomenon in 
which the probability of individual adoption is increasing with respect to the proportion that 
have already done so (Colman, 2003). In our case, this bandwagon effect means that the 
Excellence Initiative exhibits to universities societal and political requirements and does not 
necessarily have to do with a potential reward as outcome. The evaluation of the Excellence 
Initiative in the official “Imboden report” outlines that the whole system experiences a new 
“dynamic” and that an “impressive qualitative performance of Excellence Clusters” is 
observable. However, the report does not consider concentration effects of already existent 
capacities (Bargmann et al., 2016). A general positive effect not on university performance 
but of the success and goal attainment of the Initiative is supported by practitioners, e.g. by 
Huber (president of LMU in Munich): “If you consider that in the first round they [federal 
and central governments] spent less than € 2 billion, they really got a bang for their buck. […] 
The Excellence Initiative has changed the perception of German universities all over the 
world” (Morgan, 2016). 
 
118 
 
Negative effects on the university system 
The whole system could experience negative effects confirming the critics that argued that 
few Excellence Universities might be uncoupled from the rest, similarly pointed out in 
discussions about rankings (Bloch et al., 2008; Hartmann, 2006, 2010; Vogel et al., 2017). 
Losers might be decoupled in terms of attractivity, funding and motivation (J. Brown, 2011; 
Geuna, 2001).The efforts that losing universities strive are strongly depending on the eventual 
inequality and the respective perception of the self-efficacy of losing universities. If perceived 
inequality is interpreted irreversible, the differences created by the Initiative may not only 
lower but also erase the strain of losers to compete with superstars (Ajay Agrawal et al., 2017; 
J. Brown, 2011).  
Further, we might find a so-called sabotage-effect or unethical behavior (Charness, Masclet, 
& Villeval, 2013; Shleifer, 2004), as Jauernig, Uhl, and Luetge (2016, p. 14) state: 
“Apparently it is naive to assume that the mode of competitiveness and the wish to 
outperform others is switched off after the blow of the referee’s whistle at the end of the 
game, since competition seems to increase the overall level of aggression.” Focusing on 
competition can increase efforts for intense competitive behavior and in doing so reduces 
efforts for an overall benefit for both treated universities and the university system. Negative 
effects on the system side could thus, be triggered as untreated universities are showing 
negative performances in terms of a negative Matthew effect – less success brings less 
success (Bruckmeier et al., 2017; Jauernig et al., 2016). Benefits on the market are not infinite 
which could induce that Excellence Universities benefit from better collaboration 
opportunities, concentration of attention, resources, prestige, and so on while the market for 
such high-quality rewards and opportunities becomes stratified and Non-Excellence 
Universities do not have the chance to participate in “high-quality interaction”. 
Thus, we can derive the following outcomes on the winners and the systems dimension as 
shown in Figure 5: Exploratory framework for the "Picking the Winner" approach outlining 
possible outcomes for the treated universities and the whole university system. 
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(I) Role Model: 
In the “Role Model”, chosen universities as well as the whole system should experience better 
performance after the introduction of the Excellence Initiative. On the one hand, winners are 
evaluated even more by the reward while the system experiences a bandwagon effect (Ajay 
Agrawal et al., 2017; Aksnes & Rip, 2009; Debackere & Rappa, 1994). 
(II) Loosing Winners:  
Observing a Loosing Winners outcome, the treated universities show less performance while 
the untreated universities show higher performance. Winners experience crowding-out effects 
or show moral hazard behavior while the university system is motivated by competition. 
(III) Winners Track:  
The receipt of the award could lead to positive effects for the winners by signaling and 
motivational effects including subsequent performance rise and negative or no impact on the 
losers due to adverse competition effects (Neckermann & Frey, 2013). 
(IV) Dysfunction:  
If both, winners and losers, experience a decrease in performance the policy initiative can be 
labelled dysfunctional. This could be due to adverse effects corresponding to crowding-out, 
decoupling and moral hazard effects. 
The null-hypothesis is that we do not see any effect of the introduction of the Excellence 
Initiative, neither on the winners nor on the losers. 
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4.3.3 Dataset and methodology: the Difference-in-Differences approach 
The hand-collected dataset is in a strongly balanced panel structure of 73 public universities 
observed from 2004-2011 which allows capturing the officially launched Excellence Initiative 
in 2005 and 2006, becoming effective in 2006/2007 respectively. To analyze the effect of the 
Excellence Initiative in Germany, I use a Difference-in-Differences analysis like for instance 
proposed in the books of Angrist and Pischke (2008, pp. 227 ff., 315 ff.) and Greene (2003, p. 
195 ff.). This approach is a commonly employed quasi-experimental method, also described 
as natural experiment. It measures the effects of exogenous shocks – like policy changes, or 
training impact– on the treated and untreated (i.e. control) group (Ajay Agrawal et al., 2017; 
Autor, 2003; Card & Krueger, 1993; Feldstein, 1995; LaLonde, 1986; Lehmann & Menter, 
2018; Lehmann et al., 2018). The advantage of this method is that one can detect a causal 
relation between the treatment and the potential outcome – in the Excellence Initiative case 
research quantity and quality. The basic model can be described like follows: 
𝐸 = (𝑌𝑡+1
𝐸𝑥 − 𝑌𝑡+1
𝑛𝐸𝑥)- (𝑌𝑡
𝐸𝑥 − 𝑌𝑡
𝑛𝐸𝑥) 
Ex= Excellence Universities; nEx= Non-Excellence Universities; t= pre-treatment; t+1= post-treatment  
Graphically, the Difference-in-Differences approach is illustrated as in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Illustration of the basic Difference-in-Differences idea. 
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The Difference-in-Differences approach relies on the assumption of a parallel trend, meaning 
that trends would be the same for the treated as well as for the untreated group if the treatment 
was absent (as in the Pre-Treatment Period). I define as treatment group the nine chosen 
universities in the first funding line (see  
Attachment 3: List of German Excellence Universities.), and I test with two different control 
or reference groups: (1) the remaining German universities and (2) the universities that were 
successful in the application for getting a Graduate School and becoming the speaker of an 
Excellence Cluster as those were the prerequisite to become Excellence University (see 
Attachment 4: List of universities with Graduate School and Excellence Cluster.). The dummy 
for the respective treatment group turns 1 being an Excellence University, 0 otherwise. As the 
first funding period comprised two decisions – for three universities in late 2006, for six 
universities in 2007 – the treatment period starts in 2007, the respective dummy taking value 
0 before 2007 and 1 starting in 2007. The interaction of treatment group and treatment period 
is the “treatment effect” that measures the additional difference that the treated universities 
experience to the counterfactual trend.  
Thus, Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the mean trends of research quantity and quality from 
2004-2011 for Excellence and all Non-Excellence Universities. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show 
the mean trend for Excellence and Non-Excellence Universities that were successful in 
applying for a Graduate School and speaker of an Excellence Cluster. 
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Figure 7: Mean publications per professor 2004-2011 of Excellence and all Non-
Excellence Universities. 
 
Figure 8: Mean citations per publications 2004-2011 of Excellence and all Non-
Excellence Universities. 
 
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
e
a
n
 P
u
b
lic
a
ti
o
n
s
 p
e
r 
P
ro
fe
s
s
o
r
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Non-Excellence Universities Excellence Universities
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
4
2
6
2
8
M
e
a
n
 C
it
a
ti
o
n
s
 p
e
r 
P
u
b
lic
a
ti
o
n
s
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Non-Excellence Universities Excellence Universities
123 
 
Figure 9: Mean publications per professor 2004-2011 of Excellence and Non-Excellence 
(Graduate School + Excellence Cluster) Universities. 
 
Figure 10: Mean citations per publications 2004-2011 of Excellence and Non-Excellence 
(Graduate School + Excellence Cluster) Universities. 
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As the parallel trends give a first insight but might not be fully convincing in the graphical 
illustration, additionally, the parallel trend assumption test suggested and applied by Autor 
(2003) was performed and can be found in Attachment 8: Test on parallel trend assumption 
with all universities. and Attachment 9: Test on parallel trend assumption with selected 
universities. The basic idea is that no significant difference between the groups should be 
existent. Considering all universities: For research quantity this holds especially for the years 
2005 and 2004 while for research quality years 2004-2008 do not show significant 
differences, which might be explained by a minor lag of citations. Considering the selected 
universities: no significant differences in trends exist at least until 2008 for both, research 
quantity and quality. 
The method brings about two major pitfalls – one methodological, one theoretical – that have 
to be considered: First, a methodological problem is the probability of serial correlation, 
meaning that a university tends to be stuck in its path dependencies and thus, observations are 
not independent from each other during the observed years. The most widely applied 
approach to confront this problem are cluster-robust standard errors, which I will use in the 
following models (Angrist & Pischke, 2008, p. 315 ff.) and which is further handling 
heteroscedasticity issues. A panel estimation approach further helps to take into account the 
panel structure of the data. Second, as Greene (2003, p. 198) points out it is an important 
difference if the entities in the treated and control group know or do not know about being in 
either of the two groups. In the Excellence Initiative the participation was voluntary and thus, 
determined by the university management. The universities know beforehand about being 
participant or not and afterwards about being treated or untreated. This could trigger two 
effects: changing behavior of the untreated universities by demotivation or motivation and 
what will be measured for the treated universities could be the latent motivation (or 
demotivation) of the actors rather than the pure effect of the Excellence Initiative itself. We 
cannot solve this problem statistically, however, one should be cautious by interpreting the 
results on a German-wide comparison.  
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The preferable control group would have been the group of applying universities that did not 
succeed in becoming excellent, but requesting this data of the responsible representative it is 
unfortunately not accessible (Attachment 5: Request on applications for future concepts.). 
Civera et al. (2017) chose a country-comparative approach in a triple Difference-in-
Differences setting to deal with potential institutional differences as Excellence Universities 
are assumed to be not randomly chosen. As previously outlined, I will use a second control 
group that has at least the prerequisites and possibly institutional similarities to apply for 
becoming excellent, those that won the Graduate Schools and Excellence Cluster (DFG & 
Wissenschaftsrat, 2015). 
As pointed out in chapter 3.1.3 Measurement: Research quantity and quality for Picking the 
Winner policy approaches the following analysis will be based on two dependent variables 
measuring research performance: (1) the publications to professor ratio, and (2) the citations 
to publications ratio. The data is based on the dataset described in 4.2 Dataset description.  
(1) Publications measure the pure quantitative output of a university. The normalization by 
professor allows excluding eventual size effects and problems of not normally distributed 
data. It is a measure that is directly influenceable by researchers through additional 
publications (see for example Menter et al. (2018)).  
(2) The ratio of citations to publications measures research quality. The number of citations 
that a collection of a publication receives is independent of the collection size (Katerattanakul, 
Han, & Hong, 2003; Katz, 2000). It is further a fair measure that indicates the impact of 
published research (Chen, 2017). 
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Controls include institutional variables as well as environmental ones that were identified as 
triggers in the higher education system and research performance. On the institutional side, I 
include the personnel structure in order to control if the female share of scientific personnel 
influences the output (Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005; Lewison, 2001), international students as 
measure of international orientation (Cattaneo, Meoli, & Signori, 2016; Gao, 2017), teaching 
workload (Cattaneo et al., 2016; Horta, Dautel, & Veloso, 2012), innovation provided by the 
university (Acs, Anselin, & Varga, 2002; Geuna & Nesta, 2006), relation of third-party to 
state-provided funds (Bonaccorsi, Secondi, Setteducati, & Ancaiani, 2014; Gulbrandsen & 
Smeby, 2005), technical orientation (Lehmann et al., 2018), the number of undergraduate and 
graduate programs (Horta et al., 2012), and institution specificities like having a hospital 
(Agasisti & Pohl, 2012) or being a technical university (Lehmann et al., 2018). On the 
environmental side, controls will include a dummy for regional inequality (East/West) 
(Agasisti & Pohl, 2012), regional wealth (Cattaneo et al., 2016), and living quality measured 
by m² housing prices (Fabel, Lehmann, & Warning, 2002).  
The descriptives for the whole sample can be found in Table 6: Descriptives of the Excellence 
Initiative. Correlation matrices for the whole and the subsample can be found in Attachment 
6: Correlations Excellence Initiative all universities. and Attachment 7: Correlations 
Excellence Initiative selected and Excellence Universities. 
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Table 6: Descriptives of the Excellence Initiative. 
Dataset consists of 73 universities, observed from 2004-2011. 
 
All Years Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment 
 
All Universities 
Non-Excellence 
Universities 
Selected 
Universities 
Excellence 
Universities 
Non-Excellence 
Universities 
Selected 
Universities 
Excellence 
Universities 
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Research Quantity 584 3.051 1.881 192 2.341 30 3.215 27 4.765 320 2.931 50 3.901 45 5.905 
Research Quality 584 22.626 8.311 192 19.278 30 22.67 27 26.794 320 23.484 50 27.311 45 28.308 
Publications 584 1,014 901.001 192 711.089 30 1,145 27 1,906 320 906.094 50 1,496 45 2,535 
Professors 584 282 157 192 257 30 350 27 407 320 264 50 373 45 435 
Citations 584 26,799 25,450 192 16,633 30 25,893 27 49,211 320 25,311 50 40,484 45 67,305 
Personnel Structure 584 0.351 0.073 192 0.326 30 0.308 27 0.303 320 0.37 50 0.346 45 0.35 
International Students 584 2,280 1,709 192 2,115 30 3,344 27 4,265 320 1,953 50 3,059 45 4,113 
Teaching Workload 584 63.364 14.456 192 63.778 30 66.604 27 62.417 320 63.601 50 64.586 45 60.477 
Innovation by university 584 46 178 192 29 30 8 27 41 320 51 50 20 45 80 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds 
584 0.161 0.075 192 0.143 30 0.154 27 0.167 320 0.166 50 0.183 45 0.206 
Technical orientation 584 0.358 0.213 192 0.339 30 0.444 27 0.427 320 0.351 50 0.461 45 0.442 
Undergraduate 
Programs 
511 68.703 41.524 128 71.172 20 92.45 18 94.611 320 63.872 50 84.64 45 85.667 
Graduate Programs 511 35.591 26.783 128 17.547 20 23.85 18 20.389 320 42.256 50 50.06 45 45.6 
Hospital 584 0.466 0.499 192 0.422 30 0.6 27 0.778 320 0.422 50 0.6 45 0.778 
Technical University 584 0.205 0.404 192 0.188 30 0.3 27 0.333 320 0.188 50 0.3 45 0.333 
Regional inequality 584 0.205 0.404 192 0.234 30 0.2 27 0 320 0.234 50 0.2 45 0 
Regional Wealth 584 28,232 7,052 192 25,743 30 28,003 27 30,759 320 28,695 50 30,848 45 34,047 
Living Quality 569 185.618 181.006 183 149.066 29 226.138 25 334.452 317 169.4 49 232.596 44 369.918 
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Based on the results of the hausman test (see Attachment 10: Hausman test Excellence 
Initiative research quantity for all universities.; Attachment 11: Hausman test Excellence 
Initiative research quality for all universities.) a fixed-effects estimator is considered 
consistent and will be employed with cluster-robust standard errors clustered on the 
institutional level in order to handle eventual heteroscedasticity for the model including all 
universities. This estimator is assuming that institution-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity 
is correlated with independent variables. As the outlined time-invariant variables (in [ ] in the 
regression equation) will consequently enter the error term in the fixed-effects regression, 
they need to be included in the following robustness checks.  
Making use of the panel structure and employing the Difference-in-Differences method the 
following regression equation reveals the full model that is used for the whole university 
system (models 1-10): 
Research Performancei,t = β0 + [𝑎1 Treatment groupi] + β1 Treatment periodt + β2 Treatment 
effecti,t + β3 Personnel Structurei,t + β4 International Studentsi,t + β5 Teaching Workloadi,t +  
β6 Innovation by Universityi,t + β7 Dependency on third-party fundsi,t + β8 Technical orientationi,t 
+ β9 Undergraduate Programsi,t + β10 Graduate Programsi,t + [𝑎2 Hospitali] +  
[𝑎3 Technical universityi] + [𝑎4 Regional inequalityi] + β11 Regional wealthi,t + β12 Living 
qualityi,t + 𝑎𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
With ai = university, time − invariant effect ; εi,t= error term wit unobserved time-variant heterogeneity 
The hausman test for the selected universities suggests employing the random-effects model, 
which will be used accordingly with cluster-robust standard errors to confront eventual 
heteroscedasticity (see Attachment 12: Hausman test Excellence Initiative research quantity 
for selected universities.; Attachment 13: Hausman test Excellence Initiative research quality 
for selected universities.). This estimator assumes that the error term is uncorrelated with 
constant unobserved heterogeneity. Equally employing the Difference-in-Differences method 
the following regression equation (models 11-20) is retrieved:  
Research Performancei,t = β0 + 𝛽1 Treatment groupi + β2 Treatment periodt + β3 Treatment 
effecti,t + β4 Personnel Structurei,t + β5 International Studentsi,t + β6 Teaching Workloadi,t + β7 
Innovation by Universityi,t + β8 Dependency on third-party fundsi,t + β9 Technical orientationi,t +                            
β10 Undergraduate Programsi,t + β11 Graduate Programsi,t + 𝛽12 Hospitali + 𝛽13 Technical 
university + 𝛽14 Regional inequalityi + β15 Regional wealthi,t + β16 Living qualityi,t + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
With ui,t = unobserved time − variant heterogeneities 
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In order to check for robustness an OLS model (that is also used in the user-written STATA 
command for difference-in-differences estimations) including year dummies, and equally with 
cluster-robust standard errors, will be presented. In order to track and understand the results of 
the main model and check for further robustness the dependent variable will be exchanged for 
the count data that was used for building the ratios publications to professor and citations to 
publications. As the variables are count data and over-dispersed, a negative binomial 
estimator will be employed for the whole university dataset – due to the small observation 
numbers not for the selected universities. As a last robustness check, a made-up treatment 
starting in 2010 will be tested in an OLS estimation.  
4.3.4 Results, robustness and interpretation 
Considering all universities against the Excellence Universities, the estimation results for 
research quantity are shown in Table 7: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research 
quantity (all universities). and for research quality in Table 8: The effect of the Excellence 
Initiative on research quality (all universities). Results for research quantity show that the 
treatment period – i.e. the Excellence Initiative – had a positive effect on all universities. 
Significantly more papers per professor were published after the introduction of the initiative. 
For the additionally funded universities this effect is even stronger on a highly significant 
(models (1)-(4)) and in the full model (5) high significant level. This supports the role model 
argumentation in terms of research quantity – triggering the system and the winners even 
more. The robustness checks show the stability of the results (see Attachment 14: Robustness 
check: OLS estimation of the effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quantity for all 
universities. and Attachment 19: Robustness check Excellence Initiative with made-up 
treatment including all universities.).  
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Table 8: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quality (all universities). Illustrates 
the effect of the Excellence Initiative in terms of research quality and shows a different 
picture compared to the research quantity dimension. The whole university system benefitted 
by the introduction of the initiative. Excellence Universities lost research quality following 
the initiative compared to Non-Excellence Universities. This loosing winners effect is 
remarkable and partly also in line with previous findings (Menter et al., 2018). The loosing 
winners effect – if this label is appropriate after being tenured – for tenured individuals of 
Brogaard et al. (2018) seems to be not only valid on the individual but also on the institutional 
level. The robustness checks (Attachment 15: Robustness check: OLS estimation of the effect 
of the Excellence Initiative on research quality for all universities.; Attachment 19: 
Robustness check Excellence Initiative with made-up treatment including all universities.) 
show that results are stable.  
Table 9: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quantity (selected universities). 
and Table 10: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quality (selected 
universities). show the results for the 19 universities that fulfill the prerequisites for becoming 
Excellence Universities and that partly won the competition.  
Interestingly, the effect for research quantity is existent in the pure model but not robust 
against the control variables. Different than the variable treatment group: the significance 
indicates that – comparing Excellence with quasi-Excellence Universities – path dependencies 
seem to play a more crucial role than expected (which is only true if the panel structure is 
considered in the choice of estimator). The loosing winners effect is persistent also for the 
subsample that comprises selected universities, which is robust also in the OLS model (see 
Attachment 16: Robustness check: OLS estimation of the effect of the Excellence Initiative on 
research quantity for selected universities. and Attachment 17: Robustness check: OLS 
estimation of the effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quality for selected 
universities.).  
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Table 7: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quantity (all universities). 
The table reports the results of the fixed-effects panel model with cluster-robust standard errors at 
university level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels). The sample consists of 73 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (4) 
and (5) 2005-2011 due to lacking data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is 
research quantity measured by publications per professor. The treatment group are the German 
Excellence Universities, the treatment period ranging from 2007-2011, the treatment effect is the 
interaction of treatment group and treatment period. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 VARIABLES Research Quantity 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
-
in
-
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s Treatment Group - - - - - 
      Treatment Period 0.590*** 0.314*** 0.168*** 0.084 0.148** 
 
(0.048) (0.063) (0.056) (0.058) (0.064) 
Treatment Effect 0.551*** 0.512*** 0.437*** 0.412*** 0.432** 
 
 
(0.190) (0.171) (0.146) (0.153) (0.174) 
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s 
Personnel Structure 
 
3.517*** 2.611*** 1.996** 2.776*** 
  
(0.945) (0.874) (0.848) (0.810) 
International Students 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teaching Workload 
 
0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Innovation by university 
 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds  
2.202*** 1.968*** 2.024*** 2.078*** 
  
(0.640) (0.699) (0.690) (0.645) 
Technical orientation 
 
1.567*** 1.127** 0.919** 1.160** 
  
(0.496) (0.450) (0.437) (0.439) 
Undergraduate Programs 
  
-0.001 -0.002 
 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
Graduate Programs 
  
0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
Hospital 
 
- - - - 
      Technical University 
 
- - - - 
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s 
Regional inequality 
   
- - 
      Regional Wealth 
   
0.000*** 0.000*** 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality 
   
0.000 0.000 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant 2.640*** -0.153 0.340 -0.442 -1.465*** 
 
 
(0.030) (0.528) (0.475) (0.513) (0.546) 
 Observations 584 584 511 503 569 
 R-squared 0.463 0.578 0.556 0.581 0.613 
 Number of Universities 73 73 73 73 73 
 Fixed-effects panel estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quality (all universities). 
The table reports the results of the fixed-effects panel model with cluster-robust standard errors at 
university level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels). The sample consists of 73 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (18) 
and (19) 2005-2011 due to lacking data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is 
research quality measured by citations per publication. The treatment group are the German 
Excellence Universities, the treatment period ranging from 2007-2011, the treatment effect is the 
interaction of treatment group and treatment period. 
   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 VARIABLES Research Quality 
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s Treatment Group - - - - - 
 
     
Treatment Period 4.206*** 2.447*** 1.546*** 1.079** 1.552*** 
 
(0.379) (0.473) (0.514) (0.500) (0.464) 
Treatment Effect -2.693*** -2.802*** -2.402*** -2.494*** -2.680*** 
 
 
(0.801) (0.758) (0.763) (0.803) (0.786) 
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s 
Personnel Structure  39.907*** 29.177*** 28.478*** 33.912*** 
 
 (8.625) (9.065) (9.102) (8.706) 
International Students  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Teaching Workload  0.073 0.101 0.104 0.075 
 
 (0.044) (0.062) (0.065) (0.046) 
Innovation by university  0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds  5.841 3.263 4.051 5.526 
 
 (6.140) (6.479) (5.659) (5.210) 
Technical orientation  3.663 -1.491 -2.571 1.539 
 
 (4.461) (5.369) (5.758) (4.869) 
Undergraduate Programs   0.004 0.001  
 
  (0.016) (0.015)  
Graduate Programs   0.032*** 0.029**  
 
  (0.011) (0.012)  
Hospital  - - - - 
 
     
Technical University  - - - - 
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s 
Regional inequality    - - 
 
     
Regional Wealth    0.000* 0.000*** 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality    0.002 0.001 
 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
  20.205*** -2.352 2.264 -2.561 -10.044** 
 Constant (0.214) (3.725) (4.294) (4.809) (3.930) 
 Observations 584 584 511 503 569 
 R-squared 0.329 0.419 0.357 0.371 0.442 
 Number of Universities 73 73 73 73 73 
 Fixed-effects panel estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quantity (selected 
universities). 
The table reports the results of the random-effects panel model with cluster-robust standard errors at 
university level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels). The sample consists of 19 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (13) 
and (14) 2005-2011 due to lacking data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is 
research quantity measured by publications per professor. The treatment group are the German 
Excellence Universities, the treatment period ranging from 2007-2011, the treatment effect is the 
interaction of treatment group and treatment period. 
   (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 VARIABLES Research Quantity 
D
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-
D
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n
ce
s Treatment Group 1.550*** 1.625*** 1.551** 1.227* 1.319** 
 
(0.571) (0.609) (0.699) (0.701) (0.663) 
Treatment Period 0.686*** 0.292* 0.141 0.056 0.099 
 
(0.114) (0.162) (0.133) (0.136) (0.147) 
Treatment Effect 0.454** 0.330* 0.267 0.225 0.217 
 
 
(0.221) (0.196) (0.181) (0.187) (0.198) 
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s 
Personnel Structure  5.837** 7.260*** 6.765*** 6.376*** 
 
 (2.695) (2.679) (2.396) (1.938) 
International Students  -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teaching Workload  0.051*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Innovation by university  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds  5.509** 5.017** 4.865** 4.752** 
 
 (2.337) (2.285) (2.184) (2.229) 
Technical orientation  0.832 0.734 0.541 0.113 
 
 (1.131) (1.081) (1.146) (1.247) 
Undergraduate Programs   -0.003 -0.003  
 
  (0.002) (0.002)  
Graduate Programs   0.001 -0.000  
 
  (0.003) (0.003)  
Hospital  1.625** 1.455** 1.626** 1.583** 
 
 (0.692) (0.708) (0.660) (0.638) 
Technical University  0.478 0.451 0.723 0.871 
 
 (0.844) (0.878) (1.185) (1.095) 
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s 
Regional inequality    -0.835 -0.672 
 
   (1.040) (1.026) 
Regional Wealth    0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality    -0.000 -0.000 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
  3.215*** -3.404*** -3.398*** -4.625*** -5.073*** 
 Constant (0.186) (1.162) (1.186) (1.173) (1.002) 
       
 Observations 152 152 133 129 147 
 Number of Universities 19 19 19 19 19 
 Random-effects panel estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: The effect of the Excellence Initiative on research quality (selected 
universities). 
The table reports the results of the random-effects panel model with cluster-robust standard errors at 
university level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels). The sample consists of 19 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (18) 
and (19) 2005-2011 due to lacking data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is 
research quality measured by citations per publication. The treatment group are the German 
Excellence Universities, the treatment period ranging from 2007-2011, the treatment effect is the 
interaction of treatment group and treatment period. 
   (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 VARIABLES Research Quality 
D
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n
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-
D
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ce
s Treatment Group 4.124** 6.188*** 6.891*** 6.426*** 5.602** 
 
(1.888) (1.967) (1.740) (1.944) (2.360) 
Treatment Period 4.641*** 2.649*** 2.500*** 2.649*** 2.751*** 
 
(0.593) (0.532) (0.574) (0.671) (0.594) 
Treatment Effect -3.128*** -3.350*** -2.829*** -2.744*** -3.112*** 
 
 
(0.938) (0.846) (0.826) (0.878) (0.879) 
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Personnel Structure  41.721*** 21.625* 16.579 37.715*** 
 
 (10.406) (12.235) (11.179) (9.815) 
International Students  -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001* 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Teaching Workload  0.132*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.137*** 
 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) 
Innovation by university  -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds  17.747** 10.601 10.946 17.869* 
 
 (8.738) (8.892) (10.415) (10.227) 
Technical orientation  2.697 0.524 0.186 1.044 
 
 (3.791) (4.187) (4.896) (4.545) 
Undergraduate Programs   0.020** 0.018*  
 
  (0.009) (0.010)  
Graduate Programs   0.030* 0.036**  
 
  (0.016) (0.015)  
Hospital  -1.952 -2.367 -2.326 -1.757 
 
 (2.236) (1.964) (2.046) (2.217) 
Technical University  -5.364*** -4.718** -4.876** -4.808** 
 
 (1.731) (1.896) (1.903) (2.161) 
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Regional inequality    -1.241 -0.891 
 
   (3.868) (3.377) 
Regional Wealth    -0.000 0.000 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality    0.002 0.001 
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
  22.670*** 2.458 9.064 13.482** 3.769 
 Constant (1.093) (4.115) (5.852) (6.374) (4.874) 
       
 Observations 152 152 133 129 147 
 Number of Universities 19 19 19 19 19 
 Random-effects panel estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The question rises whether the ratios we used triggered the effect. Attachment 18: Robustness 
check Excellence Initiative with count data. reveals that publications per se rose significantly 
during the time of the Excellence Initiative for all universities while no additional effect can 
be observed for Excellence Universities. A rat race effect as found by Backes‐Gellner and 
Pull (2013) or Menter et al. (2018) is not present in the data – which was intended by the 
choice of limiting the dataset. The number of citations shows highly significant a loosing 
winners effect. This leads to the assumption that a loss of research quality cannot be traced 
back to more publications that could make the ratio smaller but rather to an actual decline in 
citations after becoming Excellence University. This contrasts previous research to some 
extent, which suggests that a university with title or a prestigious institution gets citations 
easier just because of the title (Bartko, 1982; Ceci & Peters, 1984; Miller, 2006). Mentioning 
again the results for graduate programs, one could interpret that activities rather than titles 
influence qualitative outcomes and respective external evaluation. The introduction of the 
Excellence Initiative fostered a loss of research quality mainly due to losses in external 
evaluation, namely citations, which was presumably connected to the announcement effect 
and eventual “salami-slicing” resulting in a loss of output quality or innovation. 
Control variables reveal potential avenues for further research: female shares in the scientific 
personnel seem to play a role, however, the impact direction remains unclear. Interestingly, 
the number of graduate programs have a positive effect on both, research quantity and quality 
– except for research quantity in the selected universities model. This could indicate two 
things: first, the feared decoupling of research and teaching stays absent, rather this could be a 
sign of the beneficial relation between both. As German universities usually employ Master 
graduates for PhD programs (rather than Bachelor undergraduates like in Anglo-Saxon 
countries) those students might prepare for their scientific career by supporting publishing 
projects. Second, graduate programs might be a sign of prestige so the more prestigious a 
university the more publications and the more citations they collect – what would be in line 
with previous research (Miller, 2006).  
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Dependency on third-party funding seems to be important for the selected universities where 
this variable is reinforcing both research quality and quantity. A higher share of third-party 
funds considering all universities is only beneficial for research quantity, not quality. This 
might be explained by the use of the measures for the specific research purpose resulting in 
more research output but not necessarily more research quality or perception in the academic 
world. The environmental variables show that for all universities regional wealth determines 
research quality and quantity, while for the selected universities this is only valid for research 
quantity. 
Concluding one may say that the initiative is beneficial for window dressing purposes as 
research quantity and corresponding ranking positions might rise for the distinguished 
universities and the whole university system (DFG & Wissenschaftsrat, 2015; Menter et al., 
2018). However, this does not hold if the control group is more homogeneously chosen. The 
initiative boosted research quality in the university system as well as the immediate peer 
group of universities. Nevertheless, Excellence Universities invest less effort what could 
indicate (i) a crowding-out effect (Kenny, 2017; Liefner, 2003), (ii) moral hazard behavior 
that is demonstrated by a so-called probation period effect (Riphahn & Thalmaier, 2001; 
Brogaard et al., 2018), and (iii) a consequence of their rat race before the award moment 
(Menter et al., 2018). The results show that the incentives and installed evaluation mechanism 
by the Excellence Initiative supported a role model in terms of quantitative output compared 
to a losing winners effect in terms of qualitative output. The German university system seems 
to be after all not as lethargic as some would accuse it to be. In particular, those universities 
that show their “enthusiasm” for winning an Excellence Cluster or Graduate school seem to 
be rather active and flexible. Future research might tackle the topic of differentiation by 
further examinations e.g. employing quantile regression as peak universities could show 
different needs and reactions than more teaching oriented ones for instance.  
One might implicate by the results that researchers of Excellence Universities are considering 
output maximization instead of impact maximization. Who should actually get rewards of 
such a competition – the one that “sells the most” or the one that “sells the most valuable” 
should be questioned and consequently answered. Inverting such a trend one has to consider 
possible policy rationales: If the target of policies is to increase ranking visibility, one should 
continue to incentivize the maximization of output, as this is a pervasive way to increase e.g. 
ranking visibility (Vogel et al., 2017). If the target is to increase research impact one should 
incentivize not “salami-publishing” (Geuna & Martin, 2003; Martin, 2013) but rather to 
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publish e.g. in high Impact Factor Journals. However, this takes time and is not displayed by 
the Excellence Initiative in two essential points: first, the time dimension of the funding is too 
small to experience a sustainable quality improvement and second, the Graduate Schools 
funded by the Initiative for fast track (mostly cumulative) promotions, are considered as a 
signal incentivizing the exact opposite, videlicet fast and many publications (Baader & Korff, 
2015). This is just in line with the already mentioned striking quote of Kerr (1975, p. 769): 
“Whether dealing with monkeys, rats, or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that 
most organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do 
(or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not 
rewarded.”  
Consequently, politicians should consider communicating transparently “hard criteria” and 
actual aims of the policy intervention according to which they are selecting respective 
universities. Such a strategy could support even more a beneficial unfolding of existent 
market powers. As the Excellence Strategy will not further subsidize Graduate Schools and 
have an extended funding period of seven years, this might be a first sign for concentrating on 
qualitative aspects rather than time-saving and quantitative measures. In the light of 
competitive mechanisms and New Public Management principles, one should also consider 
the probation period effect, which could be counteracted by payouts that are based on 
milestones.   
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This study comes at some limitations that are first the choice of variables. Publications are to 
some extent biased towards traditional publishing sciences like natural sciences. Citations are 
not an immediate measure of quality and neither does a citation always indicate being cited in 
a positive context. Observing a university as one entity might further introduce questionable 
averages as some “star scientists” of one faculty get equalized by a potentially less productive 
faculty. This might be counteracted by the observation of individual researchers. However, 
the aim is to show the influence of political strategies on the institutional settings of 
universities, which justifies the institutional level. Second, the source of main variables is the 
Scopus database that is constantly updated resulting in changing observations depending on 
the time of data retrieval. Data from different sources could be a solution and would be 
interesting to examine – also in terms of differences in databases, as the present results are 
slightly different from Menter et al. (2018) for research quality. Third, further research might 
use a bigger timeframe including the third round of the initiative. This could consciously take 
into account the before (rat race) and after (loosing winners) treatment effects as well as 
impacts of the belonging to respective peer groups. In particular, the reaction of universities 
on the possibility, that titles could be lost again, would be an interesting exercise. In this 
context, migration effects of individual researchers seem to be an equally interesting project. 
However, data for this timeframe was not accessible yet. Fourth, an even more precise 
evaluation could be undertaken if one knew the exact reference group. Fifth, the estimation 
results might further suffer from the omitted variables problem. 
4.4 Corporate Governance of higher education in Germany: University boards 
4.4.1 Literature on university boards in Germany 
External, political steering by market mechanisms like competition in the Excellence 
Initiative (as shown in the previous chapter) are one part of the New Public Management 
principles in Germany. With the revision of the Framework Act for Higher Education in 1998, 
New Public Management principles, which rooted in the Thatcher and Reagan era, were 
operatively introduced to the German higher education system. The central government’s 
possibilities for influence were reduced (no further competence to design the internal and 
external organization of a university) and federal states got more competences. Academic 
self-organization was strengthened what was presumably caused by underinvestment in 
higher education in the following of the unification of the two Germanies, a not anticipated 
growth of students (Kehm & Lanzendorf, 2005) as well as the rising criticism of external 
steering (Behm & Müller, 2010; Bogumil, Heinze, Grohs, & Gerber, 2007). Most federal state 
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governments introduced university boards
11
 as connectors of external political and societal 
interests with the internal organization of the university. They were considered a control and 
advise mechanism for the operative president
12
 and a counterbalance to the internal senate 
(controlling function; Borgwardt, 2013). The aims can be summarized as controlling, 
legitimating and advising function: controlling because autonomy was strengthened, 
legitimating because of an increased responsiveness of universities to societal expectations, 
and advising as members should bring management skills to the self-governed, assumed to be 
non-managerial university system (Jochheim, Bogumil, & Heinze, 2016).  
To generate a general understanding for the basic functioning of university boards Table 11 
shows differing designs on state-level in Germany in 2012 (corresponding to the first 
installation of a board in nearly every observed university at the date of data collection). The 
arrangements, rights and duties in terms of control and advice are diverse, resulting in purely 
external to dual to not further specified boards, ranging from 5 to 22 members having no or 
extensive voting rights as well as being selected by the ministry versus by university intern 
committees (typically senate) or by a cooperative model. The only federal state without a 
legal university board is Bremen.  
                                                 
11
 Most commonly named „Hochschulrat“ (other synonymous terms: Universitätsrat, Kuratorium, 
Landeshochschulrat). 
12
 Most commonly named president (Präsident), especially in traditional universities also rector (Rektor), both 
labels are used interchangeably throughout this book. 
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Table 11: Overview on the federal state's designs of university boards in 2012.  
Based on Behm and Müller (2010) and Hüther (2009) 
Federal State 
(German) 
Name 
Appointment 
Procedure 
Veto 
/nominating 
power 
Compo-
sition 
Size Voting Control Advise and Approval 
Period of 
office 
Controlled by 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
Aufsichtsrat 
Minister of 
Education 
yes 
dual 
(extern > 
50%) 
7, 9, or 11 
election 
and recall 
of 
executives 
executives, 
university 
constitution, 
profiling, study 
programs 
structural, developmental 
and budget plans, resource 
allocation, university 
contracts, construction and 
removal of university 
institutions, definition of 
professorates 
university 
con-
stitution 
States Minister of 
Education, liability 
Bavaria Hochschulrat 
Minister of 
Education 
yes dual 16 
Election 
and recall 
of 
president 
report of 
university 
administration, 
budget plan, 
agreement on 
objectives 
approval of chancellor’s 
election 
4 years not specified 
Berlin Kuratorium 
Senate 
(intern) 
yes 
dual 
(extern > 
50%) 
22 none 
structural, and 
developmental 
plans 
budget plan, construction 
and removal of university 
institutions, staff decisions of 
fundamental importance, 
statement to election of 
university executives, 
definition of professorates 
Externals 
2 years 
Legal supervision 
by federal state, 
academic 
supervision by 
senate 
administration 
Brandenburg 
Landeshoch-
schulrat 
Minister-
President 
no 
not 
specified 
6-12 none 
structural, and 
developmental 
plans 
proposal of presidential 
election 
4 years not specified 
Bremen no Board . . . 
 
. . . . . 
Hamburg Hochschulrat 
Senate 
(intern) and 
Hamburg 
Senate 
yes 
dual 
(min. 1 
extern) 
5-9 
election 
and recall 
of 
president 
profiling 
structural, developmental, 
and budget plans, university 
constitution, resource 
allocation 
4 years not specified 
Hesse Hochschulrat 
Minister of 
Education 
yes extern ≤ 10 
election 
and recall 
of 
presidium 
report, budget 
plan, study 
programs, 
organization of 
university 
approval of chancellor's 
election 
4 years 
Minister of 
Education 
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Federal State 
(German) 
Name 
Appointment 
Procedure 
Veto 
/nominating 
power 
Compo-
sition 
Size Voting Control Advise and Approval 
Period of 
office 
Controlled by 
Lower 
Saxony 
Hochschulrat 
or 
Stiftungsrat 
Minister of 
Education 
and Senate 
(intern) 
yes 
dual 
(min. 1 
intern) 
7 
election 
and recall 
of 
president 
(involved) 
structural, and 
developmental 
plans, agreement 
on objectives, 
control of 
presidium, 
budget plan, 
legal supervision 
Appointment of professors, 
foundation assets, foundation 
constitution 
5 years 
Minister of 
Education (for 
extern members) 
Mecklenburg-
Hither 
Pomerania 
Hochschulrat 
Konzil 
(intern) 
no extern 
university 
constitution 
none - budget plan, study programs 
university 
con-
stitution 
not specified 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
Hochschulrat 
Minister of 
Education 
yes 
dual 
(extern > 
50%) 
6, 8, or 10 
election 
and recall 
of 
presidium 
report of 
university 
administration, 
research and 
teaching issues 
structural, developmental 
and budget plans, agreement 
on objectives 
5 years liability 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
Hochschulrat 
Minister of 
Education 
and Senate 
(intern) 
yes 
dual 
(parity) 
10 none 
university 
strategy, study 
programs 
structural and developmental 
plans, construction and 
removal of university 
institutions, university 
constitution, study programs, 
proposal of presidential 
election 
5 years not specified 
Saarland 
Universitäts-
rat 
Minister-
President 
yes extern 7 
election 
and recall 
of 
president 
(involved) 
report of 
university 
administration, 
university 
constitution, 
definition of 
professorates 
structural, developmental 
and budget plans, resource 
allocation, study programs, 
construction and removal of 
university institutions 
4 years not specified 
Saxony Hochschulrat 
Minister of 
Education 
and Senate 
(intern) 
yes 
dual 
(extern > 
50%) 
5, 7, 9 or 
11 
recall of 
rector 
discharge of 
rectorate, 
structural and 
developmental 
plans, budget 
plan 
proposal of rector election, 
approval of chancellor's 
election 
5 years 
Minister of 
Education 
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Federal State 
(German) 
Name 
Appointment 
Procedure 
Veto 
/nominating 
power 
Compo-
sition 
Size Voting Control Advise and Approval 
Period of 
office 
Controlled by 
Saxony-
Anhalt 
Kuratorium 
Senate 
(intern) 
no extern 5 none 
report of 
university 
administration, 
budget plan 
- 5 years not specified 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
Universitäts-
rat (state-
wide) 
Minister of 
Education 
yes extern 9 none 
report, study 
programs, 
agreement on 
objectives 
structural, and 
developmental plans, 
resource allocation, 
university constitution, 
quality assurance, decision 
right by consultation of 
chancellor 
3 years not specified 
Thuringia Hochschulrat 
Minister of 
Education 
yes 
dual 
(extern > 
66%) 
6, 8 or 10 
election 
and recall 
of 
president 
and 
chancellor 
decisions of 
presidium, 
agreement on 
objectives 
structural and developmental 
plans, resource allocation, 
university constitution 
4 years not specified 
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University boards in Germany were due to their relative novelty
13
 in this area-covering 
manner evaluated descriptively or theoretically (Borgwardt, 2013; Gerber, Bogumil, Heinze, 
& Grohs, 2009; Hener, 2001; Kretek & Dragsic, 2012; S. Lange, 2010; Schütz, 2014; Schütz 
& Röbken, 2012), were internationally compared according to their formal and informal role 
(Kretek et al., 2013), criticized (Bultmann, 2006; Fittschen, 1998; Nienhüser, 2012), legally 
(Müller-Terpitz, 2011; Pilniok, 2012) and socio-psychologically assessed (Witte, 2002), as 
well as discussed practice-oriented in terms of success factors (Behm & Müller, 2010) and 
instructive guidance (Meyer-Guckel, Winde, & Ziegele, 2010).  
Empirically, up until now little research has focused on German university boards. The first 
attempts are based on a questionnaire in Heinze, Bogumil, Grohs, and Gerber (2007). They 
find that a dual board system usually leads to more powerful boards, and that the 
representation of business is mainly dependent on the university form. They resume that 
university management was strengthened by the introduction of university boards against the 
multi-level self-governing system. Following up in 2016, the primary activity of university 
boards is advising rather than supervising (Jochheim et al., 2016). Literature was focusing 
primarily on university board composition and causes of the composition that are to be found 
in university characteristics (such as finance structure, subject orientation, etc.) and respective 
resource dependence (Nienhüser, 2011; Nienhüser & Jacob, 2008a, 2008b). Röbken and 
Schütz (2013) evaluate the composition and differing personality traits like having a doctoral 
degree (mostly in full universities), or the subject background. They are contradicting 
previous studies disproving a disproportional representation of board members with a 
business background. This contradiction might be rooted in the negligence of structural 
differences in the legal framework and university characteristics.  
The more market-oriented model of Anglo-American boards had been evaluated comparably 
analogous to the corporate boards’ literature (see 3.2.2 The role of boards in higher education 
institutions and 3.2.3 Measurement). Causes and consequences in a more hierarchy-oriented 
system like the Germany considering the nature of higher education as well as the 
endogeneity problem have not been systematically evaluated, yet. The evaluation is 
interesting as we observe the adoption of a mechanism that evolved out of a different 
approach (stable, public institutions founded and financed by but independent from 
rulers/state) than the American one (autonomous organization, supported by other institutions 
like state, church or alumni; S. Lange, 2010). The tension of reliance and autonomy in 
                                                 
13
 The first German board was founded already in 1912 in Frankfurt as Kuratorium with slightly differing tasks. 
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Germany was latest shifted in favor of autonomy after WW II. Ordered by the British 
occupation zone, the Blue Report was indicating the need for a decentral societal supervisory 
body. The introduction was made possible more than 50 years later with the incremental 
reduction of state power over universities. A uniform introduction in 15 of 16 federal states at 
more or less the same point in time exhibits an interesting natural-experiment. Recent 
discontent on the role of university boards intensify the interest in functionalities and 
dysfunctionalities of university boards: after a leak in North Rhine-Westphalia, a fast increase 
of university president’s salaries was discussed as boards had the power to negotiate them 
(NachDenkSeiten, 2014). The power of electing or recalling presidents can be interest based 
as e.g. in the case of Beate Schücking at the University of Leipzig. She could not candidate 
again, which was suspected to be driven by personal or political motives (Stange, 2015). 
Another example is the threatened resignation of 60-88% of business representatives in case 
of a power loss in Baden-Württemberg (Allgöwer, 2012a, 2012b). 
As has been shown for corporate boards also university boards exhibit a problem of 
endogeneity. Examining causality relations of boards to performance and vice versa are 
deceptive (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972). While a panel approach could at least 
handle some problems of endogeneity, none of the existing studies is relying on a panel 
dataset (due to no availability by the recent introduction; e.g. Nienhüser & Jacob, 2008a). If 
they do, they exhibit problems of interview biases (Jochheim et al., 2016). The response by 
organizations to their specific environmental and agency problems causes the future 
composition (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000) of the board and this composition might 
influence future performance, profiles, strategies etc. of the organization (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Yermack, 1996). The relation and both perspectives are depicted simplified in Figure 
11. also showing the respective theoretical framework.  
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Figure 11: Endogeneity in performance-composition relation – an evolutionary 
perspective. 
 
Resource-dependent view 
The resource-dependency approach assumes that the context (environmental, social, 
performing) of an organization can be seen as a strategic resource and determines decisions, 
possibilities and relations of organizations like e.g. the composition of boards (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Thus, the stronger one organization is dependent on a resource in 
financial, reputational or knowledge terms, the higher will be the representation of adequate 
board members. Employing OLS regression Nienhüser (2011) evaluates that a relation 
between the dependence on third-party funds (which are in other contexts a measure for 
university performance (Hornbostel, 2001)) causes a higher share of board members coming 
from businesses.  
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Institutional view 
The second approach that discusses boards is the institutional or resource-based (in contrast to 
dependent) approach assuming that the composition and activities of a board are lowering 
agency costs and thus, are a kind of competitive advantage compared to other organizations 
what influences the performance of the organization. It is connected to basic assumptions of 
agency theory: monitoring is represented by the board and should align the agent’s interest 
with the interest of share- or stakeholders (depending on the chosen perspective). For the 
German higher education context might be mentioned the standardized questionnaire of 
Jochheim et al. (2016). It is evaluating the consequences of the introduced boards finding that 
the effects seem to be overall rather low. 
The question on how university boards in Germany work in the interplay of their composition 
and framework and if this is corresponding to university performance has not been answered 
satisfactorily yet. The following chapter wants to answer the question whether and how 
German university boards differ according to specific frameworks and competences. 
4.4.2 Difference hypotheses 
As a testing of causality hypotheses would be misleading, groups and characteristics in the 
context of higher education will be defined and tested for differences rather than causalities. 
Differences in board composition (share of business/science/society representatives, 
background of chairmen or chairwomen) are expected to be found on two group levels and 
their interplay: macro in terms of political (intensity of external steering), and micro in terms 
of intern selection of management personnel (internal vs. external presidents). The political 
level refers to external selection modes of board members that might influence the 
theoretically expected actions and benefits of the differing representatives. The internal or 
external selection of the president (operative management) is an expression of dependence on 
specific human capital and corresponding strategic positioning in terms of board composition.  
Macro: Political level 
The selection mode of the board can be purely (1) intern (e.g. Berlin), (2) shared by Ministry 
and internal committees (e.g. Saxony) or (3) purely extern (e.g. Bavaria, for the overview on 
all federal states see Attachment 22: Classification of selection mode.). The benefit for 
members is usually not the salary as in most cases they get a compensation of their expenses 
or are considered an honorary position. Thus, their motives seem to be mainly found in the 
contribution of their expertise and the prestige of the position. The latter argument to join 
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should hold especially for business (Nienhüser, 2011) as well as scientific members. Societal 
members could additionally have a benefit of overseeing the impact and implementation of 
their work and ideas. In addition, the highly discussed representation of business members in 
combination with the university board competences could result in influencing study 
programs, more practice-oriented teaching and research or controlling and adding third-party 
funding. 
 
Table 12: Simplified overview on expected differences in composition and selection 
mode. 
(Own illustration) 
Number Selection Mode Interest Chairman Board members 
1 Intern 
Strategic advisory, 
Prestige, power 
retention  
Science Business 
2 
Shared 
intern/extern 
Strategic advisory and 
monitoring 
Business Science/Society 
3 Extern 
Monitoring and 
Controlling 
Society Business 
 
Differing interests are implied for the selectors in each model that are depicted in the 
simplified overview in Table 12: Simplified overview on expected differences in composition 
and selection mode.:  
(1) Intern Selection Mode with prestige as major interest: If the board is purely internally 
chosen, the members of the internal committee should show an interest in having a not 
too powerful and at the same time prestigious board. Not too powerful because it 
should not hinder them in their activities or decrease the existent power. Prestigious 
because this could increase their reputation and make the board a window-dressing 
rather than active actor. Thus, one might expect that the chairman has a scientific 
background as this indicates knowledge about “how science and universities work” 
and he has the supervision function. The board composition could benefit from a 
stronger business background, as they should have an interest in the prestigious 
position and strategy supporting rather than controlling the society’s guidelines.  
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(2) Shared Selection Mode with strategy building as major interest: In the second group, 
the Ministry and an internal committee select jointly the board members. Combining 
the monitoring need of the Ministry and the resource need of the internal committee a 
strategic orientation could be expected. The joint mechanism makes a consensus 
necessary, which should reflect itself in some sort of diversity. It can be expected that 
the chairman is from business as they bring the resource “management” and “strategic 
orientation” and could balance the interests of science and society. By implication, the 
board members should consist of a mix of scientific and societal members. 
(3) Extern Selection Mode with monitoring as major interest: The third group is a purely 
externally chosen board, reflecting the interests of the Ministry. As they lost influence 
over universities, they have a special interest in an effective monitoring. Thus, they are 
expected to aim for a representation of their interests installing a member that 
represents society as chairman (e.g. a member of the ministry, political party, etc.) 
supervising the implementation of societal guidelines. At the same time, they could 
show an interest in management skills supporting strategy building and 
implementation that are likely to be found in representatives of business. 
Usually, a veto right or nominating power in selection mode (1) or (3) is installed (except for 
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt). This right could be 
interpreted as a consensus invitation because an official scandal is not in the interest of any of 
the involved parties (except for political reasons that are usually more concerned with the 
executive leader of the organization).  
Micro: Selection of management personnel 
The differentiation of external versus internal selection of management personnel is important 
for business as well as for the university context. Especially with view on the CEO, the 
probability of recruiting, and corresponding performance in stock companies of extern and 
intern CEOs has already been evaluated (Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004; Parrino, 1997; 
Weisbach, 1988; Zimmermann, 2009, 2010). The argument for internal selection is based on 
human capital and new institutionalist theory as an internal candidate qualifies himself and 
lowers uncertainty by his specific human capital including knowledge about internal 
processes, organizational culture, specificities and so forth. This is beneficial for an 
organization as transitions are smooth and the risk of adverse selection is reduced. The costs 
149 
 
of employing an internal candidate are organizational blindness (and corresponding suspicion 
of nepotism) and lower management skills in terms of strategy or innovation (Zimmermann, 
2009). The argument for external selection is overall found in low previous performance of an 
organization and the corresponding desirable change that should be implemented easier by an 
outsider as well as in “power games” (Zimmermann, 2010). The management of external 
appearance gains importance and might be better fulfilled by an extern candidate that brings 
his network and managerial expertise (K. J. Murphy & Zabojnik, 2007). In the case of 
universities, one could expect that costs for an external selection are lower compared to most 
business contexts as German universities are comparably homogeneous (Parrino, 1997).  
An internal and external process of coordination (with internal committees and political 
actors) mainly triggers university governance. Selecting an intern or extern candidate for 
being the operative manager of a university influences the composition of the board and vice 
versa:  
Internally chosen university presidents should reveal specific human capital and be well 
organized within their own university. The performance of the university should not be in 
question so an internal solution is favored. The expectation is that he or she contributes 
university-specific know-how. From a political perspective, it is beneficial to have business 
representatives that show managerial experience to support the president. The president could 
also favor business representatives as they bring prestige in form of entrepreneurialism and 
see their function as advisor rather than controller. A chairman from society or business 
would fulfill the managerial and controlling needs of policy. Scientists could better fulfill the 
need for someone who understands decisions that are made in universities compared to a 
complete outsider. 
If the president was chosen externally, the expectation to him would be unspecific human 
capital in terms of management skills. Thus, not managerial competences, which are coming 
from business, but rather science or societal networking and their expertise, should be the 
function of the board. Therefore, members as well as the chairman should rather come from a 
scientific or societal background also supporting as peer group an external president (that 
presumably should not have as much internal backing as an internal solution).  
The single levels as well as their interplay of the two presented perspectives will be evaluated 
descriptively. 
 
150 
 
4.4.3 Methodology and extension of the dataset: Specification of board variables 
This chapter will give an overview on the German university performances and the 
composition of boards with the interplay of the political framework with management 
decisions. The first step will be a descriptive analysis highlighting university performance 
structures, board backgrounds, and characteristics of the chairmen and chairwomen. The 73 
universities of the general dataset are reduced to 71 as the universities of Bremen and 
Greifswald did not have a university board at the time of data collection. Data on chairmen, 
members, functions and characteristics was retrieved from university websites (and less 
frequently by additional internet search) in the timeframe from November 2011 to March 
2012. The groups and chairmen, which will be evaluated, are: 
- Business representatives comprising all members that have a business background,  
- Science representatives comprising all members that have a science background (like 
coming from another university, research institute or university of applied sciences), 
- Society representatives comprising all members that have a background in a societal 
institution or fulfilling a societal function (like politicians, science administrators, 
federal or central institutes, or associations). 
The definition of the selection mode groups is summarized in Attachment 22: Classification of 
selection mode. and corresponding descriptives can be found in Table 13: University board 
descriptives according to selection mode. The list of respective universities with intern and 
extern presidents (management selection) can be found in Attachment 23: List of universities 
with internal and external presidents/rectors in 2012. and corresponding descriptives are 
presented in Table 14: Descriptives of universities with internal/external presidents.  
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Table 13: University board descriptives according to selection mode. 
 
Intern selection mode Shared selection mode Extern Selection Mode 
VARIABLES N mean SD min max N mean SD min max N mean SD min max 
                                
Number of all members 6 7.5 2.81 5 11 19 7.95 1.51 5 10 46 10.02 2.98 5 20 
Number of business representatives 6 1.67 0.82 1 3 19 1.90 1.24 0 4 46 2.609 1.44 0 7 
Number of extern science 
representatives 6 1.5 0.84 1 3 19 2.47 1.47 0 6 46 3.283 1.95 0 8 
Number of society representatives 6 2.5 0.84 1 3 19 1.63 1.12 0 4 46 1.435 1.22 0 6 
Share of business to extern members 6 0.29 0.16 0.17 0.60 19 0.33 0.22 0 0.8 46 0.383 0.2 0 1 
Share of business to all members 6 0.25 0.18 0.10 0.60 19 0.25 0.2 0 0.8 46 0.27 0.15 0 0.7 
Share of extern science to extern 
members 6 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.60 19 0.41 0.22 0 0.86 46 0.444 0.22 0 0.89 
Share of extern science to all members 6 0.23 0.19 0.09 0.60 19 0.32 0.20 0 0.75 46 0.341 0.22 0 0.89 
Share of society to extern members 6 0.43 0.13 0.20 0.60 19 0.27 0.16 0 0.57 46 0.207 0.16 0 0.55 
Share of society to all members 6 0.35 0.14 0.20 0.60 19 0.20 0.13 0 0.44 46 0.149 0.12 0 0.55 
Share of intern to all members 6 0.16 0.20 0 0.40 19 0.23 0.15 0 0.5 46 0.259 0.22 0 0.53 
Chairman business 6 0 0 0 0 19 0.32 0.48 0 1 46 0.457 0.50 0 1 
Chairman Science 6 0.83 0.41 0 1 19 0.26 0.45 0 1 46 0.348 0.48 0 1 
Chairman Society 6 0.17 0.41 0 1 19 0.42 0.51 0 1 46 0.196 0.40 0 1 
Share of females 6 0.38 0.25 0 0.7 19 0.31 0.17 0 0.57 46 0.292 0.11 0 0.5 
Teaching Workload 6 
10.17 2.07 8.14 12.94 19 12.09 2.89 6.73 18.68 46 11.551 2.70 3.45 16.61 
Research Quality 6 
29.83 4.54 23.36 36.37 19 23.98 7.97 9.73 32.56 46 28.786 8.47 10.56 41.68 
Research Quantity 6 
3.63 0.80 2.76 4.47 19 2.96 1.67 0.48 5.84 46 4.127 2.43 0.24 10.35 
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Table 14: Descriptives of universities with internal/external presidents. 
  Internal President External President 
VARIABLES N mean SD min max N mean SD min max 
                      
Number of all members 49 9.37 3.27 5 20 22 9.00 1.41 7 11 
Number of business representatives 49 2.57 1.40 0 7 22 1.82 1.22 0 4 
Number of extern science representatives 49 2.55 1.62 0 8 22 3.73 2.05 1 8 
Number of society representatives 49 1.55 1.28 0 6 22 1.64 1.00 0 4 
Share of business to extern members 49 0.40 0.20 0 1 22 0.27 0.17 0 0.60 
Share of business to all members 49 0.29 0.17 0 0.80 22 0.20 0.14 0 0.44 
Share of extern science to extern members 49 0.38 0.20 0 0.89 22 0.51 0.22 0.14 0.89 
Share of extern science to all members 49 0.28 0.18 0 0.89 22 0.42 0.24 0.11 0.89 
Share of society to extern members 49 0.24 0.17 0 0.60 22 0.25 0.16 0 0.50 
Share of society to all members 49 0.18 0.14 0 0.60 22 0.19 0.12 0 0.43 
Share of intern to all members 49 0.26 0.20 0 0.53 22 0.21 0.19 0 0.50 
Chairman business 49 0.45 0.50 0 1 22 0.23 0.43 0 1 
Chairman Science 49 0.37 0.49 0 1 22 0.36 0.49 0 1 
Chairman Society 49 0.18 0.39 0 1 22 0.41 0.50 0 1 
Share of females 49 0.30 0.15 0 0.70 22 0.31 0.14 0 0.57 
Teaching Workload 49 11.79 2.82 3.45 18.68 22 11.10 2.47 6.23 16.33 
Research Quality 49 27.86 7.86 9.73 41.68 22 26.98 9.36 10.86 38.87 
Research Quantity 49 3.94 2.35 0.48 10.35 22 3.40 1.82 0.24 6.18 
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As a second step, I test the before outlined difference hypotheses. As the political groups 
partly rely on a comparably small sample size, Fisher’s exact test helps to evaluate if the 
observed distribution of categorical variables is different from the expected one, based on the 
overall population (Fisher, 1922).  
Table 15: Simplification of contingency table. 
 Characteristic 
1 
Characteristic 
2 
Σ 
Group 1 a b a+b 
Group 2 c d c+d 
Σ a+c b+d n 
 
Based on the groups, characteristics and overlaps as shown in Table 15 Fisher’s exact test is 
calculated as follows: 
𝑝 =
(𝑎+𝑏
𝑎
) (𝑐+𝑑
𝑐
)
( 𝑛
𝑎+𝑐
)
=  
(𝑎 + 𝑏)! (𝑐 + 𝑑)! (𝑎 + 𝑐)! (𝑏 + 𝑑)!
𝑎! 𝑏! 𝑐! 𝑑! 𝑛!
 
The null hypothesis is no relation between groups and characteristics. 
For completeness and robustness, I will employ a Pearson Chi² Test (Pearson, 1900). For 
evaluating, the contingency tables three percentiles will be calculated, according to a low, 
medium or high share of the respective group representation. In order to avoid a bias due to 
differences between the groups “selection mode” and “management selection” both outlined 
tests were conducted resulting in no detection of a systematic difference between the groups 
(see Attachment 21: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact for selection mode and management 
decision.). 
The third step will be the evaluation of correlations between variables according to the 
Pearson (1896) product-moment correlation:  
Corr (X, Y): 
∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
𝑛
𝑖=1  (𝑦𝑖−?̅?)
√∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)²
𝑛
𝑖=1  √∑ (𝑦𝑖−?̅?)²
𝑛
𝑖=1
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The levels of significance (equal to a t-test) will be presented. However, as the data is 
comprising variance heterogeneity within the groups the probability of a Type I error rises 
(null hypothesis is rejected although “true”). This means that the results of correlations’ 
significance are to be taken cautiously and will be of less interest for interpretation. 
The alternative of conducting a Wilcoxon rank sum test instead of Fisher’s exact or Pearson’s 
Chi² is not considered as it needs one grouping variable and for the selection mode three 
groups are defined. A more advanced and potentially more revealing method like for example 
an analysis of variances (ANOVA) is rejected as the analysis relies on a comparably small 
sample size (with view on the respective grouping) and cannot fulfill the assumption of 
variance homogeneity (tested by Levene, 1960). 
4.4.4 Descriptive results and interpretation 
Firstly, the descriptives on the German university landscape will be given. Performance 
indicators like teaching workload, research quantity and quality as well as university board 
characteristics will be examined according to federal states differences. Secondly, the 
differences of groups that are expected according to selection mode of university board 
members (political level) and to the internal vs. external presidents (management selection 
level) as well as their combination will be outlined and discussed.  
Descriptives of the German university landscape and of the average German university board 
The German university landscape is strongly shaped by the Kulturhoheit of the states. A look 
by states on the basic research and teaching variables that define the strategic orientation later 
as well as on the shares of representatives in the university board help to understand 
descriptively systematic differences. The outputs will be standardized by a size factor 
(professors, publications or number of external members). 
The graduate per professor rate is relatively stable across states ranging from 9 to 13 
graduates per professor
14
 (see Figure 1). Due to financing formula that are usually based for a 
large part on teaching activities (student numbers) this is not surprising.  
                                                 
14
 The exception Saarland might be due to the university hospital that the single university in Saarland has. 
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Figure 12: Mean graduate per professor by state. 
 
Except for Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania the majority of states with a tendency to social 
democratic ideas (like Thuringia, Brandenburg) show lower research quantity output while 
conservatively governed states show in tendency higher research quantity output (see Figure 
13). This observation is similarly valid for research quality (see Figure 14). It is at least a hint 
at an incentive structure, which is unsurprisingly more competitive and output-oriented in 
those conservative states. Leaving aside the top and bottom states, variance is not very high in 
the mean neither for research quantity, nor for research quality. 
The high research quantity in Baden-Wuertemberg can be traced back to the merger of the 
Technical University of Karlsruhe and the nuclear research center Karlsruhe GmbH. The high 
citation per publication rates in Baden-Wuertemberg, Saarland and Berlin can again be 
explained by the merger and relative importance of university hospitals in those small states 
(with the exception of Hamburg). It can be interpreted as evidence for the functioning of an 
incentive system extraordinarily dominant in the medical disciplines (Krempkow, Landrock, 
Neufeld, & Schulz, 2013; Krempkow & Schulz, 2012; Vahl, 2008). 
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Figure 13: Mean publication per professor by state. 
 
 
Figure 14: Mean citation per publication by state. 
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Some states show trends either in favor for business (e.g. Baden Wuertemberg), science (e.g. 
Schleswig-Holstein with its state-wide board) or society (e.g. Berlin) members. However, in 
most states the distribution seems to be quite balanced for those three groups (see Figure 15, 
Figure 16, and Figure 17). 
Figure 15: Mean share of business representatives in university boards by state. 
Shares are calculated by all external members. 
 
Figure 16: Mean share of science representatives in university boards by state. 
Shares are calculated by all external members. 
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Figure 17: Mean share of society representatives in university boards by state. 
Shares are calculated by all external members. 
 
Figure 18: Average representation of external and internal university board members. shows 
the average German university board. It consists in the majority of external members (73%) in 
which the scientific group is slightly dominant followed by business representatives and 
internal professors. Yet, from this perspective the often declared hegemony of business 
representatives (25%, Nienhüser, 2011, 2012) facing scientific external members (31%) and 
internal professors (19%) is at a first glance not existent. One might get a different picture 
from the average distribution of chairmen and chairwomen that are all coming from outside 
the university. Given the overall distribution, only a slight, not overall share-based bias exists 
for chairmen coming from business according to all external members (Figure 19). Business 
representatives are 34% (science 43%, society 23%) of all external members but staff 38% of 
the board chairs (science 37%, society 25%). A possible explanation could be the – especially 
for the business background important (Allgöwer, 2012b) – prestigious function of the 
chairman which could be an incentive to join the university board. Figure 20: Average 
distribution of external and internal scientific members' subject. demonstrates the 
representation of different subjects (within the internal as well as external scientific members 
group). Except for a slight higher share of natural sciences, the distribution seems balanced 
when intuitively anticipating by the disciplines’ number of graduates. 
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Figure 18: Average representation of external and internal university board members. 
 
Figure 19: Average representation of the background of chairmen. 
 
Figure 20: Average distribution of external and internal scientific members' subject. 
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Differences of groups 
Political level: Selection mode 
The political design of selection modes is the first differentiation category for the composition 
of university boards. The descriptives for each group can be found in Table 13 for the 
selection mode of university board members. 
Figure 21 shows research performance measures with regards to the selection mode of 
university board members. The more extreme selection modes – purely internal or external – 
the higher the research productivity rates (3.6 and 4.1 mean publications per professor 
compared to 3) as well as the higher research quality rates (30 and 29 mean citations per 
publication compared to 24) compared to those with a shared selection mode. While external 
steering could hint at a production-oriented benefit, an internal steering seems to have slight 
advantages in terms of research quality. The higher quantitative research output for external 
selection modes could be explained by political interests that are pushing quantitative research 
output to improve ranking positions (see also 4.3 Higher education policies in Germany: The 
German Excellence Initiative). Universities with an internal selection of board members have 
in general more freedom and use this freedom to publish with a focus on quality. 
Figure 21: Research quantity and quality in universities with internal, shared or 
external selection mode of university boards. 
 
Interestingly, Figure 22 shows that we find a high share of society representatives in the 
group of internal selection procedures where one might have expected a science or business 
focus. A possible explanation for this result could be the anticipation of a ministerial veto and 
the preferred selection by the university of society members – rather than externally proposed 
ones. However, the strong science focus and taking advantage of steering competences 
becomes evident looking at the choice of the chairman who is in 83% of the cases having a 
scientific background (Figure 23).  
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In the shared selection mode, we observe a balanced picture with a dominating scientific 
group followed by business and society representatives. This picture is not surprising as it 
reveals the shares of all external members: science (here: 41%, overall extern: 43%) as the 
biggest outsider group, followed by business (here: 33%, overall extern: 34%) and society 
(here 27%, overall extern: 23%). Assessing the chairmen in the shared selection group is 
counterintuitive. The group with the lowest share of representatives (27%) commissions the 
highest share of chairmen: society (here: 42% chairmen, overall share of chairmen: 25%) 
followed by business (here: 32%, overall: 38%) and science (here: 26%, overall: 37%). 
Negotiations between the university committee and the ministry could lead to a compromise 
due to the parity selection mode: a high representation of science is beneficial for the 
university and a “counterpart” to the chairman who has a powerful position and is 
representing the desired monitoring function of the federal state. 
Figure 22: Mean group shares of representatives according to selection mode. 
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Figure 23: Mean group shares of chairman according to selection mode. 
 
The third selection mode is the purely external selection in which the (in comparison to the 
other selection modes) highest share of science representatives (44%) can be detected, 
followed by the (for business) highest share of business representatives (38%) and the lowest 
of society (21%). Most likely, this selection mode has a businessperson as chairman (46%, 
overall: 38%), followed by science (35%, overall: 37%) and society (20%, overall 25%). It is 
rational for the external selectors to show some kind of good will towards the university 
employing science representatives to avoid a veto. This should be the preferred case to 
potential controllers from the societal group appointed by the external (not by internal 
selection). Alternatively, observed members could also reveal the result of an extensive use of 
the veto right. In both cases – either in order to avoid or with the execution of the veto right 
the governance mechanism is supposed to influence the decisions that result in the present 
observation. As most of the chairmen come from a business background this could be seen as 
diplomatic choice and underlining the original intention of university boards to include more 
external expertise in management to universities and give strategic advice. 
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Table 16: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for business representatives and selection 
mode. 
Share of business 
representatives 
Internal Selection Shared Selection External Selection Total 
          
0%-33% 3 10 14 27 
Expected values 2.3 7.2 17.5 27 
33%-66% 2 3 17 22 
Expected values 1.9 5.9 14.3 22 
66%-100% 1 6 15 22 
Expected values 1.9 5.9 14.3 22 
Total 6 19 46 71 
  6 19 46 71 
 
Pearson chi2(2) = 4.3833 Pr = 0.357 
 
 
Fisher's exact = 0.358 
  
 
Table 17: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for science representatives and selection 
mode. 
Share of science 
representatives 
Internal Selection Shared Selection External Selection Total 
0%-33% 5 7 16 28 
Expected values 2.4 7.5 18.1 28 
33%-66% 0 7 18 25 
Expected values 2.1 6.7 16.2 25 
66%-100% 1 5 12 18 
Expected values 1.5 4.8 11.7 18 
Total 6 19 46 71 
 
6 19 46 71 
 
Pearson chi2(2) = 5.7397 Pr = 0.219 
 
 
Fisher's exact = 0.253 
  
 
Table 18: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for society representatives and selection 
mode. 
Share of society 
representatives 
Internal Selection Shared Selection External Selection Total 
0%-33% 0 7 20 27 
Expected values 2.3 7.2 17.5 27 
33%-66% 1 7 16 24 
Expected values 2 6.4 15.5 24 
66%-100% 5 5 10 20 
Expected values 1.7 5.4 13 20 
Total 6 19 46 71 
  6 19 46 71 
 
Pearson chi2(2) = 10.4143 Pr = 0.034 
 
 
Fisher's exact = 0.058 
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The results of the tests of differences in the variance within a group compared to the variance 
of the overall variance are shown in Table 16, Table 17, and Table 18. The observed 
difference in representatives is only on a significant level for society representatives. This is 
in particular interesting because this is the group that would be expected to be the most 
controversial one not in the public opinion (where those are business background members) 
but in negotiations between ministries and universities. 
Management selection level 
Figure 24 supports the assumption that – at least for the directly influenceable research 
quantity – external presidents are more likely to be chosen if research quantity is low (or vice 
versa extern presidents cause low research quantity). 
Figure 24: Research quantity and quality in universities with internal or external 
presidents. 
  
The examination of the group shares (see Figure 25 and Figure 26) shows that if a president 
was already at the university before his election most members have a business background 
(40%) followed by science (38%) and society (24%). The same distribution is roughly given 
for chairmen with business as the largest group (45%), science (37%) and society (18%). This 
can support the assumption that on the one hand, having already a good internal reputation 
and being selected for president allows having prestigious business members on the board and 
showing proximity to an entrepreneurial spirit. On the other hand, this can be a sign that 
universities and science managers (also from the ministries) want to balance specific human 
capital of the internal president with unspecific human capital. This can support strategic 
decisions and questions on change management. The higher shares of business for the 
position of the chairman can be explained by the expected higher willingness especially of 
exalted personalities of the business context to participate if they are considered for an 
outstanding position.  
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The picture changes, if the president was not member of the university when he became 
president. His average accompanying board is equipped mostly with science members (51%) 
followed by nearly the same shares of business (27%) and society (25%). Two interpretations 
are contingent: Either, he supported or needed a board that consists also of his external 
network. Alternatively, this board has been already loaded with science representatives that 
bring enough specific knowledge leading to a president with the before described abilities to 
change, give direction and work on strategic orientation. A look at the chairmen could hint to 
one of the two directions: The majority of chairman is coming from society (41%, nearly 
double the mean of 25%), followed by science (36%) and business (23%). Internal members 
of the university elect a president. Thus, this could reveal an external political steering 
mechanism for the uncertainty about strategic directions and a corresponding wish for control. 
It can further show a strategic move by the university to have someone on board that has also 
a seat in an important political or administrative institution. 
 
Figure 25: Mean group shares of representatives. 
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Figure 26: Mean group shares of chairmen. 
 
 
Table 19: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for business representatives and 
management selection. 
Share of business representatives Internal President External President Total 
0%-33% 14 13 27 
Expected values 18.6 8.4 27 
33%-66% 16 6 22 
Expected values 15.2 6.8 22 
66%-100% 19 3 22 
Expected values 15.2 6.8 22 
Total 49 22 71 
  49 22 71 
 
Pearson chi2(2) = 6.9574 Pr = 0.031 
 
Fisher's exact = 0.034 
 
 
Table 20: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for science representatives and 
management selection. 
Share of society representatives Internal President External President Total 
0%-33% 24 4 28 
Expected values 19.3 8.7 28 
33%-66% 15 10 25 
Expected values 17.3 7.7 25 
66%-100% 10 8 18 
Expected values 12.4 5.6 18 
Total 49 22 71 
  49 22 71 
 
Pearson chi2(2) = 6.1263 Pr = 0.047 
 
Fisher's exact = 0.048 
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Table 21: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for society representatives and 
management selection. 
Share of society representatives Internal President External President Total 
0%-33% 20 7 27 
Expected values 18.6 8.4 27 
33%-66% 16 8 24 
Expected values 16.6 7.4 24 
66%-100% 13 7 20 
Expected values 13.8 6.2 20 
Total 49 22 71 
 
49 22 71 
 
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.536 Pr = 0.765 
 
Fisher's exact = 0.808 
 
 
Table 19: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for business representatives and management 
selection., Table 20: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for science representatives and 
management selection., and Table 21: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact test for society 
representatives and management selection. show the expected differences exist on a 
significant level for business as well as for science representatives. This is not true for the 
share of society members. In comparison to the result of the political level – with a difference 
just for society members – this indicates that science and business play a greater role in terms 
of strategic engagement and internal interest balancing. Societal members have a greater 
relevance in terms of external interest balancing.  
Combination of political and management selection level 
The before outlined results reveal a difference between the political selection mode and the 
choice of management personnel. The societal participation seems to play a role in differing 
political governance settings. For the latter governance choice business and science 
participation is determined by (or determines) the internal steering. In order to understand the 
interplay of these external and internal determinants Figure 27 and Figure 28 combine both 
mechanisms and the respective spread of members and chairmen.  
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Figure 27: Mean shares of representatives according to selection of board members and 
president. 
 
Figure 28: Mean shares of chairmen according to selection of board members and 
president. 
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Intern president 
For the members of a board accompanying an internal president, business representatives play 
a considerable role. However, looking at the shares it is interesting that especially in the 
internal selection mode societal members dominate the boards (43%). The same holds for 
chairmen except for the observation that in this category a science background dominates. 
Science experts might be considered a suitable counterpart for the high share of societal 
members. Interestingly, none of the university boards of the internal presidents that have an 
internal selection of board members has a business chairman. This could be a sign for the 
hidden refusal of business influence in universities. The high share of business chairmen 
(55%) in the external selection mode of board members exposes their dominance in members 
and can be traced back to the endeavor of attracting prestigious personalities. It could be a 
further expression of the perceived importance for Ministries to have business representatives 
or chairmen onboard.  
Extern president 
The share of societal members in the internal selection of university board members stays 
high (43%) if the president was selected from the external university environment. In the 
other two selection modes, science representatives dominate (49% in the shared, 55% in the 
external selection mode). Chairmen in the internal selection mode are at 100% from a 
scientific background. In the shared university board member selection mode a society 
background dominates (63%) and for the external selection science (46%) on a moderate 
level. This shows the negotiation power in a shared selection procedure. Having the majority 
of members with a scientific background to support the external president (or vice versa) and 
having a controlling instance with a societal chairman. 
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Table 22: Correlation matrix of university board characteristics, selection mode, management selection and performance indicators. 
Significance at 10% level are indicated in bold. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Number of members 1 
                 2 Business representatives 0.25 1 
                3 Science representatives (extern) 0.23 -0.25 1 
               4 Society representatives 0.11 -0.39 -0.16 1 
              5 Share of business to external members 0.02 0.86 -0.52 -0.51 1 
             6 Share of science to external members 0.07 -0.43 0.90 -0.25 -0.56 1 
            7 Share of society to external members -0.08 -0.52 -0.35 0.91 -0.50 -0.32 1 
           8 Share of internal to all members 0.53 -0.02 -0.36 -0.06 0.19 -0.19 0.07 1 
          9 Chairman business 0.08 0.44 -0.25 -0.24 0.51 -0.24 -0.26 0.19 1 
         10 Chairman science 0.01 -0.06 0.18 0.05 -0.16 0.16 0.02 -0.16 -0.60 1 
        11 Chairman society -0.11 -0.43 0.08 0.21 -0.40 0.09 0.26 -0.03 -0.46 -0.44 1 
       12 Internal selection mode -0.19 -0.15 -0.24 0.24 -0.10 -0.22 0.34 -0.12 -0.24 0.29 -0.06 1 
      13 Shared selection mode -0.28 -0.20 -0.15 0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 0.23 -0.18 1 
     14 External selection mode 0.37 0.27 0.27 -0.16 0.15 0.15 -0.29 0.11 0.21 -0.05 -0.18 -0.41 -0.82 1 
    15 Management selection -0.06 -0.25 0.30 0.03 -0.31 0.29 0.02 -0.11 -0.21 0.00 0.24 -0.09 0.15 -0.08 1 
   16 Research Quality 0.01 0.16 -0.08 -0.14 0.22 -0.04 -0.14 0.12 0.22 -0.21 -0.02 0.08 -0.26 0.20 -0.05 1 
  17 Research Quantity 0.12 0.29 -0.09 0.08 0.24 -0.17 0.01 0.04 0.25 -0.25 0.00 -0.02 -0.22 0.22 -0.11 0.54 1 
 18 Teaching Workload 0.24 0.15 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.16 -0.02 0.08 -0.06 -0.16 0.12 -0.01 -0.12 -0.44 -0.23 1 
171 
 
Table 22 reports the correlations of university board’s characteristics, selection modes, 
management selection and performance indicators. The significant and comparably high 
correlation of board size and share of intern to extern members is a sign that the inclusion of 
internal members could be a mechanism of a potential power diffusion (such as in the 
business context, Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009). Complexity, the need for coordination and 
balancing of interests rises with the number of members. An enlargement with internal 
university members weakens the power of the board. The relation of teaching workload and 
size of university board is significant. This indicates that the power diffusion is more likely 
the case for universities with a teaching focus as research quantity and quality have low and 
insignificant coefficients. Not surprisingly, the substitution and catalyst patterns of the 
differing groups exist. The before outlined and descriptively depicted relations of chairmen 
and members as well as the relations of selection mode, management selection and 
performance indicators are mostly supported by (partly significant) correlations.  
The positive correlation of members and chairmen with a business background and the 
negative one of a science background with performance indicators is also observable. Either 
the business background brings in the idea of performance indicators and corresponding 
incentivizing or universities with a lower research performance cannot attract businesspersons 
as they themselves seek prestige. Vice versa for the science members performance indicators 
might not be the main focus as they concentrate on autonomy and freedom of research and 
teaching, they are considered experts for improving low performance. Alternatively, they 
could be a second best solution (before societal members) as business partners could not be 
attracted.  
The evaluation comes at some limitations: concerning the definition of selection mode, the 
selection mechanisms in the states are always relying on the specific cooperation between the 
concerned parties, interpretation of rights like veto or suggestion and trade-off of all involved 
interests. The assumptions underlying the choice of an internal or external president are 
simplified in this context, usually strongly institution specific and seldomly a pure market 
decision. As data relies on the year 2012, most of the boards were the first ever existent. The 
collection and evaluation of panel data might exhibit interesting starting points for future 
research as this could examine also reactions after structural changes in the composition in 
terms of background. Additionally, it would be interesting to assess the possible changes and 
respective causes in the positioning of universities over time as well as interpreting potential 
learning effects based on this first attempt.  
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4.5 Leadership in German universities: Of presidents 
4.5.1 Literature on presidents in Germany 
“Who ever experienced a strong university management, will never want to do without it 
again.”15  
(Dieter Imboden) 
“‘Good’ presidents do not need a presidential system, ‘bad’ presidents may not get one!”16 
(Christian Scholz) 
The citations above show the ambivalence with which strong university managers – 
presidents or rectors – are perceived in their role and how it is a matter of stakeholders’ 
expectations. As outlined in chapter 3.3 Individuals, the same holds for universities: Being 
strong could on the one hand mean attributed authority and competencies that are bundled at 
the top allowing for faster and less bureaucratic decisions, situational and flexible resource 
allocation and possibly higher identification of employees with the university. It might on the 
other hand be misused in the hands of the wrong person, leading to extravagant investments 
and expenses potentially at the cost of the rest of the university, showing a dependency on a 
person rather than the function (e.g. discussed in the context of the presidents' salaries, 
prestige projects and interest conflicts, Becker, 2013; NachDenkSeiten, 2014). The second 
citation reveals the relevance of leadership traits and behavior when it comes to being (or 
becoming) an appreciated and powerful leader in light of a nonexistent structural and legal 
rights ascription. The crucial point for organizational success and follower satisfaction is 
connected to the selection and development of the respective leaders. Thus, the age-old 
questions on who becomes a leader and who rules good are relevant also for the higher 
education system – even more due to being organized towards consensus. Does he or she have 
to be a top researcher or should he or she be more agreeable? Is the leader’s personality or the 
way of leading more important? Do we consider exogenous or endogenous factors that 
determine who becomes a leader and who leads well? The evaluation of those open questions 
contribute to an understanding of mechanisms based on traits and behavior that drive 
leadership determinants in higher education. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Free translation of: „Wer je eine starke Universitätsleitung erlebt hat, möchte sie nicht mehr missen.“ 
(Imboden & Scholz, 2016, p. 678) 
16
 Free translation of: “’Gute’ Präsidenten brauchen kein Präsidialsystem, ‚schlechte‘ Präsidenten dürfen keines 
bekommen!“ (Imboden & Scholz, 2016, p. 679) 
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The horizontal university management consists usually of the presidium, the academic senate 
(sometimes enlarged university management) and the university boards while the vertical 
management consists of the faculty deans. In the German university context, the respective 
federal state’s law and the university constitution define the role and official power of 
university presidents. The president is the executive for the whole university, in particular for 
scientific and representative purposes. Vice-presidents for specific topics, for instance 
innovation, teaching or internationalization, usually support him. Depending on the university 
constitution, he is elected for four to six years by a joint procedure of the other managing 
committees. The chancellor is additionally part of the presidium as manager of administrative 
operations. The democratically elected, collegial committee typically called academic senate 
(Bieletzki, 2012; Röbken, 2006a) enacts legislative functions like statutory regulations, 
regulation of study programs or approval of external university board members. University 
boards are part of the checks and balances for the strengthened executive power and described 
in detail in chapter 4.4 Corporate Governance of higher education in Germany: University 
boards. 
Universities got more autonomy but also more responsibilities following reforms connected to 
the New Public Management. Those responsibilities include reporting of households, target 
agreements and other strategic management tasks. Consequently, this caused a shift towards 
the hierarchical upgrading of deans and presidents on costs of the before existent collegial or 
steering committees (Kehm & Lanzendorf, 2007; Scherm, de Schrevel, & Müller, 2014). 
Critics assessed that this was not really related to efficiently distributing additional resources 
in a sprinkler approach but rather that cutbacks are not coming into effect in a lawn mower 
manner (Becker, 2013; Kleimann, 2015, p. 5).  
Presidents were extensively studied (notably more for the Anglo-American system), 
evaluating the president’s profile, selection procedure and leadership style (for a general 
literature overview on used methods and results about university presidents see Badillo Vega, 
2018, p. 67 ff. and 82 ff.). Literature and empirical evidence on German university presidents 
is scarce. German university presidents qualify for their position based on scientific capital 
from being a professor and institutional capital from being a dean or a vice president 
beforehand (Reuter, Berli, & Tischler, 2016, p. 140 f.). It is most likely that the scientific 
career is suspended for the time being (Bieletzki, 2017). They perceive their role – fitting to 
the collegial principle – as integrative mediator and change-oriented manager (Kleimann, 
2017). Presidents reason their leadership position situationally, emotionally and socially 
174 
 
rather than purely rationally (Reuter et al., 2016, p. 148). Coming from the extern, they 
describe it as subjective intention moving from scientist to public administrator comprising an 
“extern logic” while internal presidents emphasize an “inner logic”. However, both positions 
are characterized by the will to contribute to becoming a congruent part of their university. 
Empirical studies are broadly based on qualitative evaluations, e.g. using discourse 
deconstruction, qualitative interviews, etc. (Kehm & Lanzendorf, 2007; Kleimann, 2014, 
2015, 2017; Scherm, 2014; Wilkesmann, 2017). Quantitative evaluations usually used 
questionnaire-based data on leadership styles (Scherm & Jackenkroll, 2017), describing 
profiles of German university presidents (Röbken, 2006b), evaluating the subject-specific 
background (Wilkesmann, 2017) or effects of top management team diversity (Hattke & 
Blaschke, 2015).  
4.5.2 (Exploratory) Hypotheses 
Even after the reforms that strengthened the position of presidents, their situation and sphere 
of influence is defined much more by their standing and reputation than by the formally 
ascribed power due to the nature of a university as “loosely coupled expert organization”. 
Consensus legitimation (democratic election, collegial principle), low disciplinary authority 
(constitutionally guaranteed entitlement for basic resources) and power potential (no power to 
direct; Freyaldenhoven, 2015; Röbken, 2006b) characterize the structure of leadership 
positions in universities. Contradicting findings on leadership indicate that the context is an 
important determinant (De Hoogh et al., 2015), which is expected in particular for the 
university system. The combination of consensus-seeking factors based on the collegial 
principle and hierarchy-driven factors based on political upgrading of presidents causes the 
call for a strong leader that is at the same time reconciling all voices present in a university. 
Unsurprisingly, strong leadership abilities, respect for the differences in scientific branches 
and knowledge of university life are considered integral requirements for university presidents 
(Bryman, 2007; Krüger & Rudinger, 2011). 
The relation of leadership characteristics and styles towards leadership emergence and 
effectiveness was discussed in detail in 3.3.2 Born or Made: The role of leadership 
characteristics and style in leadership emergence and effectiveness. Both, characteristics and 
styles, play a considerable but distinct role in leadership emergence and effectiveness (Derue 
et al., 2011). Leadership emergence has to be distinguished to formal versus informal power 
ascription and reflects a potential to dominate in terms of polarization. Leadership 
effectiveness reflects a potential to persuade in terms of leader and organization performance 
175 
 
(Judge, Bono, et al., 2002). Characteristics like charisma, which is again associated with 
polarization (Norton, Ueltschy Murfield, & Baucus, 2014) is closely linked to leadership 
emergence. Leadership effectiveness corresponds to structures and follower motivation, 
which is related to organizational performance (Braun, Peus, Weisweiler, & Frey, 2013). In 
times of transparency and rankings, it becomes even more important to understand modes of 
action as leaders play a substantive role in the strategic and operative governance of 
universities. In the following, I will outline the factors that are expected to impact leadership 
emergence and leadership effectiveness. Leadership research in universities is still a black 
box, so some relations can be hypothesized one directionally but others are pointed out in an 
exploratory way. Table 23 gives an overview on influences that remain out of the theoretical 
perspective unclear (+/-) or where a clear tendency can be derived. 
Leadership emergence 
As leadership emergence is concerned with factors that make a person being perceived as a 
leader the main determinants should be found in personality characteristics rather than in the 
leadership style (Judge, Bono, et al., 2002; Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986). For instance, 
Zaccaro, Foti, and Kenny (1991) found that 59% of variance in leadership emergence was 
explained by leadership traits, while other studies found 24-30% of explained variance (Arvey 
et al., 2006; De Neve et al., 2013). The Big Five personality traits correspond to leadership 
emergence (Judge, Bono, et al., 2002; Judge, Hurst, et al., 2009). Table 23 summarizes the 
expected impact of leadership traits on leadership emergence, with two directional hypotheses 
for Neuroticism and Extraversion and three explorative hypotheses for Openness to 
experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Table 4 gives an overview on the meaning 
of each characteristic. Each of the five characteristics is the opposite pole to another 
manifestation in a personality.
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Table 23: Expected impact of leadership traits (Big Five) on leadership emergence and 
leadership behavior on leadership effectiveness. 
Mainly based on Bono and Judge (2004), Judge and Bono (2000), De Hoogh et al. (2015) and 
Judge, Hurst, et al. (2009). 
Characteristic Pole Expected impact 
on characteristic  
Measurement Source 
    
Leadership traits 
Openness to 
experience 
Closedness to 
Experience 
+/- McCrae & Costa 
(1997) 
Conscientiousness Lack of Direction +/- Barrick et al. (1998) 
Extraversion Introversion + Chatterjee & 
Hambrick (2011) 
Agreeableness Antagonism +/- Amichai-Hamburger 
& Vinitzky (2010) 
Neuroticism Emotional Stability - Sedikides et al. (2004) 
    
Leadership behavior 
Consideration / +/o / 
Initiating Structure / U-shaped / 
 
First, for Openness to experience it remains unclear which relation to leadership emergence 
will be shown, if any. This personality trait is one of the most few examined one with regards 
to leadership and includes three dimensions: appreciation for culture, need for intellectual 
stimulation and introspective qualities (Bono & Judge, 2004). Open individuals are 
considered creative, willing to change and able to put themselves to the perspective of another 
person (Judge & Bono, 2000). On the one hand, as fear of change might be especially among 
those that are responsible for deciding if one becomes a leader, this could lower the 
probability of being selected as leader by the decision-maker. On the other hand, creativity, 
empathy and intellectual interest (which is especially important in the academic environment) 
could increase the probability of being selected as a leader (Sosik, Kahai, & Avolio, 1998). 
However, the competence openness was only ranked 14 out of 18 of desired president 
competences in the president of the year ranking, which raises the question if one should 
expect a relation at all (Krüger & Rudinger, 2011). 
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Second, the trait Conscientiousness is expected to be positively related to leadership 
emergence while for the university context it might play a differentiated role. This trait is 
mainly composed of the will to achieve and self-discipline including responsibility, integrity 
and good organization (Costa Jr & McCrae, 1992). Conscientiousness is positively related to 
overall job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991), good organizational citizen behavior 
(Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993) and people scoring high in this dimension are more likely 
to fairly deliver on informal contracts and clarify what they expect by their fellows (Bass, 
1985; Bono & Judge, 2004). Contrary findings showed that Conscientiousness is weakly 
correlated with supervisor and follower ratings (Avolio, Dionne, Atwater, Lau, & Camobreco, 
1996), because they are more probable to show off less favored transactional leadership 
behaviors (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Well or even over-performing persons qualify by their 
functional skills (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994) for leadership positions, so the probability 
of becoming a leader rises. As the university context is a highly specialization-divergent 
expert organization, the proficiency in one subject could play a minor role for becoming the 
president, which is also supported by the third least important leadership competence “high 
scientific reputation” (Krüger & Rudinger, 2010, 2011).  
Third, Extraversion is assumed to be positively related to leadership emergence. Extroverted 
people comprise two elements: sociability and dominance. They are able to manage 
interpersonal relationships successfully by adaption. Flexibly, they dominate or take initiative 
in social situations (Watson & Clark, 1997). Extroverted people are characterized by 
emotional expressiveness (W. L. Gardner & Avolio, 1998), are more likely to be well 
evaluated (Gough, 1990) and become social leaders of a group (Costa Jr & McCrae, 1988). 
The charismatic element inherent in this trait is also supporting Weber’s call for charismatic 
leaders in bureaucratic institutions, which should catch up the limited possibilities of 
motivation. Although bright and dark sides of charismatic persons exist, most recent studies 
underlie that extroverts are perceived as “leaderlike” (Judge, Piccolo, et al., 2009, p. 865). 
They will more likely search actively for leadership as this is part of their personality structure 
as well as they will be more likely perceived as leader by others (Judge & Bono, 2000). The 
prospects for extroverted persons in the university context might be fitting to the requirement 
of having communicative abilities ranked in the top five leadership competences (Krüger & 
Rudinger, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
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Fourth, the expectation for Agreeableness is ambiguous. Agreeable persons avoid conflict 
(Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996), appreciate companionship and foster a favorable 
work environment (Mayer, Bardes, & Piccolo, 2008). The major components of this trait are 
altruism and corresponding concern for others, cooperativeness as well as modesty (De 
Hoogh, Den Hartog, & Koopman, 2005). Charismatic leadership tends to be corresponding to 
Agreeableness (Judge & Bono, 2000). On one side, they show conformity and lack of 
assertiveness relying too much on affiliation and thus, lower their chance of becoming a 
leader (Judge, Bono, et al., 2002). On the other side, their trustworthiness, generosity and 
interest for relations to others, serving as a kind of role model can increase their probability of 
becoming a leader (Bono & Judge, 2004; Judge, Piccolo, et al., 2009). As university members 
express their need for problem solving competences and fairness among the top ten leadership 
competences (Krüger & Rudinger, 2010, 2011), there might be a positive link between 
agreeable individuals and leadership emergence. This could indicate that this dimension 
influences leadership effectiveness: Once being perceived as leader, followers value 
approachability and compassion (Hogan & Shelton, 1998). 
Fifth, Neuroticism as characteristic is expected to have a negative impact on leadership 
emergence and is opposed by Emotional Stability. Neurotic personalities are viewing the 
world pessimistic and are easy to feel emotional distress (Bono & Judge, 2004) as well as they 
lack self-efficacy (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002). Self-confidence is one of the main 
requisites of people that emerge as leaders (Northouse, 1997, p. 17). On the one hand, those 
persons tend to less likely attempt to lead and on the other hand, they are not considered able 
to be stable enough to lead (Bono & Judge, 2004). Thus, a negative relation of neuroticism on 
leadership emergence or vice versa a positive relation of Emotional Stability on leadership 
emergence is expected. President rankings highlight this as leadership attitude and courage for 
decisions are ranked among the top competences (Krüger & Rudinger, 2010, 2011). 
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Leadership effectiveness 
The two most robust, partly left aside and recently again upcoming concepts that explain 
leadership effectiveness by leadership behavior is initiating structure and consideration. 
Initiating structure is the instrumental and task-oriented coordination in organizations. 
Consideration is appreciation as well as concern for followers resulting in motivation in 
organizations (Fleishman, 1953a; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004; Lambert, Tepper, Carr, Holt, 
& Barelka, 2012; G. A. Yukl & Yukl, 1989, p. 49 ff.). This differentiation is describing 
mechanisms of motivation and coordination that are part of every organizational design. In 
general, one might say that consideration plays an important role especially in the lower or 
middle management as it is strongly corresponding to follower satisfaction while initiating 
structure is associated with leader and group-organization performance (Judge, Piccolo, et al., 
2004). Contingency theory addressed the contextual aspect, which recent empirical leadership 
research broadly ignored: A task-oriented leadership style – which is basically corresponding 
to the concept of “initiating structure” – is most effective if the leader is very supported 
(favorable situation) or not supported at all (unfavorable situation) by his followers. 
University presidents get their power in a democratic way. Thus, one would expect a 
favorable situation for a leader who initiates structure rather than following a relation oriented 
strategy of consideration (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 61 f.; Fiedler, 1967). This could mean for 
presidents that they are evaluated according to the structures they initiate rather than 
according to their considerable behavior.  
Initiating structure is expected to have an impact on leadership effectiveness depending on the 
intensity of structure. Scoring high in this category was related to performance in a positive as 
well as negative way (Parker, 1963), which is assumed to be part of differing influences of 
contextual factors. Path goal theory, derived by motivation and expectation theories is based 
on the assumption that “[…] an individual chooses the behaviors he engages in on the basis of 
(1) the valences he perceives to be associated with the outcomes of the behavior under 
consideration; and (2) his subjective estimate of the probability that this behavior will indeed 
result in the outcomes” (House, 1971, p. 322). Leaders who set the frame (path) and reinforce 
desired behavior (goal) of followers increase leadership effectiveness in terms of follower 
satisfaction and performance (House, 1971; House & Dessler, 1974), which could exemplary 
be shown in a meta-study by Wofford and Liska (1993).  
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Higher-level jobs – like professors in academia – are characterized by role autonomy and 
ambiguities, consist of non-routinized and shapeable tasks, and are intrinsically satisfying. An 
initiation of structure could thus, not be seen as an imposition of external control but rather as 
a clarification of path-goal relationship, reducing role ambiguities and support resulting in 
follower satisfaction and leadership effectiveness (House, 1971). Subordinate ability and task 
structure is moderating the relation of initiating structure and leadership effectiveness 
(Wofford & Liska, 1993). Consequently, based on questionnaires, initiating structure behavior 
is positively related in a research driven Anglo-American context, to leader, group or 
organizational performance (House, Filley, & Kerr, 1971; Keller, 2006). Using a MLQ-based 
questionnaire in six universities and relying on precarious causality assumptions
17
 Scherm and 
Jackenkroll (2016, 2017) found that a laissez-faire leadership style has a negative effect for 
presidents (even though, less negative than for deans) in terms of follower satisfaction. This 
laissez-faire leadership style is by definition corresponding to low structures. Within research 
teams, job satisfaction and team performance benefit from a transformational leadership style 
and a trusting atmosphere with the supervisor (Braun et al., 2013; Scherm & Jackenkroll, 
2016, 2017). Still, negative relations of initiating structure on follower job satisfaction are 
existent (for instance Lok & Crawford, 2004; Pool, 1997). This incongruence of findings 
might be due to differing samples, industries, job levels and so forth but also due to the fact, 
that the intensity of structure plays a substantial but under-investigated role. Especially in the 
university context, where professors have guaranteed academic freedom, it is reasonable to 
expect a positive influence of a mediocre intensity of structure, which gives them some 
guidance, but does neither dominate nor hinder them by inaction in their daily work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Very high correlations of dependent and independent variables, no cluster-robust standard errors, intransparent 
re-framing and differentiation of questions and non-validation of scales. 
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Considerable behavior is hypothesized to be – if at all – positively related to leadership 
effectiveness. Consideration is characterized by prosocial behavior, which is producing and 
maintaining follower satisfaction and group advantages (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 129). The 
before mentioned personality trait Agreeableness is associated with considerable behavior of 
leaders (Dilchert & Ones, 2009). Consideration shows mixed evidence (House, 1971) with a 
recent tendency for positive relations: it was found to have positive effects on leadership 
effectiveness in job and follower satisfaction (Judge, Piccolo, et al., 2004; Pool, 1997) or 
follower commitment (Lok & Crawford, 2004). Relying on a meta-study Judge, Piccolo, et al. 
(2004) conclude that consideration predicts follower motivation and leadership effectiveness 
even more than initiating structure. More recent Lambert et al. (2012) examined the 
“forgotten but not gone” ones theorizing that even (subjectively) excessive considerate 
behavior is favored by followers.  
Following the path-goal theory, the more satisfaction one gets by work tasks the less 
dependent is an employee on leader consideration. Social identity theory underlines that social 
identity, and with it motivational aspects that are part of considerate behavior, supports the 
identification of employees with their organization and consequent follower satisfaction. 
Belonging to a social group (stressing similarities, delimiting against other groups) constructs 
social identity and is based on a normative or structural fit. This satisfies the employees’ need 
for positive self-esteem and reduces subjective uncertainty (Hogg, 2001). Leaders that 
identify with the organization, as the ones that define identity and mobilize people to achieve 
organizational goals, are thus, decisive for identification processes of followers – in particular, 
if they exhibit consideration behavior. Especially in the university context that grants 
autonomy and requires a high degree of intrinsic motivation, consideration may play a role in 
a more direct context but not on the top of the hierarchy. Following Lambert et al. (2012) and 
House (1971) one can expect that if a relation exists at all, due to the low management need of 
university professors and the characteristics of higher level jobs, it should be low but positive.  
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4.5.3 Specification of leadership variables and methodology 
The dataset consists of 93 presidents in 73 universities observed from 2009-2012. The data is 
in an unbalanced panel structure depending on data availability in differing data sources. 
Main data source is the German Association of University Professors and Lecturers (DHV)
18
 
ranking which is evaluating university presidents and education ministers based on a yearly 
member survey since 2009. At a minimum 30 DHV members have to fill the questionnaire in 
order to be included in the ranking, the participation is ranging between 2,052 and 3,166 
considered questionnaires. 
The dependent variables are measuring (a) leadership emergence or polarization, indicating 
the strength of informal leadership by being mentioned in the DHV ranking (value 1) or not 
(value 0), and (b) leadership effectiveness or quality, indicating how well perceived a leader is 
by followers, by the average grade reported in the DHV ranking (Deutscher 
Hochschulverband, 2009; Krüger & Rudinger, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). Although the 
leadership emergence variable does not comprise non-leaders in a technical sense of legal and 
formal power ascription, the far more important part in academia is being recognized and 
noteworthy as leader, being a symbol that is legitimated by his standing. Being included in the 
ranking clearly indicates that the leader is important and perceived as activating leader – be it 
in a negative or positive sense. They are not included if not enough followers could be 
mobilized or were willing to answer the questionnaires about their leader (which is also the 
reason why university size needs to be a control variable). Thus, being included means formal 
as well as informal power of the leader while being not included means having only formal 
power. The variable measuring leadership effectiveness indicates the satisfaction of followers 
with the leader. Follower satisfaction as one goal of leadership is a strong predictor of 
organizational success and consequently, leadership effectiveness in the academia (Braun et 
al., 2013; Bryman, 2007). 
Though, it would have inhibited usual questionnaire problems – e.g. differing interpretations, 
understanding or tendencies of questions and answers, social desirability and halo effects – 
the most common and reliable way to measure the five personality traits would have been a 
psychological test according to the Five-factor model (see also 3.3.3 Measurement: The Big 
Five), e.g. by the NEO-PI-R Facet Scale (Bass & Avolio, 1989; Costa Jr & McCrae, 1995; 
McCrae & Costa Jr, 2004) or the MLQ (Antonakis et al., 2003). Executives are often not 
willing to participate (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006) and a voluntary participation by presidents 
                                                 
18
 Professional representation of around 30,000 interdisciplinary members of the scientific community.  
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would introduce further selection biases. Leadership traits variables are used as main 
independent variables for leadership emergence and as control variables for leadership 
effectiveness. Leadership behavior variables are the main independent variables for leadership 
effectiveness. The variables for leadership traits and leadership behavior were operationalized 
by using the following proxies (see also Table 23: Expected impact of leadership traits (Big 
Five) on leadership emergence and leadership behavior on leadership effectiveness., for a 
detailed description of variables see Table 5 General description of all variables.).  
- Openness to experience means that someone is curiously seeking out for the 
unfamiliar, in particular, experience and variety seeking is highly related to this trait 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997) as well as travelling, coping and adjustment or adventures 
(Konopaske, Robie, & Ivancevich, 2009). This variable will be operationalized by the 
time that the president spent abroad (in months) as this indicates a spirit of discovery 
and curiosity about new environments. 
- Conscientiousness is a personal factor indicating that the person is planful, organized, 
disciplined and consistently over-performing at work (Barrick & Mount, 1991; 
Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998; Dudley, Orvis, Lebiecki, & Cortina, 2006). 
A measure of not only performing in terms of quantity but also in terms of external 
evaluation in the scientific context is the citations per publications ratio that the 
president has. The measure is corresponding to the observation that leaders are often 
chosen due to their technical talent rather than their ability to lead (Hogan et al., 1994) 
and it is further considered essential performance criteria in science (Braun et al., 
2013). 
- Extraversion is measured by being an “outsider” president. Coming from the 
organization-extern as a CEO is connected to being more talkative (Kaplan, Klebanov, 
& Sorensen, 2012) and assertive (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). While literature 
suggests that insiders are more likely to become presidents (Badillo Vega, 2018, p. 89 
f.) it is an even more decent result for someone to be appointed from outside the 
university and for sure connected to a charismatic presence which is itself 
corresponding to extraversion (Judge, Hurst, et al., 2009). Thus, the variable will be 
operationalized by being a president who was appointed from the extern (Röbken, 
2006b). 
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- Agreeableness is an interpersonal dimension and highly associated with the will to 
cooperation, being flexible, helpful and network centrality (K. J. Klein, Lim, Saltz, & 
Mayer, 2004). One of the strategic choices of scientists is with who and how many co-
authors they want to collaborate in their publications. Having many co-authors means 
more coordinative effort but also more networking and cooperation, which is the basis 
of agreeable behavior. His subject influences the number of co-authors – for which 
will be controlled. Thus, the total number of co-authors of the president will measure 
the dimension Agreeableness. As this is influenced by experience, it will be controlled 
for the age of the president. 
- Neuroticism is measured by its pole Emotional Stability as Sedikides et al. (2004) 
showed the invers relation of neuroticism and over-confidence in form of 
“narcissism”. Photos were used as measure of over-confident behavior in the business 
context (picture of CEO in annual report) and found that narcissistic CEOS tend to 
bring more variance of big wins or big losses but are on average not performing better 
or worse (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). The variable will be operationalized by 
having a wikipedia entry for medium confidence and having a wikipedia entry with a 
picture for over-confidence. As personality traits will be included in the evaluation of 
leadership effectiveness as well, only having a wikipedia entry with photo will be 
included in the regression
19
. The choice of wikipedia counts that were collected this 
year (2018) are considered a reliable proxy as personality traits have been consistently 
proven to remain stable among adults (Roberts & Del Vecchio, 2000). Thus, the bias 
that might have been existent over time is the same for all included individuals. 
Leadership behavior in terms of (i) initiating structure (which is corresponding to the task-
oriented literature) and (ii) consideration (corresponding to the relations-oriented literature) is 
operationalized as follows (Derue et al., 2011; Lambert et al., 2012; Pool, 1997): (i) initiating 
structure will be measured by third-party funds that are collected by the university. Raising 
and managing third-party funds is connected to many background processes (acquisition, 
administration, IT, professionally qualified application preparation, realization and tracking, 
etc.) as well as central management and steering necessities (Gröger & Schumann, 2014). As 
outlined in 4.5.2 (Exploratory) Hypotheses, I expects an U-shaped relation according to the 
level of steering so the quadratic term is added; (ii) consideration will be measured by the 
variable identity which is the ratio of the google hits on university name and president’s name 
                                                 
19
 As the sample size is reduced to those presidents that are in the ranking (compared to the overall population of 
presidents). 
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to the university name indicating the level of individual to collective congruence. The 
underlying logic is similar to family firms, which comprise social capital and allow for a 
higher social identification for its members by reciprocal trusting relationships (Arregle, Hitt, 
Sirmon, & Very, 2007). As leadership behavior and traits are both considered to be connected 
to leadership effectiveness both will be included in the full model for leadership effectiveness 
as suggested by Judge, Bono, et al. (2002). 
Control variables on the individual president level include sex (Röbken & Mertens, 2015), age 
(Röbken, 2006b), mobility by number of university changes (Röbken, 2006b) and natural vs. 
social subject (Röbken, 2006b). At the university level will be controlled for university size 
and reputation which is assumed to have the greatest impact due to popularity (Menter et al., 
2018), as well as for technical orientation (Menter et al., 2018). The ranking of respective 
federal state ministers will be included to avoid a biased caused by well-perceived politics. 
The environmental level (NUTS-2) could play a role as a positive basic mood might influence 
the rating of the evaluators, thus, controls include the regional situation in terms of 
unemployment (Lehmann & Menter, 2017; Lehmann et al., 2018), and the living quality in 
terms of land prices (similarily tested by Fabel et al., 2002 who used renting prices as 
indicator). 
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Table 24: Descriptives Presidents. 
Dataset consists of 93 presidents in 73 universities, observed from 2009-2012. 
  
Variable Operationalization N Mean SD Min (Example) Min Max (Example) Max 
D
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s [1] Leadership emergence Mention (1) 292 0.59 0.49 0 Bonn, Chemnitz 1 Aachen, Augsburg 
[2] Leadership effectiveness Grade 172 2.87 0.56 1.45 Munich TU 3.58 
Berlin HU, Darmstadt 
TU 
[3] 
Leadership effectiveness 
(robust) 
Position 172 18.39 8.30 1 
Munich TU, 
Bochum 
31 Braunschweig, Kiel 
F
iv
e
-F
a
ct
o
rs
 
[4] Openness for experience 
International experience 
(months) 
291 24.48 39.80 0 
Hannover, 
Greifswald 
192 Dresden TU 
[5] Conscientiousness Citations/Publications 208 12.22 12.94 0 Lüneburg, Freiburg 52.40 Munich TU 
[6] Extraversion Extern (1) 291 0.25 0.43 0 Siegen, Hildesheim 1 Regensburg, Cottbus 
[7] Agreeableness Co-authors 226 76.5 67.2 0 
Augsburg, Coblenz-
Landau 
227 Braunschweig TU 
[8] Narcissism medium Wikipedia entry (1) 292 0.92 0.27 0 Magdeburg, Lübeck 1 
Erlangen-Nuremberg, 
Siegen 
[9] Narcissism high Wikipedia with photo (1) 292 0.53 0.50 0 
Erlangen-
Nuremberg, 
Karlsruhe KIT 
1 Berlin HU, Gießen 
L
ea
d
er
sh
ip
 
B
eh
a
v
io
r
 [10] Initiating Structure Third-party funds (in TEUR) 292 74.60 63.07 1.15 Vechta 311.41 Munich TU 
[11] Consideration 
Google hits president/ 
google hits university 
292 0.01 0.02 0 
Göttingen, 
Flensburg 
0.16 Kaiserslautern TU 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
le
v
el
 
[12] Sex Female (1) 292 0.11 0.31 0 
Magdeburg, 
Mannheim 
1 Münster, Augsburg 
[13] Age Age 292 57.06 6.31 35 Gießen 71 Magdeburg 
[14] Mobility Number of university changes 291 2.92 1.82 0 
Hannover, 
Hohenheim 
8 Hamburg, Regensburg 
[15] Subject Natural sciences (1) 292 0.55 0.50 0 Münster, Augsburg 1 
Hohenheim, Karlsruhe 
KIT 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l 
le
v
el
 
[16] University size Students 292 19,085 10,952 2,729 Lübeck 50,499 Cologne 
[17] Technical orientation Share of technical graduates 292 0.47 0.22 0 Erfurt 1 Lübeck 
[18] Reputation Excellence University (1) 292 0.12 0.33 0 Augsburg, Vechta 1 Munich, Göttingen 
 [19] Policy Frame Grade education minister 270 3.69 0.49 2.00 Saxony-Anhalt 4.82 Schleswig-Holstein 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
N
U
T
S
-2
 
le
v
el
 [20] Regional situation Unemployment (in %) 292 6.73 2.65 2.70 Munich, Tübingen 13.90 Greifswald, Rostock 
[21] Living Quality m² land prices (in TEUR) 289 205 211 2 Freiberg 1334 Munich 
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A logit model is employed for the binary dependent variable leadership emergence, which is 
also controlling for year effects and robust standard errors clustered at university level 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 457 ff.). The preconditions of having a sufficient number of 
observations (due to using a maximum likelihood estimator) and absence of multicollinearity 
are met by the data. Average marginal effects (for reducing the probability of 
misinterpretation) are reported to understand the effect size. Robustness is checked by a probit 
model, by clustering standard errors at federal states level, and reporting conditional marginal 
effects at means (except for university size no high correlations of the independent variables, 
see Attachment 25: Correlations presidents.). 
y(leadership emergence)*i= β0 + β1 Opennessi + β2 Conscientiousnessi + β3 Extraversioni 
+ β4 Agreeablenessi + β5 Emotional Stabilityi + ∑ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑖 
With y(leadership emergence)i = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
 ; 
εi= error term with unobserved heterogeneity; i= president-level 
A tobit model with standard errors at university level is employed for the second dependent 
variable leadership effectiveness measured by the grade of the leader (Tobin, 1958; 
Wooldridge, 2010, p. 519 ff.). This maximum likelihood estimator is designed for linear 
relationships with left- or right-censored dependent variables. It is a mix of a linear and binary 
regression as the observed values for the dependent variable should show a linear relation 
while the censored data gives information about why 𝑦𝑖 is in the observed group versus in the 
censored group (Schild, 2017). This is modelled by assuming a latent variable 𝑦𝑖
∗, which is by 
definition equal to the observed 𝑦𝑖. The lower third of evaluated presidents is not graded but 
only alphabetically listed in a range from grade A to grade B. For all years, the average lower 
third grade is between 3.17 and 3.58. Thus, for the upper limit (UL) case: 
𝑦(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖 = {
𝑦𝑖
∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ <  𝑦𝑈𝐿 
𝑦𝑈𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≥  𝑦𝑈𝐿
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Consequently, values higher than 3.17 (UL) are censored, as the “true value” might be equal 
or above this threshold (see also Attachment 24: Histogram of presidents’ grades., differing 
values above three are due to the yearly difference of the average lower third). Average 
marginal effects at differing points will be presented in steps of 25 (ranging from 1.15 to 
311.41) to understand the U-shaped relation of initiating structure. It will be controlled for 
years. As robustness check will be presented: a model excluding the outliers of the 
consideration variable (see Attachment 26: Density of consideration.), a model reporting 
clustered standard errors at federal states level, and a model with the rank position (censored 
at values higher than 21) as dependent variable, and average marginal effects. 
y(leadership effectiveness)*i= β0 + β1 Initiating structurei + β2 Initiating structure²i + β3 
Considerationi + ∑ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑖 
With εi= error term with unobserved time-variant heterogeneity; i= president-level 
Pseudo R² will be reported for the logistic estimations (model accuracy for the same outcome 
as suggested by Wooldridge (2010, p. 465 ff.)), R² for the tobit estimations (Goodness of fit 
by correlating predicted and observed values as suggested by Wooldridge (2010, p. 527 ff.)). 
Chi² test (testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the constant are jointly “0”) 
will be outlined for both dependent variables to understand how well the models are 
performing in contrast to each other. The logit index and for the tobit model the predicted 
values (similar to probit index as tobit estimations are partly based on probit) help to 
understand the accuracy of the observed and predicted values for leadership emergence and 
effectiveness. 
4.5.4 Results, robustness and interpretation 
Table 25 shows the results of the logistic regression for the effect of personality traits 
(combined Model 6) on leadership emergence: Openness (Model 1), Conscientiousness 
(Model 2), Extraversion (Model 3), Agreeableness (Model 4), and Emotional Stability (Model 
5). The effects are controlled by introducing further president characteristics (Model 7) and 
university and environmental variables (Model 8). The average marginal effects for Models 1 
– 8 can be found in Table 26. The outlined robustness checks can be found in Attachment 28 
showing the marginal effect at mean, Attachment 29 and Attachment 30 for the probit 
estimation and average marginal effects as well as Attachment 31 with standard errors 
clustered at federal states level. 
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Table 25: Logit estimation for the effect of personality traits on leadership emergence. 
Leadership emergence measured by being included in the VHB Ranking or not.  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Openness -0.007 
    
-0.003 -0.007 -0.000 
 
(0.006)     (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Conscientiousness  0.022    0.037 0.043* -0.004 
  (0.016)    (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) 
Extraversion   -0.290   -0.401 -0.826 -0.525 
 
  (0.459)   (0.689) (0.788) (0.789) 
Agreeableness    0.003  -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 
   (0.003)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Emotional Stability 
(Ref Low) 
        
    Medium     0.981 1.516*** 1.370** 0.999 
         (0.822) (0.504) (0.649) (0.871) 
    High     2.110** 2.978*** 2.937*** 1.537* 
         (0.823) (0.521) (0.669) (0.882) 
Sex (female)       -1.172 -2.105** 
 
      (0.762) (0.937) 
Age       0.007 0.009 
 
      (0.041) (0.045) 
Mobility       0.290* 0.111 
 
      (0.169) (0.252) 
Subject       -0.355 -0.256 
 
      (0.683) (0.792) 
University size        0.222*** 
 
       (0.044) 
Technical 
orientation 
       2.516* 
 
       (1.345) 
Reputation        0.597 
 
       (0.731) 
Policy Frame        0.430 
 
       (0.427) 
Regional Situation        0.125 
 
       (0.104) 
Living Quality        -1.235 
        (1.879) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Constant 1.108*** 0.853** 1.015*** 0.734* -0.458 -1.047** -1.917 -6.988* 
 
(0.285) (0.378) (0.269) (0.383) (0.773) (0.530) (2.396) (3.775) 
Nr. of clusters 58 73 62 73 58 58 58 58 
Observations 290 208 291 226 292 206 206 191 
Pseudo R² 0.037 0.034 0.023 0.024 0.100 0.148 0.176 0.453 
Prob > Chi² 0.003 0.066 0.002 0.050 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 26: Average marginal effects for leadership emergence (Table 25). 
Average marginal effects are calculated for each president with their respective observed 
values of covariates and subsequently averaged across all presidents. 
VARIABLES (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
Openness -0.002     -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001)     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Conscientiousness  0.005    0.007 0.008* -0.001 
  (0.004)    (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Extraversion   -0.068   -0.077 -0.153 -0.061 
 
  (0.107)   (0.132) (0.144) (0.091) 
Agreeableness    0.001  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Emotional Stability 
(Ref Low) 
        
    Medium     0.213 0.291*** 0.259** 0.126 
         (0.157) (0.098) (0.115) (0.115) 
    High     0.467*** 0.600*** 0.575*** 0.193* 
         (0.151) (0.080) (0.103) (0.115) 
Sex (female)       -0.217 -0.246** 
 
      (0.136) (0.097) 
Age       0.001 0.001 
 
      (0.008) (0.005) 
Mobility       0.054* 0.013 
 
      (0.032) (0.029) 
Subject       -0.066 -0.030 
 
      (0.126) (0.091) 
University size        0.026*** 
 
       (0.003) 
Technical 
orientation 
       0.294* 
 
       (0.169) 
Reputation        0.070 
 
       (0.088) 
Policy Frame        0.050 
 
       (0.046) 
Regional Situation        0.015 
 
       (0.012) 
Living Quality        -0.144 
        (0.224) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Nr. of clusters 58 73 62 73 58 58 58 58 
Observations 290 208 291 226 292 206 206 191 
Average marginal effects, dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level;  
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Except for Emotional Stability, no leadership trait shows a positive relation to leadership 
emergence. The Chi²-test indicates that all models fit significantly better than an empty model 
with no predictors. Emotional Stability, especially in the high form is positively related on a 
highly significant (Models 5 – 7) and significant (Model 8) level to leadership emergence. 
The Pseudo R² - which has to be if at all interpreted cautiously – shows consequently, the 
highest value for a single trait in Emotional Stability (0.100). Most explanatory power is 
added by including university and environmental factors (Pseudo R²: 0.453). Especially the 
highly significant university size makes sense as the bigger the university, the higher the 
number of potential voters, the higher the probability to be included in the ranking. Thus, 
being a highly emotionally stable president increases the probability to emerge as leader by 
46.7 percentage points (Model 5a) and in the full model by 19.3 percentage points in 
comparison to being a leader without Emotional Stability. If the university size increases by 
one student, the probability to emerge as leader rises by 2.6 percentage points. 
The result for Emotional Stability is in line with previous findings. As in the business context 
within in a meta-study, Emotional Stability is the major driver of job performance regardless 
of job or criteria (Salgado, 1997). A positive perception of the world, trust in self-efficacy and 
self-confidence is essential part in both striving to and becoming a leader (Bono & Judge, 
2004). As the president of a university is the primus inter pares, academics seem to live this 
out: neither Openness to experience, nor Conscientiousness, Extraversion or Agreeableness 
show any effect on leadership emergence. Thus, the process of becoming a professor might 
already select or homogenize the professor population in terms of personality (despite 
differing subjects) that the only differentiation relevant for being perceived as (either good or 
bad) leader can be detected in over self-confident behavior. 
Table 27 shows the results of the tobit estimation for leadership behavior in terms of initiating 
structure (Model 25) and consideration (Model 26) on leadership effectiveness
20
 (combined in 
Models 27) as well as control variables on the presidents’ traits and characteristics (Model 
28), university specificities and environment (Model 29). Marginal effects (at differing data 
points in 25-steps) for initiating structure on leadership effectiveness can be found in Table 28 
and Table 29. Robustness is checked in Attachment 32 by eliminated outliers of consideration, 
Attachment 33 with standard errors clustered at federal states level and Attachment 34 
including the ranking position as dependent variables.
                                                 
20
 Interpreted out of reasons for simplification, more precisely this means here and in the following on the latent 
variable. 
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Table 27: Tobit estimation of leadership behavior on leadership effectiveness. 
VARIABLES (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) 
Initiating structure 0.007**  0.007** 0.009** 0.008* 
 (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Initiating structure² -0.000**  -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Consideration  1.049 0.991 -1.742 -1.842 
  (4.071) (3.605) (4.181) (4.322) 
Openness    0.000 0.001 
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Conscientiousness    -0.008 -0.014** 
    (0.006) (0.007) 
Extraversion    0.097 0.189 
 
   (0.193) (0.170) 
Agreeableness    -0.004** -0.002 
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Emotional Stability    0.178 0.140 
 
   (0.201) (0.176) 
Sex    -0.358 -0.431* 
 
   (0.256) (0.248) 
Age    0.006 0.004 
 
   (0.012) (0.014) 
Mobility    0.022 0.005 
 
   (0.070) (0.066) 
Subject    0.419* 0.322 
 
   (0.232) (0.224) 
University size     -0.099 
 
    (0.139) 
Technical orientation     -0.002 
 
    (0.011) 
Reputation     0.446 
 
    (0.581) 
Policy Frame     0.434 
 
    (0.318) 
Regional Situation     0.025 
 
    (0.049) 
Living Quality     0.709** 
     (0.346) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Constant 2.810*** 3.121*** 2.796*** 2.360*** 2.385** 
 
(0.175) (0.117) (0.193) (0.893) (1.194) 
Nr. of clusters 58 58 58 46 45 
Observations 172 172 172 127 116 
Right-censored 
observations 
70 70 70 54 46 
R² 0.192 0.149 0.193 0.317 0.356 
Prob > Chi² 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses, observations of leadership 
effectiveness censored at value “3” 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28: Marginal effect for initiating structure on leadership effectiveness (Table 27, Model 25). 
Average marginal effects are calculated at representative values of third-party funding for each president with their respective observed values of 
covariates in the variable “initiating structure” and subsequently averaged across all presidents. 
 Low initiating structure Medium initiating structure High initiating structure 
 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 
Marginal effect 0.007** 0.006** 0.005** 0.003* 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003* 0.005** -0.006** -0.007** -0.009** 
Std.err. 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Average marginal effects with cluster-robust standard errors (172 observations, 58 clusters).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 29: Marginal effect for initiating structure on leadership effectiveness (Table 27, Model 29 including all control variables). 
Average marginal effects are calculated at representative values of third-party funding for each president with their respective observed values of all 
covariates and subsequently averaged across all presidents. 
 
 Low initiating structure Medium initiating structure High initiating structure 
 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 
Marginal effect 0.008* 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.004* -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -.0012*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
Std.err. 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Average marginal effects with cluster-robust standard errors (116 observations, 45 clusters).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Initiating structure has a U-shaped relation, which is unexpectedly invers and significant at 
low and high levels of initiating structure. Consideration does not play a role in the present 
evaluation, which might be explained by the professors’ autonomy and missing disciplinary 
power what could make them indifferent. Initiating structure (Model 25) explains 19.2% of 
leadership effectiveness while the full model (Model 29) including all control variables 
explains 35.6% of the variance in leadership effectiveness what comes roughly to the 
explanatory power that is suggested by leadership literature (Derue et al., 2011). However, as 
the consideration model shows also 14.9% of explained variance it stands to reason that a year 
effect seems to be existent. The Chi²-test indicates that all models fit significantly better than 
an empty model with no predictors. 
The inverse U-shaped relation of initiating structure on leadership effectiveness reveals that 
having either a high or low level of initiating structure is considered to be well evaluated by 
the followers while a medium level does not have any impact on leadership effectiveness. As 
the grading scheme is from one to six with one being the best, six being the worst grade, high 
grades are considered negative, low grades are positive. If initiating structure raises by one 
unit in the low initiating structure, the predicted value of leadership effectiveness raises by 
0.007 to 0.003 percentage points which shows effectively to lower follower satisfaction (as 
grades become worse). In the case of high initiating structure, one unit more causes 0.003 to 
0.009 percentage points lowering the value of leadership effectiveness meaning that grades 
become better. The effect size is low but robust, in particular for high initiating structure cases 
it is reasonable to invest in more structures.  
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The moderation by the context in terms of task and ability (Wofford & Liska, 1993) could be 
an explanation for the unexpected invers U-shaped relationship between initiating structure 
and leadership effectiveness. Academics have no clear task description like for example an 
assembly line worker, rather is their task broadly defined by the missions of universities: 
teaching, research and arguably innovation. Thus, this might lead to a paradox situation: On 
the one hand, dominant styles that initiate structure are experienced as beneficial because 
committee work and corresponding satisfaction with having participated in the decision 
process could lead to the need for less bureaucratic and fast decisions and structures at the top. 
On the other hand, the satisfaction with laissez-faire styles could reflect the motivational 
aspect of professors. They are highly intrinsically motivated and prefer to be autonomous in 
their work and working environment. Thus, professors appreciate a low level of structures or 
pressures, and evaluate a tightening of structures negatively. The margins show that the effect 
is especially robust for dominant styles with a high degree of structure initiated when 
controlling for university and environmental variables.  
Another explanation is also a limitation of this empirical study: According to expectations 
about an institution followers select where they want to work, which might possibly introduce 
a follower evaluation and follower selection bias. Even if more than half of the presidents are 
in their first term and the average time in office of German university presidents is around 4 
years (Röbken, 2006b), it could be that the evaluation for entering or becoming president or 
rector of the year is biased towards those with long terms in office as professors have more 
chances to polarize. The application and selection of (potential) employees is corresponding 
to this: For instance, the president of the Technical University in Munich is already in place 
over 20 years and “famous” for a dominant managing style (Becker, 2013). A potential 
employee will only apply and possibly get a job if he complies or even likes the management 
style, which is true also for the laissez-faire side (for example Godehard Ruppert that is 
president since year 2000 at the University of Bamberg (Universität Bamberg, 2018)). 
Considering this thought, it would be interesting for future research to consider a “continuity” 
evaluation of presidents and respective follower satisfaction following the idea of a 
“university Leviathan”.  
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The quality of living also influences leadership effectiveness positively and rather robust. 
Assuming that mostly professors are living and working at the respective university this 
finding could be caused by two underlying rationales: first, there might not only exist an 
effect of locational attractivity for students’ applications (Fabel et al., 2002) but the same 
could hold for university presidents. As university presidents are mostly internally appointed 
and not as mobile as e.g. their American counterparts (Röbken, 2006b), a second explanation 
is contemplable: the attractive environment and connected atmosphere or leisure facilities 
could influence the level of “happiness” as well as who is applying and eventually working at 
the university. On the labor market competition, star scientists have the possibility to be more 
selective, choosing locations that are more attractive and should consequently be happier with 
their job. The environment might influence the general level of contentment of people living 
there as well as of professors. As a side effect, their leadership satisfaction, tolerance or 
simply non-complaints due to distraction possibilities should be influenced positively.  
Despite the explanatory value of the present study, it also has some limitations. Endogeneity 
could be a problem, as one has to ask: are good leaders in the organization because they are 
already performing well? Alternatively, are the organizations performing well because of 
good leaders? A more balanced panel structure would have helped. Although not fully, I rely 
partly on evaluation-based data what could be biased by strategic voting, personal resentments 
and selection bias as only university professors that are DHV members are represented. More 
objective measures that could indicate the “value” of the leader, like his salary, are not 
publicly available in Germany (like for the soccer context used by Lehmann & Schulze, 
2008). The results are not representing those that could be opposing or that might not 
contribute such as other stakeholders that are influenced by and influence decisions (i.e. 
students or administrative staff). However, as professors cannot be overruled by law (Dobbins 
& Knill, 2015; Pasternack & von Wissel, 2010) this can be considered a minor issue. As the 
analysis does not show evidence for consideration but for initiating structure the question 
arises whether the results mean just another brick in the wall of weak and inconsistent 
findings like G. A. Yukl and Yukl (1989, p. 49 ff.) suggest. It should not be claimed that the 
results are applicable universally or generalizable to each and every industry or environment, 
however, for the university context they comprise interesting insights and help to shed light 
on leadership in non-corporate, nontrivial environments.  
 
 
197 
 
The results implicate a somewhat fatalistic and promising perspective on leadership in 
universities: Becoming a recognizable leader depends on leadership traits, especially on being 
emotionally stable. This is reasonable for anyone who becomes a leader with regards to his 
mental health as well as for the followers that want someone who gives them security and 
stability. Personality traits are nothing, which can be trained or changed easily. They are 
determined by genes, experiences, etc. and are not influenceable directly by individuals. If 
one became leader, leadership behavior is much more important. Especially a more 
“technical” and task-oriented leadership style is evaluated well. It is promising that follower 
satisfaction can be improved by the right strategy as the leadership style can be trained and 
taught. 
As being a president, it is advisable to take care about the specific university setting (being 
research, teaching oriented, having followers asking for guidance or wanting to be let alone, 
etc.). Depending on the specific context, follower satisfaction can be increased by either 
investing in structures that help members to fulfill their tasks more easily or by lowering 
assistance. Based on the results and their robustness, a well applicable strategy seems to 
overcome mediocre university structures by investing in more assistance and initiate 
structures.  
As this study is only a first step towards leadership research in universities, further research 
might include testing moderators as they have been found to be important in leadership 
contexts (Avolio et al., 1999; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004; Ng & Sears, 2012). The 
inclusion of other stakeholder groups would be interesting to test for differences in how a 
leader is perceived by differing perspectives. The highly interesting effects of a university 
president’s traits and characteristics for instance on salary are up until now not realizable as 
data is non-transparent in Germany (unlike the US) and only fragmented information exists 
(NachDenkSeiten, 2014). Another promising evaluation could include “control groups” which 
consists of full professors that have never been dean or president themselves to see which 
traits distinguish formal leaders from non-leaders. As a last point an analysis in times of 
university crisis could be included as Weber suggests that charismatic leaders are beneficial in 
those times. However, it could be difficult to define a “crisis” for universities. Overall, 
leadership is an actual topic in particular, within the new governance structures and 
strengthened university management.  
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Chapter four served as examination of the determinants in the Corporate Governance of 
universities. The systematization of the distribution and specificities of German universities in 
the field of tension of teaching and research activities showed that even if German universities 
are not particularly scattered, they do show dependencies: on disciplines like having a medical 
faculty (connected to a sprinkler approach of funding), on location like being located in East 
Germany (connected to a subsidizing disadvantage approach of funding) or on research 
performance (connected to a picking the winner approach). The political level of analysis 
showed that the introduction of a picking the winner approach can have a significant impact 
on the outcomes of universities – even though evaluation measures need to be picked 
thoroughly. University boards and their composition, which are the institutional level of 
analysis, are showing considerable differences according to member selection modes and 
staffing procedures being result of stakeholder interests and power distribution. The last level 
of analysis showed that equally to the formal and institutional design of universities, 
personalities and their way of leading shape the perception of organization members. The 
consideration of the interplay on all levels contribute to an elaborated Corporate Governance 
of universities.  
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5 Conclusion  
The aim of this dissertation was to gain knowledge about the residuals that were shown to be 
eminent in current research. An overview of the questions that were posed in the introduction 
and the answers that were demonstrated throughout the book will be given. 
What are the path dependencies of universities that shape our modern understanding?  
Universities evolved out of the necessity to form interest groups in medieval times. Their 
organizational form had to be approved and supported. However, they were not considered as 
stable or as a traditional part of society as they are considered today. In particular, the 
uncertainty in German states was a stimulus and generated the need to organize lecturers and 
researchers in one institution. Germany, being one of the most influential players in modern 
global history, developed institutions that were shaped by the freedom of the Weimar 
Republic, strong centralization activities during the Nazi time and corresponding 
reconstruction policies after WW II. Centralized initiatives pleased essential requirements of 
higher education and were followed by legislation that allowed democratic reforms. In the 
neoclassical spirit, competitive thinking was introduced but not realized before mechanisms 
of New Public Management were established in Germany. The higher education system today 
is differentiated and traditional at the same time. While most important financing sources are 
still the federal states, attempts to adjust to high performing countries have been implemented 
such as study fees, competitiveness contests and embeddedness in laws.  
How can the performance of universities be influenced beneficially from an external 
governance perspective? 
Employing competitive incentives like the Excellence Initiative initiated a process that was 
not only notable for those winning the contest (Excellence Universities) but for the system as 
a whole. While a bandwagon effect was preliminary demonstrated for quantitative as well as 
qualitative indicators, “winners” were incentivized differently. While their research output 
was significantly rising, their research impact significantly decreased compared to those not 
being selected as an Excellence University. In particular, the effects of the lost quality of the 
“winners against the losers” are robust. It is up for the responsible politicians to decide 
whether this quantitative output maximization should be supported or if a qualitative output 
should be incentivized for winning institutions. Consequently, measures and initiatives in 
place should be adjusted to the – after all – not so inflexible German university system.  
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How can the performance of universities be influenced beneficially from an internal 
management perspective?  
The introduction of university boards and the strengthening of university management are 
also part of the New Public Management reforms that gave more autonomy and more self-
responsibility to universities. The interplay of politics and universities, as well as the 
president’s role, became obvious in the selection of university board members. As soon as 
data is accessible, an empirical analysis of the effects of university boards is recommended. 
The preceding selection process of university leaders (that are corresponding to university 
boards) seems to be triggered upfront by the personal characteristic of emotional stability 
(versus neuroticism). Performance of presidents is influenced by their ability to introduce 
structures that give support and barely by considerable behavior. This restricts the emergence 
as university leader to his (inflexible) traits. For leadership effectiveness, it is encouraging 
that behavior (trainable) of the leader is decisive for follower satisfaction. 
However, one up until now ignored point of the analysis is the scientific background of the 
author herself. How can someone that is part of the university system remain objective 
enough to evaluate it? The validity of the results were tried to be shown by the robustness of 
the presented results, using objective measures and theoretically confronting criticism, which 
is admittedly valid. The results should be interpreted against the subject-specific background 
of the thesis, which is socio-economical. 
Bringing those analyses together one might conclude that the interplay of internal and external 
instruments in the higher education sector can influence performance and satisfaction of those 
that are inside the respective universities. The output of universities is far away from being 
exogenously given. What implications might be derived? The public opinion is shaping the 
modes of action of universities, which is the reason to choose carefully performance 
indicators that are always establishing explicit and implicit expectations. Even if this is 
uncomfortable for many reasons, the responsibility of politicians is thus: to communicate and 
appreciate what is considered beneficial. If the incentive is given to those that are 
quantitatively producing the most (Menter et al., 2018) this should be made transparent and a 
matter of discussion. The internal mechanisms implicate that university professors have a 
preference for being their own “foreman” while they need sophisticated and elaborated 
structures easing their everyday work and the expectations that are brought to their attention. 
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I wanted to show that universities are institutions that are in their function and meaning 
changing as well as changeable. The way they act is endogenous and can be framed 
exogenous according to societal needs. Thus, concluding this research experience, the 
challenge of trying to grasp some answers might be best encapsulated by the words of Bob 
Dylan (1963): “The answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind.” Therefore, the answers that I 
tried to provide within the different parts of my dissertation are temporary stable 
arrangements that are a result and a part of history, endogenously given and at the same time 
reactive to exogenous modifications. 
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VII Attachment 
Attachment 1: List of university profiles according to research quantity (publications/professor) and teaching (graduates/professor). 
Universities with the same profile for research quantity and quality are in bold. 
 1 - STUCK IN THE MIDDLE PROFILE 2 - RESEARCH PROFILE 3 - TEACHING PROFILE 4 - PEAK PROFILE 5 - LOW PROFILE 
     
Darmstadt TU Augsburg U Bonn U Aachen TH Bayreuth U 
Duisburg-Essen U Bamberg U Bremen U Berlin TU Berlin FU 
Freiberg TUBergAk Bielefeld U Düsseldorf U Bochum U Berlin HU 
Giessen U Braunschweig TU Erlangen-Nuremberg U Dresden TU Clausthal TU 
Hamburg-Harburg TU Chemnitz TU Frankfurt am Main U Hohenheim U Cottbus TU 
Hannover U Dortmund TU Freiburg U Jena U Halle-Wittenberg U 
Konstanz U Erfurt U Göttingen U Karlsruhe KIT Ilmenau TU 
Leipzig U Flensburg U Hamburg U Magdeburg U Kaiserslautern TU 
Marburg U Frankfurt (Oder) U Heidelberg U Munich TU Kassel U 
Münster U Greifswald U Kiel U Munich U Cologne U 
Stuttgart U Hildesheim U Lübeck U Regensburg U Lüneburg U 
 
Coblenz-Landau U Mainz U 
 
Osnabrück U 
 
Mannheim U Tübingen U 
 
Paderborn U 
 
Oldenburg U Ulm U 
 
Rostock U 
 
Passau U Würzburg U 
 
Saarbrücken U 
 
Potsdam U 
  
Siegen U 
 
Trier U 
  
Weimar U 
 
Vechta U 
  
Wuppertal U 
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Attachment 2: List of university profiles according to research quantity (citation/publication) and teaching (graduates/professor). 
Universities with the same profile for research quantity and quality are in bold. 
1 - STUCK IN THE MIDDLE PROFILE 2 - RESEARCH PROFILE 3 - TEACHING PROFILE 4 - PEAK PROFILE 5 - LOW PROFILE 
     
Bochum U Aachen TH Bayreuth U Augsburg U Berlin FU 
Darmstadt TU Bamberg U Berlin HU Bielefeld U Bonn U 
Dresden TU Berlin TU Duisburg-Essen U Braunschweig TU Clausthal TU 
Erlangen-Nuremberg U Chemnitz TU Düsseldorf U Bremen U Cottbus TU 
Giessen U Erfurt U Frankfurt am Main U Dortmund TU Freiberg TUBergAk 
Hamburg U Flensburg U Freiburg U Hohenheim U Göttingen U 
Hamburg-Harburg TU Frankfurt (Oder) U Kaiserslautern TU Karlsruhe KIT Halle-Wittenberg U 
Jena U Greifswald U Kiel U Münster U Hannover U 
Leipzig U Hildesheim U Cologne U Oldenburg U Heidelberg U 
Magdeburg U Coblenz-Landau U Konstanz U Regensburg U Ilmenau TU 
Mainz U Mannheim U Lübeck U Stuttgart U Kassel U 
 
Munich TU Marburg U Trier U Lüneburg U 
 
Munich U Saarbrücken U 
 
Osnabrück U 
 
Passau U Tübingen U 
 
Paderborn U 
 
Potsdam U Ulm U 
 
Rostock U 
 
Vechta U Würzburg U 
 
Siegen U 
    
Weimar U 
    
Wuppertal U 
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Attachment 3: List of German Excellence Universities. 
Full name of university Decision 
RWTH Aachen  Okt 07 
Freie Universität Berlin  Okt 07 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität 
Freiburg 
Okt 07 
Universität Göttingen  Okt 07 
Universität Heidelberg Okt 07 
Universität Konstanz Okt 07 
Universität Karlsruhe 
(Technische Hochschule) 
Okt 06 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München 
Okt 06 
Technische Universität München Okt 06 
Source: DFG and Wissenschaftsrat (2007); DFG and Wissenschaftsrat (2006) 
Attachment 4: List of universities with Graduate School and Excellence Cluster. 
Full name of university 
Universität Bielefeld 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn  
Universität Bremen 
Technische Universität Darmstadt  
Technische Universität Dresden 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nuremberg 
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel 
Universität des Saarlandes 
Source: DFG and Wissenschaftsrat (2007); DFG and Wissenschaftsrat (2006) 
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Attachment 5: Request on applications for future concepts. 
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Attachment 6: Correlations Excellence Initiative all universities. 
Number of universities: 73, years 2004-2011. 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
[1] Research Quantity 1.00 
                 
[2] Research Quality 0.59 1.00 
                
[3] 
Excellence 
Universities 
0.48 0.23 1.00 
               
[4] Selected Universities 0.13 0.14 -0.15 1.00 
              
[5] Excellence Initiative 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 
             
[6] Personnel Structure -0.10 0.06 -0.10 -0.11 0.29 1.00 
            
[7] 
International 
Orientation 
0.48 0.44 0.42 0.21 -0.05 -0.06 1.00 
           
[8] Teaching Workload -0.14 -0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.30 1.00 
          
[9] 
Innovation by 
university 
0.18 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.00 0.21 0.13 1.00 
         
[10] 
Dependency on third-
party funds 
0.06 -0.06 0.15 0.06 0.16 -0.55 0.07 0.11 0.21 1.00 
        
[11] Technical orientation 0.25 -0.06 0.14 0.18 0.03 -0.71 0.09 -0.22 0.02 0.57 1.00 
       
[12] 
Undergraduate 
Programs 
0.30 0.37 0.18 0.17 -0.08 0.17 0.36 0.09 -0.02 -0.30 -0.24 1.00 
      
[13] Graduate Programs 0.17 0.30 0.04 0.10 0.42 0.30 0.25 0.06 0.19 0.04 -0.02 0.18 1.00 
     
[14] Hospital 0.63 0.49 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.27 0.47 -0.17 0.11 -0.52 -0.18 0.52 0.19 1.00 
    
[15] TU 0.09 -0.17 0.12 0.09 0.00 -0.64 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.60 0.73 -0.29 -0.09 -0.27 1.00 
   
[16] Regional inequality -0.12 -0.27 -0.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.11 -0.06 0.04 0.07 0.16 1.00 
  
[17] Regional Wealth 0.38 0.41 0.24 0.09 0.21 -0.09 0.48 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.08 -0.51 1.00 
 
[18] Living Quality 0.44 0.33 0.35 0.10 0.06 -0.08 0.53 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.22 0.06 0.19 0.04 -0.29 0.69 1.00 
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Attachment 7: Correlations Excellence Initiative selected and Excellence Universities. 
Number of universities: 19, years 2004-2011. 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
[1] Research Quantity 1.00 
                 
[2] Research Quality -0.09 1.00 
                
[3] 
Excellence 
Universities 
0.52 0.22 1.00 
               
[4] Selected Universities -0.52 -0.22 -1.00 1.00 
              
[5] Excellence Initiative 0.25 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 
             
[6] Personnel Structure -0.14 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.00 
            
[7] 
International 
Orientation 
0.20 -0.31 0.33 -0.33 -0.07 -0.19 1.00 
           
[8] Teaching Workload -0.11 -0.24 -0.22 0.22 -0.10 -0.41 0.38 1.00 
          
[9] 
Innovation by 
university 
0.37 -0.24 0.36 -0.36 0.18 -0.19 0.33 0.28 1.00 
         
[10] 
Dependency on third-
party funds 
0.15 0.03 0.11 -0.11 0.20 -0.63 0.15 0.52 0.21 1.00 
        
[11] Technical orientation 0.35 -0.41 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.75 0.29 0.46 0.32 0.65 1.00 
       
[12] 
Undergraduate 
Programs 
0.01 0.13 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.37 -0.09 -0.35 -0.12 -0.48 -0.51 1.00 
      
[13] Graduate Programs -0.02 0.10 -0.09 0.09 0.50 0.37 0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 1.00 
     
[14] Hospital 0.20 -0.13 0.19 -0.19 0.00 0.51 0.12 -0.54 0.15 -0.80 -0.40 0.44 0.08 1.00 
    
[15] TU 0.19 -0.53 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.57 0.27 0.41 0.44 0.56 0.74 -0.42 0.11 -0.27 1.00 
   
[16] Regional inequality -0.24 -0.35 -0.33 0.33 0.00 -0.13 0.19 0.33 -0.04 0.21 0.19 -0.12 0.20 -0.14 0.50 1.00 
  
[17] Regional Wealth 0.49 -0.10 0.25 -0.25 0.25 -0.25 0.41 0.07 0.21 0.33 0.46 -0.02 0.02 -0.15 0.19 -0.39 1.00 
 
[18] Living Quality 0.41 -0.08 0.25 -0.25 0.04 -0.24 0.51 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.35 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.13 -0.17 0.77 1.00 
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Attachment 8: Test on parallel trend assumption with all universities. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Publications per 
Professor 
Citations per 
Publications 
      
Excellence Universities 2.253*** 8.172*** 
 (0.474) (1.683) 
2005  0.175*** 2.165*** 
 (0.032) (0.352) 
2006  0.467*** 2.631*** 
 (0.053) (0.381) 
2007  0.568*** 2.927*** 
 (0.055) (0.404) 
2008  0.720*** 4.127*** 
 (0.062) (0.373) 
2009  0.794*** 6.077*** 
 (0.073) (0.412) 
2010  0.859*** 7.594*** 
 (0.077) (0.535) 
2011  1.081*** 8.299*** 
 (0.093) (0.480) 
Excellence University#2005  0.114 -0.456 
 (0.108) (1.414) 
Excellence University#2006  0.399** -1.511 
 (0.190) (1.248) 
Excellence University#2007  0.587** -1.218 
 (0.254) (1.399) 
Excellence University#2008  0.543** -1.796 
 (0.250) (1.510) 
Excellence University#2009  0.658** -3.860** 
 (0.261) (1.561) 
Excellence University#2010  0.811*** -4.556*** 
 (0.273) (1.543) 
Excellence University#2011  1.008*** -5.312*** 
 (0.352) (1.678) 
Constant 2.127*** 17.680*** 
 (0.162) (0.891) 
   
Observations 584 584 
R-squared 0.277 0.147 
Test on parallel trend assumption according to Autor (2003); OLS regression 
with robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Attachment 9: Test on parallel trend assumption with selected universities. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Publications per 
Professor 
Citations per 
Publications 
      
Excellence Universities 1.494*** 4.455** 
 (0.498) (1.918) 
2005  0.330*** 1.310*** 
 (0.051) (0.223) 
2006  0.657*** 2.513*** 
 (0.108) (0.445) 
2007  0.762*** 3.266*** 
 (0.113) (0.596) 
2008  0.862*** 4.410*** 
 (0.112) (0.558) 
2009  0.996*** 6.001*** 
 (0.153) (0.993) 
2010  1.063*** 7.874*** 
 (0.138) (0.883) 
2011  1.393*** 8.026*** 
 (0.186) (1.003) 
Excellence University#2005  -0.041 0.399 
 (0.121) (1.471) 
Excellence University#2006  0.209 -1.393 
 (0.222) (1.338) 
Excellence University#2007  0.392 -1.558 
 (0.286) (1.541) 
Excellence University#2008  0.401 -2.079 
 (0.280) (1.650) 
Excellence University#2009  0.455 -3.784** 
 (0.307) (1.881) 
Excellence University#2010  0.607* -4.836*** 
 (0.310) (1.771) 
Excellence University#2011  0.696* -5.039** 
 (0.406) (1.980) 
Constant 2.886*** 21.396*** 
 (0.158) (1.175) 
   
Observations 152 152 
Number of Universities 19 19 
Test on parallel trend assumption according to Autor (2003); Random-effects 
panel regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Attachment 10: Hausman test Excellence Initiative research quantity for all universities. 
Hausman test:  
    
       Coefficients     
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
      
 
  
Excellence Initiative 0.148 0.168 -0.020 0.013 
Excellence Universities 0.432 0.430 0.002 0.005 
Personnel Structure 2.776 2.071 0.705 0.304 
International Students 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Teaching Workload 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.001 
Patents 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Dependency on third-
party funds 
2.078 2.533 -0.455 0.123 
Technical orientation 1.160 1.725 -0.564 0.200 
Regional Wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Living Quality 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
     
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
     chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
= 24.75 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.001 
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Attachment 11: Hausman test Excellence Initiative research quality for all universities. 
Hausman test:  
    
     
  Coefficients     
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
      
 
  
Excellence Initiative 1.552 1.938 -0.386 0.148 
Excellence Universities -2.680 -2.677 -0.002 0.054 
Personnel Structure 33.912 24.308 9.604 3.371 
International Students 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Teaching Workload 0.075 0.071 0.004 0.008 
Patents 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
Dependency on third-
party funds 
5.526 10.151 -4.625 1.405 
Technical orientation 1.539 4.565 -3.026 2.199 
Regional Wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Living Quality 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
     
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
     
chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
= 37.13 
  
Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
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Attachment 12: Hausman test Excellence Initiative research quantity for selected 
universities. 
Hausman test:  
    
     
  Coefficients     
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
      
 
  
Excellence Initiative 0.083 0.099 -0.016 0.016 
Excellence Universities 0.201 0.217 -0.015 0.008 
Personnel Structure 7.366 6.376 0.990 0.439 
International Students 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Teaching Workload 0.047 0.047 0.000 0.001 
Patents 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Dependency on third-
party funds 4.881 4.752 0.129 0.200 
Technical orientation -0.465 0.113 -0.578 0.260 
Regional Wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Living Quality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
     
chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
= 7.71 
  
Prob>chi2 = 0.3589 
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Attachment 13: Hausman test Excellence Initiative research quality for selected 
universities. 
Hausman test:  
    
     
  Coefficients     
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
  
    
Excellence Initiative 2.422 2.751 -0.328 0.205 
Excellence Universities -3.229 -3.112 -0.118 0.102 
Personnel Structure 48.572 37.715 10.858 5.615 
International Students -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Teaching Workload 0.143 0.137 0.006 0.011 
Patents -0.010 -0.009 -0.001 0.002 
Dependency on third-
party funds 14.702 17.869 -3.167 2.459 
Technical orientation -0.285 1.044 -1.328 3.294 
Regional Wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Living Quality 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
     
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
     
chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
= 11.78 
  
Prob>chi2 = 0.1082 
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Attachment 14: Robustness check: OLS estimation of the effect of the Excellence 
Initiative on research quantity for all universities. 
The table reports the results of the ordinary least squares model with cluster-robust standard errors at university 
level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels). The sample 
consists of 73 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (8) and (9) 2005-2011 due to lacking 
data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is research quantity measured by publications per 
professor. The treatment group are the German Excellence Universities, the treatment period ranging from 2007-
2011, the treatment effect is the interaction of treatment group and treatment period. Years were included. 
   (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) 
 VARIABLES Research Quantity 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
-i
n
-
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s Treatment Group 2.423*** 1.165** 1.193** 0.836 0.765* 
 
(0.557) (0.486) (0.535) (0.509) (0.452) 
Treatment Period 1.137*** 1.029*** 0.977*** 0.715** 0.816*** 
 
(0.091) (0.176) (0.239) (0.283) (0.271) 
Treatment Effect 0.551*** 0.444** 0.389*** 0.413*** 0.493** 
 
 
(0.192) (0.186) (0.143) (0.137) (0.199) 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Personnel Structure  -3.386* -3.299* -2.508 -2.444 
 
 (1.762) (1.734) (1.664) (1.705) 
International Students  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teaching Workload  0.005 0.006 0.010 0.008 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Innovation by university  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds 
 7.287*** 6.998*** 7.801*** 7.906*** 
 
 (2.178) (2.421) (2.156) (1.999) 
Technical orientation  1.683 1.871 1.779* 1.624* 
 
 (1.074) (1.146) (0.913) (0.868) 
Undergraduate Programs   -0.001 -0.002  
 
  (0.004) (0.003)  
Graduate Programs   -0.003 -0.000  
 
  (0.004) (0.003)  
Hospital  2.983*** 3.078*** 3.403*** 3.249*** 
 
 (0.269) (0.340) (0.352) (0.290) 
Technical University  -0.548 -0.590 -0.334 -0.281 
 
 (0.399) (0.433) (0.369) (0.341) 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Regional inequality    -0.541* -0.516* 
 
   (0.297) (0.280) 
Regional Wealth    0.000 0.000 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality    0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
 Years included included included included included 
 Constant 2.341*** -1.696*** -1.203*** -1.908*** -2.812*** 
 
 
(0.177) (0.433) (0.406) (0.440) (0.434) 
 Observations 584 584 511 503 569 
 R-squared 0.276 0.701 0.698 0.745 0.745 
 Number of Universities 73 73 73 73 73 
 Ordinary Least Squares estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 15: Robustness check: OLS estimation of the effect of the Excellence 
Initiative on research quality for all universities. 
The table reports the results of the ordinary least squares model with cluster-robust standard errors at university 
level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels). The sample 
consists of 73 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (8) and (9) 2005-2011 due to lacking 
data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is research quality measured by citations per 
publications. The treatment group are the German Excellence Universities, the treatment period ranging from 
2007-2011, the treatment effect is the interaction of treatment group and treatment period. Years were included. 
   (6a) (7a) (8a) (9a) (10a) 
 VARIABLES Research Quality 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
-i
n
-
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s Treatment Group 7.516*** 1.817 1.498 0.714 0.893 
 
(1.773) (2.292) (2.337) (2.665) (2.671) 
Treatment Period 7.977*** 11.226*** 7.884*** 6.306*** 4.379*** 
 
(0.484) (1.364) (1.687) (1.713) (0.741) 
Treatment Effect -2.693*** -2.921*** -2.418** -2.665*** -3.075*** 
 
 
(0.806) (0.990) (0.950) (0.944) (0.851) 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Personnel Structure  -47.472*** -51.884*** -44.863*** -25.925** 
 
 (12.603) (13.253) (12.130) (10.815) 
International Students  0.002*** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 
 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Teaching Workload  -0.075* -0.074 -0.038 -0.016 
 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.053) (0.047) 
Innovation by university  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds  20.743 18.805 28.758* 39.312** 
 
 (14.339) (14.619) (15.456) (15.455) 
Technical orientation  -10.500* -11.437* -10.659** -6.749 
 
 (5.967) (6.072) (4.853) (4.694) 
Undergraduate Programs   0.011 0.008  
 
  (0.022) (0.019)  
Graduate Programs   0.032 0.039*  
 
  (0.023) (0.020)  
Hospital  7.016*** 6.699*** 9.137*** 10.065*** 
 
 (1.873) (2.169) (2.192) (1.944) 
Technical University  -5.380** -5.154* -4.267* -4.745** 
 
 (2.608) (2.722) (2.227) (2.318) 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Regional inequality    -4.581** -4.134** 
 
   (1.857) (1.867) 
Regional Wealth    0.000 0.000* 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality    -0.003 -0.003 
 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
 Years included included included included included 
  17.760*** 33.193*** 36.787*** 28.573*** 17.295*** 
 Constant (0.896) (6.753) (7.134) (7.518) (6.423) 
 Observations 584 584 511 503 569 
 R-squared 0.144 0.498 0.484 0.557 0.518 
 Number of Universities 73 73 73 73 73 
 OLS estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 16: Robustness check: OLS estimation of the effect of the Excellence 
Initiative on research quantity for selected universities. 
The table reports the results of the ordinary least squares model with cluster-robust standard errors at university 
level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels). The sample 
consists of 19 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (8) and (9) 2005-2011 due to lacking 
data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is research quantity measured by publications per 
professor. The treatment group are the German Excellence Universities, reference group are those universities 
that were selected to have additional funding for Graduate School and Excellence Cluster, the treatment period 
ranging from 2007-2011, the treatment effect is the interaction of treatment group and treatment period. Years 
were included. 
   (11a) (12a) (13a) (14a) (15a) 
 VARIABLES Research Quantity 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
-i
n
-
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s Treatment Group 1.550** 1.788*** 1.870** 1.736* 1.743** 
 
(0.583) (0.586) (0.691) (0.854) (0.704) 
Treatment Period 1.507*** 1.632*** 1.738** 1.336 1.002 
 
(0.171) (0.333) (0.635) (0.876) (0.610) 
Treatment Effect 0.454* 0.605** 0.549** 0.599** 0.698** 
 
 
(0.226) (0.245) (0.204) (0.221) (0.263) 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Personnel Structure  -4.105 -1.642 -4.428 -7.142* 
 
 (4.505) (4.242) (3.968) (3.430) 
International Students  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teaching Workload  0.027 0.025 0.048* 0.060** 
 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.025) (0.027) 
Innovation by university  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds  -1.466 -2.060 0.439 -0.246 
 
 (6.106) (6.187) (5.294) (5.283) 
Technical orientation  5.146** 6.130** 3.299 2.587 
 
 (2.379) (2.612) (3.127) (2.665) 
Undergraduate Programs   0.007 0.001  
 
  (0.007) (0.006)  
Graduate Programs   -0.010 -0.012  
 
  (0.014) (0.014)  
Hospital  1.610* 1.321 2.349*** 2.354*** 
 
 (0.796) (0.916) (0.660) (0.485) 
Technical University  -0.697 -0.360 -0.521 -0.714 
 
 (0.756) (0.910) (1.775) (1.555) 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Regional inequality    1.326 1.303 
 
   (2.230) (2.057) 
Regional Wealth    0.000 0.000 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality    0.000 0.000 
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
 Years included included included included included 
  2.860*** 0.329 -0.734 -3.194 -3.028 
 Constant (0.176) (3.421) (3.768) (3.931) (3.504) 
 Observations 152 152 133 129 147 
 R-squared 0.369 0.622 0.640 0.671 0.676 
 OLS estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 17: Robustness check: OLS estimation of the effect of the Excellence 
Initiative on research quality for selected universities. 
The table reports the results of the ordinary least squares model with cluster-robust standard errors at university 
level in parentheses (***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels). The sample 
consists of 19 German public universities observed from 2004-2011 (model (8) and (9) 2005-2011 due to lacking 
data availability for study programs). The dependent variable is research quality measured by citations per 
publications. The treatment group are the German Excellence Universities, reference group are those universities 
that were selected to have additional funding for Graduate School and Excellence Cluster, the treatment period 
ranging from 2007-2011, the treatment effect is the interaction of treatment group and treatment period. Years 
were included. 
   (16a) (17a) (18a) (19a) (20a) 
 VARIABLES Research Quality 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
-i
n
-
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s Treatment Group 4.124** 5.371*** 5.075*** 4.283** 3.951** 
 
(1.927) (1.373) (1.552) (1.564) (1.675) 
Treatment Period 7.121*** 8.396*** 6.259*** 10.271*** 12.883*** 
 
(0.964) (1.412) (1.896) (2.177) (1.504) 
Treatment Effect -3.128*** -2.675** -2.174** -2.229** -2.218* 
 
 
(0.958) (1.130) (0.907) (0.947) (1.070) 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Personnel Structure  -19.396** -30.059** -21.658** -18.888** 
 
 (8.898) (11.579) (7.757) (7.606) 
International Students  -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Teaching Workload  0.045 0.068 -0.034 -0.044 
 
 (0.070) (0.080) (0.056) (0.057) 
Innovation by university  -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Dependency on Third-
Party Funds  8.723 9.311 -5.952 -2.848 
 
 (16.338) (14.041) (9.299) (13.008) 
Technical orientation  -8.291* -11.882** -5.689 -7.308 
 
 (4.738) (5.593) (3.748) (4.981) 
Undergraduate Programs   -0.003 0.016  
 
  (0.016) (0.012)  
Graduate Programs   0.022 0.021  
 
  (0.037) (0.031)  
Hospital  -1.160 -0.569 -5.991*** -4.937** 
 
 (2.385) (2.504) (2.068) (1.799) 
Technical University  -4.975*** -5.034*** -1.564 -1.901 
 
 (1.321) (1.518) (2.063) (2.059) 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Regional inequality    -8.953** -7.023* 
 
   (3.665) (3.482) 
Regional Wealth    -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality    0.008** 0.008** 
 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
 Years included included included included included 
  21.553*** 31.479*** 36.531*** 58.253*** 53.520*** 
 Constant (1.204) (5.778) (6.589) (5.936) (5.684) 
 Observations 152 152 133 129 147 
 R-squared 0.207 0.684 0.694 0.783 0.772 
 OLS estimation with cluster-robust standard errors at university level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 18: Robustness check Excellence Initiative with count data. 
Robustness check with a negative binomial estimation for the dependent variables 
Publications, Citations and Professor. The treatment group are the German Excellence 
Universities, the treatment period ranging from 2007-2011, the treatment effect is the 
interaction of treatment group and treatment period. 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
VARIABLES Publications Citations Professors 
Treatment Group 0.052 0.290 -0.007 
 
(0.219) (0.248) (0.137) 
Treatment Period 0.051*** 0.171*** 0.009 
 
(0.016) (0.024) (0.012) 
Treatment Effect -0.015 -0.178*** -0.000 
 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.016) 
Personnel Structure 2.400*** 3.222*** 0.367** 
 
(0.261) (0.344) (0.183) 
International Students 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teaching Workload 0.002* 0.005*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Innovation by university 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependency on Third-Party 
Funds 
1.336*** 2.088*** 0.102 
 
(0.187) (0.249) (0.138) 
Technical orientation 0.441*** 0.673*** 0.047 
 
(0.125) (0.163) (0.097) 
Hospital 1.642*** 1.755*** 0.665*** 
 
(0.173) (0.170) (0.098) 
Technical University 0.351* 0.857*** 0.046 
 
(0.192) (0.183) (0.122) 
Regional inequality -0.346** -1.189*** 0.071 
 
(0.173) (0.180) (0.111) 
Regional Wealth 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Living Quality 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.912*** -0.278 6.112*** 
 
(0.192) (0.185) (0.268) 
Observations 569 569 569 
Number of Universities 73 73 73 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 19: Robustness check Excellence Initiative with made-up treatment 
including all universities. 
OLS regression with Research Quantity and Research Quality as dependent variables. Treatment group are the 
German Excellence Universities, made-up treatment period is starting from 2010-2011 and treatment effect is the 
interaction of treatment group and period. 
 (d) (e) 
VARIABLES 
Research 
Quantity 
Research 
Quality 
   
Treatment Group 2.636*** 6.698*** 
 
(0.235) (1.126) 
Treatment Period 1.140*** 8.071*** 
 
(0.273) (1.312) 
Treatment Effect 0.526 -3.460 
 
(0.469) (2.251) 
years included included 
   Constant 2.080*** 17.861*** 
 
(0.191) (0.917) 
Observations 584 584 
R-squared 0.276 0.145 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Attachment 20: Robustness check Excellence Initiative with made-up treatment 
including selected universities. 
OLS regression with Research Quantity and Research Quality as dependent variables. Treatment group are the 
German Excellence Universities, reference group are universities that got funding for Graduate Schools and 
Excellence Clusters, made-up treatment period is starting from 2010-2011 and treatment effect is the interaction 
of treatment group and period. 
 (f) (g) 
VARIABLES 
Research 
Quantity 
Research 
Quality 
   Treatment Group 1.730*** 3.053*** 
 
(0.269) (0.869) 
Treatment Period 1.526*** 7.314*** 
 
(0.531) (1.713) 
Treatment Effect 0.416 -3.535** 
 
(0.539) (1.737) 
years included included 
   Constant 2.774*** 22.060*** 
 
(0.353) (1.139) 
Observations 152 152 
R-squared 0.367 0.208 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 21: Pearson Chi² and Fisher's exact for selection mode and management 
decision. 
 
Internal selection Shared selection External selection Total 
     
Internal President 5 11 33 49 
 
4.1 13.1 31.7 49 
     
External President 1 8 13 22 
 
1.9 5.9 14.3 22 
     
Total 6 19 46 71 
 
6 19 46 71 
  
Pearson chi2(2) = 1.8336 Pr = 0.400 
  
Fisher's exact = 0.471 
 
 
Attachment 22: Classification of selection mode. 
With 1 having an internal selection mode, 2 having a shared selection mode and 3 having an 
external selection mode.  
Federal State Selection Mode Veto right 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 3 Yes 
Bavaria 3 Yes 
Berlin 1 Yes 
Brandenburg 3 No 
Bremen . . 
Hamburg 2 Yes 
Hesse 3 Yes 
Lower Saxony 3 Yes 
Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania 1 No 
North Rhine-Westphalia 3 Yes 
Rhineland-Palatinate 2 Yes 
Saarland 3 Yes 
Saxony 2 Yes 
Saxony-Anhalt 1 No 
Schleswig-Holstein 3 Yes 
Thuringia 3 Yes 
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Attachment 23: List of universities with internal and external presidents/rectors in 2012. 
Internal President External President 
Aachen TH Coblenz-Landau U Bayreuth U 
Augsburg U Cologne U Berlin HU 
Bamberg U Konstanz U Chemnitz TU 
Berlin FU Lübeck U Cottbus TU 
Berlin TU Magdeburg U Darmstadt TU 
Bielefeld U Mannheim U Dresden TU 
Bochum U Marburg U Duisburg-Essen U 
Bonn U Munich TU Düsseldorf U 
Braunschweig TU Munich U Erfurt U 
Clausthal TU Münster U Flensburg U 
Dortmund TU Osnabrück U Frankfurt (Oder) U 
Erlangen-Nuremberg U Paderborn U Göttingen U 
Frankfurt am Main U Passau U Hamburg U 
Freiberg TUBergAk Rostock U Kiel U 
Freiburg U Stuttgart U Leipzig U 
Giessen U Trier U Lüneburg U 
Halle-Wittenberg U Tübingen U Mainz U 
Hamburg-Harburg TU Ulm U Oldenburg U 
Hannover U Vechta U Potsdam U 
Heidelberg U Weimar U Regensburg U 
Hildesheim U Wuppertal U Saarbrücken U 
Hohenheim U Würzburg U Siegen U 
Ilmenau TU   
 
Jena U   
 
Kaiserslautern TU   
 
Karlsruhe KIT   
 
Kassel U   
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Attachment 24: Histogram of presidents’ grades. 
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Attachment 25: Correlations presidents. 
Number of universities: 73, number of presidents 93, years 2009-2012.  
  
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
[1] 
Leadership 
emergence 
1.00 
                    
[2] 
Leadership 
effectiveness 
   . 1.00 
                   
[3] 
Leadership 
effectiveness 
(robust) 
   . 0.78 1.00 
                  
F
iv
e-
F
ac
to
rs
 
[4] 
Openness for 
experience 
-0.14 0.02 0.03 1.00 
                 
[5] Conscientiousness 0.12 -0.28 -0.28 0.11 1.00 
                
[6] Extraversion -0.07 0.07 0.12 0.51 0.18 1.00 
               
[7] Agreeableness 0.08 -0.27 -0.23 -0.09 0.59 -0.08 1.00 
              
[8] 
Narcissism 
medium 
0.20 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.07 1.00 
             
[9] Narcissism high 0.29 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.31 1.00 
            
L
ea
d
er
sh
ip
 
B
eh
av
io
r 
[10] 
Initiating 
Structure 
0.49 -0.07 0.06 -0.09 0.21 -0.10 0.17 0.25 0.44 1.00 
           
[11] Consideration -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.18 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 1.00 
          
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
le
v
el
 
[12] Sex -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.13 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 -0.07 1.00 
         
[13] Age -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.14 0.12 -0.12 0.07 -0.19 -0.17 0.00 -0.20 -0.12 1.00 
        
[14] Mobility 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.47 0.05 0.39 -0.21 -0.02 0.15 0.07 0.12 0.23 -0.13 1.00 
       
[15] Subject 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.40 0.01 0.74 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.25 1.00 
      
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
le
v
el
 
[16] University size 0.60 -0.13 0.00 -0.12 0.29 0.00 0.11 0.30 0.41 0.76 -0.07 0.03 -0.10 0.11 0.06 1.00 
     
[17] 
Technical 
orientation 
0.12 0.00 0.04 -0.15 0.13 -0.18 0.34 0.00 0.02 0.35 0.07 -0.15 0.10 -0.12 0.49 0.02 1.00 
    
[18] Reputation 0.21 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.22 -0.17 0.15 0.11 0.27 0.62 0.03 -0.06 -0.12 0.06 0.09 0.30 0.17 1.00 
   
 [19] Policy Frame 0.05 -0.19 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 -0.05 1.00 
  
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
N
U
T
S
-2
 
le
v
el
 [20] Regional situation 0.04 0.06 -0.13 -0.03 -0.13 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.12 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.19 -0.22 1.00 
 
[21] Living Quality 0.21 0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.28 -0.08 0.04 0.16 0.24 0.53 -0.09 -0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.12 0.43 0.16 0.38 0.07 -0.39 1.00 
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Attachment 26: Density of consideration. 
 
 
Attachment 27: Observed values and predicted values for initiating structure (third-
party funds) and leadership effectiveness. 
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Attachment 28: Robustness check conditional marginal effects at mean for leadership 
emergence. 
Marginal effects at the means are calculated by setting the observed values of all covariates to 
their means within the sample. 
VARIABLES (9a) (10a) (11a) (12a) (13a) (14a) (15a) (16a) 
Openness -0.002     -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(0.001)     (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Conscientiousness  0.005    0.009 0.010* -0.001 
  (0.004)    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Extraversion   -0.070   -0.093 -0.189 -0.101 
 
  (0.111)   (0.160) (0.182) (0.151) 
Agreeableness    0.001  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Emotional Stability     0.220 0.303*** 0.280** 0.239 
Medium     (0.161) (0.099) (0.119) (0.215) 
 
    0.483*** 0.629*** 0.625*** 0.341 
High     (0.155) (0.078) (0.100) (0.211) 
Sex       -0.269 -0.407*** 
 
      (0.172) (0.153) 
Age       0.002 0.002 
 
      (0.009) (0.009) 
Mobility       0.066* 0.021 
 
      (0.040) (0.047) 
Subject       -0.081 -0.050 
 
      (0.157) (0.151) 
University size        0.043*** 
 
       (0.006) 
Technical 
orientation        0.486* 
 
       (0.281) 
Reputation        0.115 
 
       (0.148) 
Policy Frame        0.083 
 
       (0.076) 
Regional Situation        0.024 
 
       (0.020) 
Living Quality        -0.239 
        (0.369) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Nr. of clusters 58 73 62 73 58 58 58 58 
Observations 290 208 291 226 292 206 206 191 
Conditional marginal effects at mean, dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level; 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 29: Robustness check probit estimation for leadership emergence. 
VARIABLES (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Openness -0.004     -0.002 -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.003)     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Conscientiousness  0.014    0.022 0.026* -0.003 
  (0.010)    (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) 
Extraversion   -0.181   -0.243 -0.494 -0.225 
 
  (0.285)   (0.409) (0.454) (0.393) 
Agreeableness    0.002  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 
   (0.002)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Emotional Stability     0.589 0.924*** 0.825** 0.683 
Medium     (0.486) (0.298) (0.385) (0.444) 
 
    1.279*** 1.805*** 1.760*** 0.878* 
High     (0.481) (0.295) (0.385) (0.474) 
Sex       -0.721 -1.103** 
 
      (0.458) (0.458) 
Age       0.004 0.000 
 
      (0.023) (0.023) 
Mobility       0.178* 0.022 
 
      (0.097) (0.126) 
Subject       -0.192 -0.024 
 
      (0.420) (0.463) 
University size        0.121*** 
 
       (0.019) 
Technical 
orientation        1.763** 
 
       (0.730) 
Reputation        0.469 
 
       (0.377) 
Policy Frame        0.161 
 
       (0.229) 
Regional Situation        0.061 
 
       (0.056) 
Living Quality        -1.072 
        (0.969) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Constant 0.680*** 0.522** 0.626*** 0.453* -0.281 -0.654** -1.146 -3.525* 
 
(0.169) (0.228) (0.161) (0.235) (0.457) (0.303) (1.358) (1.838) 
Nr. of clusters 58 73 62 73 58 58 58 58 
Observations 290 208 291 226 292 206 206 191 
Pseudo R² 0.036 0.034 0.027 0.024 0.098 0.148 0.176 0.438 
Prob > Chi² 0.002 0.060 0.002 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
256 
 
Attachment 30: Robustness check average marginal effects for leadership emergence 
(Attachment 29). 
Average marginal effects are calculated for each president with their respective observed 
values of covariates and subsequently averaged across all presidents. 
VARIABLES (9a) (10a) (11a) (12a) (13a) (14a) (15a) (16a) 
Openness -0.002     -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001)     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Conscientiousness  0.005    0.007 0.008* -0.001 
  (0.004)    (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Extraversion   -0.068   -0.078 -0.154 -0.049 
 
  (0.107)   (0.131) (0.139) (0.085) 
Agreeableness    0.001  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Emotional Stability     0.211 0.297*** 0.262** 0.157 
Medium     (0.158) (0.097) (0.116) (0.107) 
 
    0.464*** 0.604*** 0.576*** 0.202* 
High     (0.150) (0.079) (0.104) (0.115) 
Sex       -0.224 -0.238** 
 
      (0.138) (0.094) 
Age       0.001 0.000 
 
      (0.007) (0.005) 
Mobility       0.055* 0.005 
 
      (0.030) (0.027) 
Subject       -0.060 -0.005 
 
      (0.131) (0.100) 
University size        0.026*** 
 
       (0.003) 
Technical 
orientation 
       0.381** 
 
       (0.162) 
Reputation        0.101 
 
       (0.083) 
Policy Frame        0.035 
 
       (0.048) 
Regional Situation        0.013 
 
       (0.012) 
Living Quality        -0.232 
        (0.212) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Nr. of clusters 58 73 62 73 58 58 58 58 
Observations 290 208 291 226 292 206 206 191 
Average marginal effects, dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level; 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 31: Robustness check logit for leadership emergence with standard errors 
clustered at federal states level. 
VARIABLES (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Openness -0.007     -0.003 -0.007 -0.000 
 
(0.006)     (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Conscientiousness  0.022    0.037 0.043** -0.004 
  (0.016)    (0.025) (0.021) (0.040) 
Extraversion   -0.290   -0.401 -0.826 -0.525 
 
  (0.460)   (0.502) (0.563) (0.977) 
Agreeableness    0.003  -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 
   (0.004)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Emotional Stability     0.981 1.516** 1.370* 0.999 
Medium     (0.804) (0.625) (0.729) (0.771) 
 
    2.110** 2.978*** 2.937*** 1.537** 
High     (0.906) (0.436) (0.481) (0.730) 
Sex       -1.172* -2.105** 
 
      (0.675) (0.887) 
Age       0.007 0.009 
 
      (0.039) (0.048) 
Mobility       0.290** 0.111 
 
      (0.137) (0.235) 
Subject       -0.355 -0.256 
 
      (0.509) (0.792) 
University size        0.222*** 
 
       (0.036) 
Technical 
orientation        2.516* 
 
       (1.391) 
Reputation        0.597 
 
       (0.814) 
Policy Frame        0.430 
 
       (0.434) 
Regional Situation        0.125 
 
       (0.099) 
Living Quality        -1.235 
        (1.549) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Constant 0.680*** 0.522** 0.626*** 0.453* -0.281 -0.654** -1.146 -3.525* 
 
(0.169) (0.228) (0.161) (0.235) (0.457) (0.303) (1.358) (1.838) 
Nr. of clusters 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Observations 290 208 291 226 292 206 206 191 
Pseudo R² 0.036 0.034 0.027 0.024 0.099 0.148 0.176 0.453 
Prob > Chi² 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 . 
Robust standard errors clustered at federal states level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 32: Robustness check leadership behavior on leadership effectiveness 
without consideration outliers. 
VARIABLES (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
Initiating structure 0.007**  0.007** 0.009** 0.010** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Initiating structure² -0.000**  -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Consideration  1.305 -1.016 -8.381 -14.843 
  (8.403) (7.681) (9.357) (11.058) 
Openness    0.000 0.001 
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Conscientiousness    -0.009 -0.017*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
Extraversion    0.116 0.276* 
 
   (0.184) (0.156) 
Agreeableness    -0.004** -0.002 
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Emotional Stability    0.217 0.211 
 
   (0.204) (0.186) 
Sex    -0.362 -0.470* 
 
   (0.261) (0.245) 
Age    0.005 0.001 
 
   (0.014) (0.017) 
Mobility    0.013 -0.011 
 
   (0.070) (0.061) 
Subject    0.398* 0.327 
 
   (0.230) (0.225) 
University size     -0.048 
 
    (0.135) 
Technical orientation     -0.008 
 
    (0.013) 
Reputation     0.193 
 
    (0.593) 
Policy Frame     0.549* 
 
    (0.308) 
Regional Situation     0.037 
 
    (0.046) 
Living Quality     0.743** 
     (0.301) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Constant 2.806*** 3.127*** 2.812*** 2.475** 2.527* 
 
(0.188) (0.132) (0.199) (1.008) (1.391) 
Nr. of clusters 57 57 57 44 43 
Observations 170 170 170 125 114 
Right-censored 
observations 
69 69 69 53 45 
R² 0.191 0.148 0.191 0.328 0.382 
Prob > Chi² 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses, tobit estimation, observations of 
leadership effectiveness censored at value “3” 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
259 
 
Attachment 33: Robustness check leadership behavior on leadership effectiveness with 
standard errors clustered at federal states level. 
VARIABLES (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) 
Initiating structure 0.007*  0.007* 0.009** 0.008 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Initiating structure² -0.000*  -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Consideration  1.049 0.991 -1.742 -1.842 
  (2.712) (2.839) (4.159) (4.183) 
Openness    0.000 0.001 
 
   (0.002) (0.001) 
Conscientiousness    -0.008* -0.014* 
    (0.004) (0.008) 
Extraversion    0.097 0.189 
 
   (0.295) (0.228) 
Agreeableness    -0.004* -0.002 
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Emotional Stability    0.178 0.140 
 
   (0.178) (0.198) 
Sex    -0.358 -0.431*** 
 
   (0.218) (0.141) 
Age    0.006 0.004 
 
   (0.011) (0.013) 
Mobility    0.419** 0.322 
 
   (0.200) (0.210) 
Subject    0.022 0.005 
 
   (0.047) (0.044) 
University size     -0.099 
 
    (0.128) 
Technical orientation     -0.002 
 
    (0.009) 
Reputation     0.446 
 
    (0.672) 
Policy Frame     0.434 
 
    (0.336) 
Regional Situation     0.025 
 
    (0.041) 
Living Quality     0.709*** 
     (0.269) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Constant 2.810*** 3.121*** 2.796*** 2.360*** 2.385* 
 
(0.125) (0.154) (0.130) (0.839) (1.336) 
Nr. of clusters 16 16 16 15 15 
Observations 172 172 172 127 116 
Right-censored 
observations 
70 70 70 54 46 
R² 0.192 0.149 0.193 0.317 0.356 
Prob > Chi² 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . 
Robust standard errors clustered at federal states level in parentheses, tobit estimation, observations 
of leadership effectiveness censored at value “3” 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Attachment 34: Robustness check leadership behavior on leadership effectiveness with 
ranking position as dependent variable. 
VARIABLES (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) 
Initiating structure 0.146**  0.147** 0.180** 0.153 
 (0.072)  (0.071) (0.079) (0.096) 
Initiating structure² -0.001*  -0.001* -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Consideration  37.502 40.727 2.424 -1.112 
  (94.503) (83.110) (77.695) (79.463) 
Openness    -0.023 0.002 
 
   (0.043) (0.037) 
Conscientiousness    -0.207** -0.353*** 
    (0.102) (0.114) 
Extraversion    4.772 5.689* 
 
   (3.933) (3.282) 
Agreeableness    -0.106*** -0.086** 
 
   (0.040) (0.040) 
Emotional Stability    2.395 1.411 
 
   (3.719) (3.197) 
Sex    -6.152 -9.859* 
 
   (5.392) (5.436) 
Age    0.087 0.066 
 
   (0.249) (0.273) 
Mobility    11.999** 11.305** 
 
   (4.671) (4.630) 
Subject    -0.032 -0.366 
 
   (1.467) (1.355) 
University size     -3.749 
 
    (2.756) 
Technical orientation     0.028 
 
    (0.229) 
Reputation     5.655 
 
    (12.073) 
Policy Frame     13.061** 
 
    (6.550) 
Regional Situation     0.781 
 
    (1.028) 
Living Quality     14.953** 
     (6.483) 
Years incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. 
Constant 17.161*** 23.668*** 16.565*** 11.174 15.229 
 
(3.755) (2.738) (4.232) (17.493) (24.154) 
Nr. of clusters 58 58 58 46 45 
Observations 172 172 172 127 116 
Right-censored 
observations 
96 96 96 71 62 
R² 0.106 0.081 0.105 0.225 0.254 
Prob > Chi² 0.129 0.004 0.191 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level in parentheses, tobit estimation, observations of 
leadership effectiveness censored at value “21” 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
